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Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern 
men’s conduct. Yet very frequently the ‘world images’ that 
have been created by ‘ideas’ have, like switchmen, 
determined the tracks along which action has been pushed 
by the dynamic of interest.1 
        Max Weber 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Max Weber, “The Social Psychology of the World Religions,” in From Max Weber: Essays is Sociology, 
ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge, 1991), 280. 
Abstract 
 
The rise in prominence of transregional security threats has heightened an awareness for 
an interdependent outlook on security threats, often requiring regional solutions to insure 
stability. The Asia Pacific security environment is not exempt from these security threats. 
Strategic challenges such as terrorism, environmental security or nuclear proliferation 
pervade the region and transcend its countries’ borders. Amongst a myriad of regional 
security institutions and dialogues with a focus on the region, the sub-regional security 
dialogue between the European Union (EU) and New Zealand administers an effective 
contribution to stability in South East Asia and the Pacific. This thesis explores the 
volume of the EU and New Zealand security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region. The 
amount of interaction that takes place and the quality of dialogue produced is analysed 
through constructivist and regionalist tenants; the security-focused identities of each 
agency is investigated and compared, in order to elucidate the ‘reality’ of the security-
based consultation. It is argued that continual social and political interaction between the 
EU and New Zealand will formulate a specific security identity and encourage further 
stability and peace in the Asia Pacific region. Thus, the research question can be 
formulated as what volume and form of cooperation exist between the European Union 
and New Zealand on security issues pertaining to the Asia Pacific region, and what 
efforts have been made to maintain, deepen and improve the relationship since 1999? 
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1 Introduction: the New Zealand and the European 
Union Security Dialogue  
Transregional security challenges pervade and threaten the Asia Pacific region, 
endangering neighbouring countries and distant regions. A number of threats including 
terrorism, global warming, illegal arms trade or nuclear proliferation, are challenges that 
transcend borders and infiltrate a majority of governments’ threat perceptions. These 
common security threats warrant the need for regional solutions. Since the end of the 
Cold War perceptions on security have evolved: higher value has been placed on regional 
mechanisms to counter transregional threats, and a growing awareness of cultural 
differences has permeated into official dialogue. A number of initiatives, from a plethora 
of countries and regions, have been instigated to quell looming crises that threaten the 
wellbeing of regions, nations and the individual. Some of these schemes include interfaith 
dialogues, multilateral military exercises, and educational exchanges. Other, more direct 
dialogue takes place between influential states or regions such as the European Union 
(EU), China, Russia or the United States (US). These external agents can contribute to 
peace and stability, or enhance hostilities, depending on their approach and interests in 
the region. One particular locale of the regional security architecture, that has made 
considerable efforts to maintain peace in the region, is the sub-regional security dialogue 
between the EU and New Zealand (NZ). This consultation is characterised by an array of 
formal and informal diplomatic procedures, development cooperation and implicit 
military functions. These areas of collaboration are founded upon the 1999 EU-NZ Joint 
Declaration, which notes a desire “to enhance consultations on bilateral and international 
issues of mutual interest, including on the increasingly important Asia Pacific region and 
the growing role of the European Union.”2 References to security in the Declaration 
provide the pretext for this thesis: to elucidate what areas of security cooperation exist.  
 
                                                 
2 The Europeans Commission’s Delegation to New Zealand, Joint Declaration on relations between the 
European Union and New Zealand, (Strasbourg, 4 May 1999), preamble, http://www.delaus.ec. 
europa.eu/nz/agreements.htm.  
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As more emphasis is put on diplomatic procedures within a regional system, a major 
focus of this investigation will look at the socio-political configuration of an actor’s 
identity and how this identity interacts within a regional or sub-regional system. This 
thesis will take a snapshot of two security identities and assess the interaction that takes 
place within the context of a specific locality. The European Union and New Zealand 
security identities will be analysed through a study of their dialogue mechanisms in the 
Asia Pacific region. Security can not be seen in isolation but is intimately connected with 
a myriad of variables such as social, economic or historical factors. These interests 
combine to produce a specific sub-regional identity. The European Union and New 
Zealand – two entities separated by distance and drawn together by common values – 
possess a unique relationship that can be reinforced by positive and productive security 
dialogue.   
 
1.1 Methodology 
 
This study explores the existing volume (independent variable) of regional security 
dialogue (dependent variable) between the European Union and New Zealand since 1999 
in the Asia Pacific region. Although a considerable amount of scholarly work has been 
published on the EU as a global and normative power,3 little research has been conducted 
on the EU-NZ security relationship, resulting in this study assuming an acute pioneering 
characteristic. The research question can be formulated as what volume and form of 
cooperation exist between the European Union and New Zealand on security issues 
pertaining to the Asia Pacific region, and what efforts have been made to maintain, 
deepen and improve the relationship since 1999? In other words, the volume of 
cooperation (the amount of interaction that takes place) and the form of cooperation (the 
type and quality of interaction that occurs) evident in the EU-NZ security dialogue, will 
                                                 
3Some major authorities with a focus on Asia Pacific include Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, The 
European Union as a Global Actor, (New York: Routledge, 2006)., George Wiessala, Re-orienting the 
Fundamentals, Human Rights and New Connections in EU-Asia Relations (England: Ashgate Pub., 2006)., 
Georg Wiessala, The European Union and Asian Countries (London; New York: Sheffield Academic 
Press, 2002)., Hanns Maull, Gerald Segal, and Jusuf Wanandi, Europe and the Asia Pacific (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1998), 107-34., Jürgen Rüland “The European Union as an Inter-and Trans regional 
Actor: Lessons for Global Governance from Europe’s Relations with Asia,” The National Europe Centre 
research paper no. 13 (2002).  
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be explored by analysing the security cultures that exist and how they interact. Therefore, 
in order to effectively answer the research question the separate security cultures of the 
EU and New Zealand must first be examined. After determining what exists, the 
similarities and differences inherent in the security cultures can be examined; this will 
provide an indication as to what the current level (or quality) of security dialogue is and 
how it can be improved.  
 
The following Figure (1.1) illustrates the logic of the thesis by describing the particular 
sections of the thesis and how they interrelate. Section ‘A’ is the primary area of interest, 
namely the cross-over of EU and New Zealand security cultures in the Asia Pacific 
region. As the diagram clearly demonstrates, the dependent variable (A) is connected to a 
number of similar sections that exert a considerable amount of influence over it. 
Consequently, this thesis will examine the surrounding areas to determine the core 
question, in particular, areas ‘i,’ ‘ii,’ ‘B’ and ‘C’ as these sections are most closely linked 
to section ‘A.’    
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Primary Sections of Interest in the EU-NZ Security Dialogue 
 (i) 
 
  
A B C 
(ii) 
Key 
A: NZ-EU Security Dialogue in the Asia Pacific Region 
B: New Zealand Security Culture in the Asia Pacific Region 
C: EU Security Culture in the Asia Pacific Region 
i:  Asia Pacific Region  
ii: EU-NZ security cooperation outside of the Asia Pacific 
region 
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A number of primary and secondary sources are examined in order to determine the 
existing volume of regional security dialogue between the EU and New Zealand in the 
Asia Pacific region. Primary sources include 10 elite interviews, official documents, 
speeches, and archival material from the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (MFAT). Academic articles, journals and books, including a number of other 
secondary resources, are used to establish a firm context around which the EU-NZ 
security dialogue can be properly examined and to acquire a balanced view of the 
research material. As this study is largely exploratory, there is no need for an exhaustive 
literature review. In its place, secondary material on Asia Pacific security, and New 
Zealand and EU security efforts in the Asia Pacific region, is contextualised and made 
apparent throughout the thesis. It is well understood that biases exist when only a limited 
number of primary sources are examined. However, by using a variety of different 
primary and secondary sources the weight of biases is reduced, although never 
eradicated.  
 
Part of this research is based on qualitative interviews that were conducted with a number 
of officials directly or indirectly involved with security in the Asia Pacific region. The 
officials were chosen by their title and vocation. The interviewees principally consisted 
of European Union officials from the Commission and the Parliament, the Commission’s 
Delegation representatives, European diplomats, New Zealand diplomats, a Non 
Governmental Organisation (NGO) director, New Zealand politicians connected to 
Foreign Affairs and personnel from the New Zealand Ministry of Defence. The 
interviews went from 45 minutes in length to 1 hour and 45 minutes (see Table 1.1); they 
were recorded and transcribed verbatim. The records of the interviews have also been 
retained. While the number of officials interviewed was small, limiting the validity of the 
research, the interviewees provided a valuable and unique source of information. The 
interviews were ‘semi-structured,’ which means a set of questions – reviewed and 
accepted by the University of Canterbury’s Ethics Committee4 - were prepared as suitable 
                                                 
4 Email correspondence with Chair of the Ethics Committee at the University of Canterbury, 21 August 
2006. 
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guidelines for the interviews. The questions were designed to gain an understanding of 
what security-related consultation processes exist and how culture-based processes 
influence their decision-making capacity. Due to the nature of the topic, some preferred  
 
to be off-record (see Table 1.1). This provided for greater flexibility and less sensitivity 
in what was said, but could only be indirectly used in the thesis for contextual purposes. 
In relation to this, all interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality.5 Overall, the 
interviews were seen as a positive process that provided new and challenging information 
that could be used to further enhance the EU-NZ relationship and contribute to a more 
stable environment in the Asia Pacific region.  
 
The researcher has encountered a number of limitations that, for various reasons, have 
altered the original course of the thesis. Access to New Zealand’s MFAT archives that 
pertained to security in the Asia Pacific region and to the EU-NZ security dialogue was 
embargoed. Archives that were available and relevant to the research topic consisted of 
EU-NZ aid related material, which restricted the researcher’s ability to properly analyse 
the EU-NZ security relationship. Other primary documentation relevant to EU and New 
Zealand security in the Asia Pacific region was also very limited. In addition to 
                                                 
5 All interview data is referenced with the date of interview and general location of the interviewee only.  
Table 1.1: Interview Population 
 
Date   Location  Time         On Record  
 
8 November 2006.  *   1 hour   No 
20 November 2006  Brussels   1 hour   Yes 
8 December 2006. Brussels   1 hour 10 minutes Yes 
18 April 2007  Wellington  1 hour 45 minutes Yes** 
18 April 2007   Wellington  45 minutes  Yes 
16 April 2007   Wellington  1 hour   Yes** 
16 April 2007   Wellington  1 hour   Yes 
17 April 2007  Wellington  1 hour   Yes 
19 April 2007  Wellington  1 hour   No 
19 April 2007   Wellington  1 hour   No 
 
 
*   Location concealed at the request for confidentiality 
** The interviewee chose to talk informally after the interview process   
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limitations created by the small number of interviews, the ‘quality’ of the participants can 
be questioned. It could be argued that some practitioners or officials, such as NGO 
representatives or politicians, are not in a direct decision-making capacity and, 
consequently, are not suitable to be interviewed. While this is true to a certain extent, the 
nature of this thesis is exploratory, which aims to discover what exists as its primary 
objective. From this perspective, the interviews were valuable and while not all officials 
interviewed were making the decisions, they certainly contribute to the process. This 
study does not conduct an in-depth analysis of EU Member States’ security initiatives in 
the Asia Pacific region, nor does this thesis explore the economic aspects of the 
relationship. The attention of the thesis is primarily focused on regional security relations 
in South East Asia and the Pacific and not on EU-NZ security relations outside of this 
region.6   
 
It is envisioned that this thesis will produce a viable contribution to a range of academic 
and governmental sectors. From a theoretical perspective, constructivism will be tested 
through the use of empirical data and theoretical adoptions (see Chapter 2). 
Pragmatically, this thesis will contribute to the development of knowledge for decision 
makers in New Zealand, the EU and other regions. More precisely, it is hoped that the 
information revealed through this study will aid in positive and concise policy formation. 
Lastly, it is anticipated that by advancing the field of enquiry in EU-NZ relations, further 
study of dialogue mechanisms can be encouraged.  
 
1.2 Chapter Outline 
 
In connection to the research question, the chapters are divided into separate areas that 
reflect the above methodological system (see Figure 1.1). The second chapter 
(‘Theoretical Framework’) applies constructivist and regionalist theories to the research 
question. This will help to elucidate the research question and define the parameters of 
the topic. This section also questions the idea of what security is and how it is 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that these areas are analysed in this thesis, but only in how this related to the EU-NZ 
security relationship. 
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conceptualised by practitioners and officials who deal with regional security. The third 
chapter (‘Regional Security in the Asia Pacific Region’) provides a succinct overview of 
the current security situation in South East Asia and the Pacific, provides an overview of 
the main regional security institutions and defines how the region perceives security. This 
section limits its description to regional security and explores the cultural values that 
underpin security initiatives and diplomatic practices in the region.7 The fourth chapter 
(‘European Union and New Zealand Security Dialogue in the Asia Pacific’) describes the 
current EU-NZ security dialogue systems. Both direct and indirect avenues are explored 
where the EU and New Zealand cooperate on security issues pertaining to the Asia 
Pacific region. Additionally, chapter 4 illustrates the key socio-political links that form 
the basis of the dialogue, provides empirical data on how practitioners in the field 
perceive the importance of the cooperative relationship, outlines what issues are 
prioritised in the dialogue and what outcomes have resulted from the various consultation 
processes. While providing a succinct overview of the EU-NZ security dialogue in the 
Asia Pacific region, this chapter does not provide an adequate explanation of the 
individual security-related perceptions of the EU and New Zealand. Consequently, the 
following three chapters question the specific security culture of each agency in order to 
form a more sophisticated analysis of the socio-political construction of the dialogue.8 
Chapters 5 and 6 (‘New Zealand’s Security-Identity in the Asia Pacific Region’ and ‘The 
European Union’s Security-Identity in the Asia Pacific Region’) look at the historical 
perceptions, internal politics, concepts of security, geographical perceptions, normative 
values, and capabilities of the EU and New Zealand. In other words, the security cultures 
– made up of a unique selection of socio-political factors – of both parties are analysed.9 
The seventh chapter (‘A Comparative Analysis of the European Union’s and New 
Zealand’s Security Cultures in the Asia Pacific Region’) looks at the EU and New 
Zealand security cultures to determine the current volume of security dialogue and how 
the consultation processes may be enhanced. This is done by examining four areas that 
affect the dialogue, namely definitions of security, geographic perceptions, normative 
                                                 
7 See section (i) in Figure 1.1. 
8 See section ‘A’ and (ii) in Figure 1.1. 
9 See section ‘B’ and ‘C’ of Figure 1.1. In regard to the ‘unique selection of socio-political factors,’ see 
Figure 2.1. 
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interests and capabilities.10 The conclusion outlines the main findings from this thesis and 
provides some ideas for future initiatives based on the research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 See section ‘A’ in Figure 1.1 
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2 Theoretical Framework   
 
Albert Einstein succinctly noted that it “is the theory that decides what can be 
observed.”11 While theoretical frames limit the course of explorative study, they also help 
to define and explain a particular subject area. This chapter describes two primary 
theories, namely constructivism and regionalism. These theoretical approaches will be 
used to help elucidate and discover reasons for the current state of affairs in the EU-NZ 
security relationship. In addition, understanding what security means from a theoretical 
perspective is analysed in order to add depth and further refine the parameters of this 
thesis.  
 
2.1 A Constructivist and Regionalist Approach 
   
       We construct worlds we know in a world we do not.12 
 Nicholas Onuf  
 
The theoretical ideas associated with regionalism and constructivism will be used 
together in order to establish a better understanding of the EU-NZ security dialogue in the 
context of the Asia Pacific region. Constructivism is intertwined with key concepts, such 
as reflectivism, social learning and identity building, while regionalism provides adequate 
parameters within which constructivist tendencies can be sufficiently analysed. A similar 
approach in the study of international relations has been used by Julie Gilson in her 
economic analysis of the biennial Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM).13 Indeed, many of the 
theoretical foundations used in this paper are attributed to Gilson’s conceptual approach 
to inter-regionalism. Other influential scholars in the field of either regionalist or 
constructivist thought include Alexander Wendt, Peter Katzenstein, Jürgen Rüland, 
                                                 
11 Thinkexist.com, “Theory Quotes: Albert Einstein,” http://thinkexist.com/quotations/theory/. 
12 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, World of our making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International 
Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), 38. 
13 Julie Gilson, Asia Meets Europe: Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting (Cheltenham; 
Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Pub., 2002).  
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Friedrich Kratochwil, and Ralf Rollof.14 This paper will also contribute to the theoretical 
field of constructivism and regionalism through the use of new empirical data and 
succinct analysis, which will strengthen its status as an international relations theory. 
Obtaining a precise understanding of what constructivism and regionalism are and how 
they function is imperative to the foundations of this thesis and its theoretical constructs. 
Consequently, the following sections are split into constructivist and regionalist sections. 
 
Constructivism     
The use of constructivism, as the binding theoretical concept for this thesis, will aid in 
determining why security dialogue between New Zealand and the EU exists, how this 
discourse might be maintained and possibly improved in the future. These aims can be 
achieved by examining EU and New Zealand perspectives on security and the volume of 
socialisation involved by conducting interviews with officials and examining other 
primary resources. Constructivism provides a succinct frame within which an analysis of 
dialogue mechanisms can be achieved. Understanding the concepts of constructivism 
provides the researcher with the appropriate tools, and establishes logical parameters, to 
make sense of an otherwise complicated set of phenomena.15  
 
Contra realism, constructivist theory creates an alternative view of international relations 
by questioning the fundamental principles of mainstream political theory. Concepts such 
as anarchy, self-help, the balance of power, the interplay between identity and interest 
and the understanding of power, are all questioned by constructivist thought. The nature 
                                                 
14 See Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2005)., Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, The Return of Culture 
and Identity in IR Theory, Critical Perspectives on World Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1996)., Heiner Hanggi, Jürgen Rüland, and Ralf Roloff, Inter-regionalism and International 
Relations a Stepping Stone to Global Governance? (Oxforshire: Routledge Curzon, 2005)., Jürgen Rüland, 
“Inter-regionalism and the Crisis of Multilateralism: How to Keep the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
Relevant,” European Foreign Affairs Review 11, no. 1 (2006): 45-63., Jürgen Rüland, “Inter- and 
Transregionalism: Remarks on the State of the Art of a New Research Agenda,” National Europe Centre 
Paper no. 35 (2002)., J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, Rethinking Security in East Asia: 
Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004).,  Alexander Wendt, 
Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge Studies in International Relations; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999)., Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics,” International Organisation 46, no. 2 (1992): 391-425. 
15 For a comprehensive discussion on the paradigmatic formulation and application of theory see James N. 
Rosenau, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy (London, New York: Pinter; Nichols, 1980).    
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of constructivism is multifaceted; it covers a diverse range of factors including the 
application of knowledge, identities, culture, ideology, language and discourse.16 This 
paper will focus on what are arguably the two most important factors contributing to 
constructivist theory, namely socialisation and identity formation. Inter-subjectivity and 
subjective notions are connected with these two factors. The former equates to social 
interaction between people as opposed to subjectivity, which refers to a cognitive process 
that is internally manifested. Although specific definitions can vary, this paper will 
assume that constructivism is a conceptual framework, within which an analysis of the 
cognitive nature of agencies and their identities formulate an explanation of international 
processes. In other words, constructivism posits that common ideals, established through 
social learning, will construct decision makers’ ideas and interests.17 Unlike the realist 
paradigm – which holds that material forces and nature are the major determinants in 
defining ideas and interests – constructivism assumes reflectivist tendencies which are 
involved with understanding the subjective nature of agents.18 Analysing the EU and 
New Zealand through a constructivist lens attempts to divert away from the idea of 
‘actorness’ and move closer to viewing the parties in how they are “thought to relate to 
the world system.”19 Constructivism does not deny all neorealist or neoliberal concepts, 
but redefines the way these concepts are understood and illuminates factors sidelined by 
rationalists. By analysing the ‘process’ rather than the ‘structural system’ a different 
conceptual frame is formed.20 Wendt clearly expresses this sentiment as, “we are what we 
are by how we interact rather than being what we are regardless of how we interact.”21 
This clearly demonstrates the flexible nature of identities and the construction of 
perceived reality that contribute to a process that constructivism attempts to explain.    
 
                                                 
16 Ted Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security 23, 
no. 1 (1998): 177.  
17 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 1. 
18 See John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International 
Relations (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 242-5. 
19 Ben Rosamond, “The EU Model of Governance in World Politics,” European Foreign Affairs Review 10, 
no. 4 (2005): 478. NB: This quote is specifically centred on the EU and not New Zealand.  
20 Baylis and Smith, The Globalisation of World Politics : An Introduction to International Relations, 5. 
Also see Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 181.  
21 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 393-4. 
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The specific identity formula that international actors possess at a given point in time will 
affect relationships and, consequently, the decisions they make (see Figure 1.1).22 A 
particular identity formulation is influenced by subjectivity, which explores the concept 
of how the social theories we create in order to understand the international system 
actually construct the social world in which we live.23 This cognitive aspect creates 
perceptions, which in turn contributes to forming particular identities. Unlike realism, 
which defines its interest in terms of power balancing, the subjective nature of 
constructivism argues that states define their interest through what they perceive. In other 
words, if a state sees itself as contributing toward a ‘balanced paradigm’– a realist 
concept – the decisions the corresponding states make will be directly conditioned by 
their particular understanding of how the international system works. Subsequently, this 
perception will also shape their identity as an international actor. For example, if New 
Zealand decision makers accept the so called ‘small state theory,’24 either sub-
consciously or consciously the decisions and actions they take will be determined by this 
perceived reality. This fundamental aspect is explained by Smith as:  
 
 [i]dentities and interests that rationalists take as given and which they see as resulting in 
the international politics we observe are not in fact given but are things we have created. 
Having created them we could create them otherwise; it would be difficult because we 
have all internalised the ‘way the world is,’ but we could make it otherwise.25  
 
Consequently, we find that power is not only found in materialism but also in ideas.26 
Unlike realism, which brackets the notion that ideas affect foreign policy, this study 
posits that ideas, norms, values and identities influence actors’ perceived reality, and 
consequently, the decisions they make.  
                                                 
22 The ‘Socio-Cultural Milieu’ depicted in Figure 2.1 contains a variety of examples that combine to create 
specific identities at a given point in time. See also Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International 
Relations Theory,”187.  
23 Reflectivist theory is a major subjective component to constructivism. Reflexism explores the concept of 
how the social theories we create in order to understand the international system actually construct the 
social world in which we live. See Baylis and Smith, The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction 
to International Relations, 227.  
24 See Richard Kennaway and John T. Henderson, Beyond New Zealand (Auckland, New Zealand: 
Longman Paul, 1991), 3-17. 
25 Smith and Baylis, The Globalisation of World Politics : An Introduction to International Relations, 244.    
26 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 177. 
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Social learning lies at the heart of constructivist theory; it is through a process of 
cognitive exchange that common ideas can be forged and stability produced. Gilson 
argues that the “process of interaction itself has the potential to affect both the nature and 
constituents of that interaction”,27 which can be both cognitive and physical. However, 
there are certain limits to the amount of cooperation, which is directly related to the 
different actors’ identities and past socialisation. Other intervening variables also affect 
the volume of socialisation such as time constraints, choice of venue, frequency of 
meetings or influences stemming from the international environment (see ‘Intervening 
Variables’ Figure 2.1).28 Despite these variables, continual interaction between different 
states or regions will construct a (sub) regional identity, which in turn creates stability 
and enhances the prospects for continual dialogue.29 Consequently, it is through social 
learning that a separate identity is forged, contributing to the deepening of a particular 
relationship.30  
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the process of when two agencies, with separate socio-cultural 
factors, interact with one another and how the process of socialisation can encourage 
common interests. ‘Agency A’ represents the EU and ‘Agency B’ represents New 
Zealand. Both of these agencies have a unique identity, made up of a collection of socio-
cultural and socio-political identity markers (socio-cultural milieu). The exact nature of 
these identities, at one point in time, is determined by the weight of importance or 
priority each individual identity marker has in a particular setting. When these separate 
identities interact with one another (inter-subjectivity) differences and similarities are 
exposed. During continual interaction a separate sub-regional identity is created and re-
created over time, which can reduce distrust and enhance similarities. As already noted, 
the separate identities of the EU and New Zealand will be explored in greater detail in 
chapters 5 and 6 respectively, while chapter 7 will look at the interaction that takes place 
during the EU-NZ security dialogue. 
                                                 
27 Gilson, Asia Meets Europe, Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting, 15.  
28 Mario Telò, Europe, a civilian power? European Union, global governance, world order (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 128. 
29 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 188-9.  
30 See Figure 2.2, which demonstrate how socialisation contributes to regional identity. 
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Figure 2.1:  Constructivist process to be applied to the European Union 
and New Zealand sub-regional dialogue  
 
Constructivism analyses the subjective understanding of actors in an inter-subjective 
environment. Through the construction of identities, socialisation between agencies takes 
place, which is limited or enhanced by perceptions.31 These perceptions create parameters 
in which the mind operates and creates its own reality; outside of these parameters lies 
ultimate truth. We, therefore, live in a world of ambiguous and illusory constructs which 
we endeavour to make sense of, while the ultimate truth continues to be untouched.32 By 
analysing the perceptions actors have, a theoretical framework can be formed and further 
strengthened by regionalism.      
                                                 
31 Perceptions, in this case, can also be related to what actors prioritise within their ‘socio-cultural milieu:’ 
see Figure 2.1.  
32 This concept can be traced to the works of Plato, who stated in his ‘simile of the cave’ that “the capacity 
for knowledge is innate in each man’s mind, and that the organ by which he learns is like an eye which 
cannot be turned from the darkness.” Desmond Lee, trans., The Republic (London, England: Penguin 
Books, 2003), 245. 
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Regionalism   
As a theoretical concept the idea of regionalism, or more accurately ‘new-regionalism,’ 
questions traditional understandings of international relations theory.33 Instead of looking 
at the international spectrum as a system made up of independent states in an atmosphere 
of anarchy and self-help, regionalism places less emphasis on borders and greater 
importance on the interdependent nature of states.34 It is expedient to adopt regionalism 
as a conceptual tool because it provides an avenue of insight and clarity into the 
complexities involved in international relations. Regionalism simplifies the field of 
enquiry and establishes firm parameters within which an analysis can be formed. 
Furthermore, by understanding how regions are formed and how they operate provides a 
valuable insight into the sub-regional and regional relationships shared by the EU and 
New Zealand. This thesis will examine the security relationship present in regional fora, 
such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or the Association of South East 
Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF), and sub-regional relationships, such as the 
biannual high level meetings between the EU Troika and NZ officials. This study will 
adopt a regionalist perspective, which will help define and elucidate regional and state 
interaction in the international system.  
  
It is assumed in this thesis that a region exists of “socially created entities that take on 
meaning and importance because states [usually] perceive themselves as cohabiting a 
common area and sharing a common future.”35 It should be noted that the above insertion 
deviates from the original meaning of the quote because the assumption that regional 
interaction is confined to geographical proximities is invalid. This study supports an 
understanding that regionalism and globalisation reduces the importance of geo-politics 
in an international system. For example, a heightened focus on non-conventional security 
                                                 
33 Rüland, “Inter-regionalism and the Crisis of Multilaterlism,”46. Also see Telò, Europe, a civilian power? 
European Union, global governance, world order, 127. NB: ‘New Regionalism’ is associated with the 
emerging multilateral systems in Asia (the term regionalism and ‘new regionalism’ will be used 
synonymously throughout this thesis).  
34 Hanggi, Rüland and Roloff, Inter-regionalism and International Relations a Stepping Stone to Global 
Governance? 277. 
35 David Lake and Patrick Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park, 
Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 11-12. For a deeper look into the different concepts of a 
region see William R. Thompson, “The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional 
Inventory,” International Studies Quarterly 17, no. 1 (1973): 89-117. 
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issues creates interdependence between countries of no particular geo-political proximity. 
This is most obvious in an inter-regional security institution known as the ARF, which 
has Canadian, European and New Zealand membership. Gilson limits her analyses to a 
‘region to region’36 basis (inter-regionalism), discounting other variables such as a 
‘region to state’ (sub-regional) interaction. This thesis does not discredit Gilson’s 
theoretical framework, but builds on her approach to inter-regionalism by developing a 
sub-regional analysis. Regions must also be understood as dynamic entities that change in 
function or form depending on how actors “view themselves and each other within…the 
process of interaction”37 amongst a plethora of other international mechanisms that fit 
outside the regional frame.  
 
Similar to the diverse definitions surrounding regions, understanding the meaning of 
regionalism can also be puzzling.38 Most scholars have adopted a form of ‘defensive 
regionalisation,’ which posits region-building as a product of or a reaction to 
globalisation.39 However, Gilson effectively uses inter-regionalism as a theoretical tool to 
aid in understanding the relations between the EU and the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), albeit from an economic perspective. Gilson surpasses the 
mainstream assumptions associated with regionalism by analysing the social dimensions 
within regions as a precondition to region-building. Consequently, a constructivist 
typology is applied to an inter-regional framework, which adds depth to the field of 
enquiry. Using constructivist thought, regionalism can be defined as “a way to build and 
solidify regional collective identities.”40  
 
                                                 
36 Gilson, Asia Meets Europe, Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting, 19.  
37 Ibid, 11. 
38 NB: This should not be confused with regionalisation, which is a ‘bottom up’ process concerned with 
non-State actors. For more on the definition of regionalism or regionalisation see: Hanggi, Rüland and 
Roloff, Inter-regionalism and International Relations a Stepping Stone to Global Governance? 4.   
39 Ibid, 6-7. Other major authorities who have used inter-regionalism as an international relations theory, 
with a special focus on the ASEAN-EU dialogue include, Bernhard Dahm and Wolfgang Harbrecht, 
ASEAN und die europäische Gemeinschaft: Partner, Probleme, Perspektiven (Hamburg: Deutsches 
Übersee-Institut, 1988)., Barbara Dreis-Lampen, ASEAN und die Europäische Union: Bestandsaufnahme 
und Neubewertung der inter-regionalism Beziehungen (Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde, 1998)., 
Christopher M. Dent, The European Union and East Asia: An Economic Relationship (London: Routledge 
1999)., Gilson, Asia Meets Europe, Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting. 
40 Hanggi, Rüland, and Roloff, Inter-regionalism and International Relations a Stepping Stone to Global 
Governance? 219. 
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Through social interaction within regional fora it is presumed that a separate, regional 
identity is formed (see Figure 2.2). Gilson argues that regional “institutions may establish 
mechanisms for interaction through which participants define and redefine their own 
identities.”41 Thus it is through a process of interaction in a confined arena, such as 
regional institutions, that identities can evolve. However, the amount of interaction is also 
determined by the weight of importance that is given to the identity formation. For 
example, if an actor decides to focus on one particular identity marker within a socio-
cultural milieu the amount of socialisation and depth of an attainable regional identity 
may be severely diminished depending on the corresponding agencies’ perceptions.42 The 
manufactured perception(s) or identity of an actor will affect their actions and decisions: 
if an actor accepts multiple identity markers within the socio-cultural milieu, there is a 
higher probability that greater connections can be made between the two agencies, 
increasing the potential for an improved dialogue. Furthermore, identity formation is not 
limited to interaction within a region but is also formed from past experiences, domestic 
concerns and history, which also shape and form identities (see Figure 2.1).43 For this 
reason, this thesis will also examine the formation of identities and the historic pursuit of 
security relations in order to grasp a deeper understanding of the current perceived 
identities of each international actor.   
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the process of continual interaction between New Zealand and the 
EU. Through socialisation (see box i), identities are conditioned by a process of social 
learning and knowledge-sharing (see box ii). This can be influenced by external 
authorities such as epistemic communities or other regional security institutions. These 
processes contribute to the formation of a sub-regional security-identity (see box iii.a) 
and will continually evolve as new information and altered individual identities are 
inserted into the equation. Consequently, the decisions that are made, within the dialogue 
                                                 
41 Gilson, Asia Meets Europe, Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting, 17. From Peter Katzenstein, 
The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1996), 17. And Jeffrey T. Checkel, “Social Construction and Integration,” Journal of European 
Public Policy 6, no. 4 (1999): 545. 
42 For more on the positive and negative aspects of multiple identities see Amartya Sen, Identity and 
Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (London: Allen Lane, 2006), 175-6. Also see Figure 2.1: an identity 
marker can be any particular factor, such as language, that helps to define an identity.  
43 Smith and Baylis, The Globalisation of World Politics : An Introduction to International Relations, 245.  
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system, will be influenced from the collective interest formed through the sub-regional 
security-identity (see box iv). 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Flow Chart of Constructivist processes within a Regional 
System  
 
This thesis wrestles with the idea of collective interests being formed from a regional 
identity. The ultimate expression of constructivism would likely entail decisions being 
made from the formation of collective interests as apposed to self interest. Proving the 
socio-political impetus behind decision-making is problematic. However, this study 
attempts to elucidate the connection between inter-subjectivity and collective interests by 
analysing the identities of the EU and New Zealand within a sub-regional system. This 
will contribute to a part of the solution, but does not attempt to make a direct link 
between collective interest and decision making, which is essentially the next theoretical 
step.  
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Regionalism not only provides an appropriate lens into the EU-NZ security dialogue in 
the Asia Pacific, but it is also in itself a theoretical tool, which contributes to 
understanding the evolving nature of the EU and NZ security relationship. Regional 
security institutions also act as social forums where political elites can transfer ideas and 
knowledge, contributing to stable and evolving multilateral fora. Indeed, this is not 
dissimilar to the theoretical concepts associated with constructivism.   
 
Constructivist and Regionalist Theory  
Constructivism combined with regionalism reinforces the notion that interdependent 
states will cooperate together to form common ideas, which in turn produces stability.44 
Although constructivism will often portray interdependence in a positive light, it also has 
the ability to form a negative construct. Depending on the identity formation of a 
particular agent, the socialisation process can highlight the differences apparent between 
the two agencies, which can create an environment of distrust and animosity.45 
Regionalism and inter-subjective dynamics between actors create an environment of 
interdependence. This can equate to “vulnerability and the risk of being ‘the sucker,’ 
which, if exploited, will become a source of conflict rather than cooperation.”46 However, 
constructivism combined with regionalism limits the effect of the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’ – 
a hypothetical ‘zero-sum’ game – by advocating that social networks reduce distrust. 
However, this is dependent on a number of variables. It is vital for the future wellbeing of 
states to maintain a long-term perspective and collective identity with other states, as this 
reduces uncertainty. Thus, regional orders not only provide a social forum but also create 
an atmosphere of insurance against the negative outcome of the prisoners’ dilemma. This 
concept is reflected in Ted Hopf’s account of constructivism where he mentions that 
constructivism makes uncertainty a variable to understand, rather than a constant to 
                                                 
44 See Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 178. For an in depth 
discussion on social learning and the relationship between power and knowledge see Ernst B. Haas, When 
Knowledge Is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations, Studies in International 
Political Economy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 587. Also see Figure 2.2. 
45 Rüland, “Inter-regionalism and the Crisis of Multilateralism: How to Keep the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) Relevant,” 47.  
46 Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” 416. Also see 
Gilson, Asia Meets Europe, Inter-Regionalism and the Asia-Europe Meeting, p.15. 
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assume.47 This social construct changes the way a problem is considered, which in some 
instances can change the problem itself. With this in mind, by combining constructivist 
notions with regionalism, understanding how a segment of the international system 
functions becomes more transparent and reduces the vulnerability of being a ‘sucker.’ 
This paper argues that regional institutions heighten the potential for increased social 
learning, which reduces the importance of realist notions such as  ‘systems’ or geo-
politics within the structure of the international system. Furthermore, constructivist 
theory combined with regionalist ideas also heightens the effect collective cogitation has 
in determining how regions and inter-regional institutions evolve. Perhaps this is why 
Hopf boldly stated that “the inter-subjective structure is the final arbiter of meaning.”48 
 
2.2 Defining Security 
 
Defining what security threats mean for EU and New Zealand officials and understanding 
the theoretical nature of security is essential for a succinct analysis to be undertaken. The 
word ‘security’ is a term so often heard that it has become desensitised and hard to 
define. When we talk about security, what do we mean? Entering into the scholarly 
debate about ‘widening’ or ‘narrowing’ creates a conceptual lens through which a 
transpicuous concept of security can be formed.  Traditional theorists adhere to the 
narrow view, which encompasses a realist understanding of security. The narrow 
perspective will often place military conflict or political authority as the epicentre of 
security conceptualisation. Ole Wæver defines traditionalist theory as the “phenomenon 
of war and…‘the study of threat, use, and control of military force.’”49 Major scholarly 
authorities who adhere to this perspective include Colin Gray, Richard Lebow and John 
Chipman.50 On the other side of the spectrum, scholars such as Barry Buzan, Richard 
                                                 
47 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 188. 
48 Ibid, 175. 
49 Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, Colo.: 
Lynne Rienner Pub., 1998), 1-5. 
50 Colin S. Gray, “New Directions for Strategic Studies: How Can Theory Help Practice?” Security Studies 
1, no. 4 (1992): 610-635., John Chipman, “The future of strategic Studies: Beyond Grand Strategy,” 
Survival 34, no. 1 (1992): 109-131., Richard N. Lebow, “Interdisciplinary Research and Future of Peace 
and Security Studies,” Political Psychology 9, no. 3 (1988): 507-543. In Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 3.   
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Ullman, Egbert Jahn, Pierre Lemaitre or Weaver hold that a wider understanding of 
security should be conceptualized, particularly since the fall of the Soviet Union.51  
 
The idea of ‘widening’ was introduced in the 1970s and 1980s when economic, 
environmental and identity issues, coupled with an increase in transnational crime, 
emphasised the need to redefine security.52 A vast number of articles and books were 
introduced in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which held that a wider perspective on 
security was needed. Indeed, Helene Sjursen stated that “security is something other than, 
or something in addition to, military force.”53 Traditionalists fought back, arguing that the 
political and intellectual significance of attaching the word ‘security’ to other policy areas 
would be damaging by stating that widening “elevates security into a kind of universal 
good thing”54 by diluting its original importance.  
 
This thesis will define security as wide: it accepts that non-conventional security 
concerns are active in the international arena, while also maintaining that military force 
has a role to play. In addition to a wide conception of security, a constructivist approach 
will also be applied. ‘Widening’ weakens the meaning of security because it accepts all 
phenomena as security, creating a perplexing construct. In order to remedy this problem a 
concept entitled ‘interchangeable precedence’ will be adopted. This re-conceptualises 
how one looks at security by positing that while a wide range of issues may be labelled a 
‘security problem’, the security issues are, nevertheless, confined to the perception of the 
political actors within a decision-making body. In other words, security issues will fall 
and rise in prominence depending on the political situation in a confined timeframe. This 
means, for example, military force or environmental security are only as important as the 
                                                 
51 The sudden failure of communism and its repercussions in the international system has been hard for 
realists to convincingly explain, exposing room for other theories to become more established. Richard 
Ullman, “Redefining Security,” International Security 8, no. 1 (1983): 129-153., Jahn Egbert, Pierre 
Lemaitre, and Ole Weaver, “Concepts of Security: Problem of Research on Non-Military Aspects,” 
Copenhagen Papers no. 1 (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 1987). In Buzan, Wæver, 
and Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 2.    
52 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 1-5.  
53 Frédéric Charillon, “The EU as a Security Regime,” European Foreign Affairs Review 10, no. 4 (2005): 
523. 
54 Daniel Deudney, “The Case Against Linking Enviromental Degredation and National Security,” 
Millennium 19, no. 3 (1990): 441-473. In Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security : A New Framework for 
Analysis, 4. 
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social or political climate that they exist in. Indeed, this sentiment reflects Jörn Dosch’s 
conceptualisation of security, which states that “[s]ecurity is not the product of any 
predictable rules, [but] depends on individual threat perceptions, differs greatly according 
to an actor's status and position within the international system and, most importantly, is 
subject to interpretation.” 55 It is vital to maintain an approach to the definition of security 
that recognises security issues as dynamic entities.  
 
Security concerns will change in precedence depending on an assortment of variables, 
which frequently relate to the application of knowledge and technology. It is widely 
understood by constructivists that, through the application of knowledge and technology, 
epistemic communities are able to communicate and influence decision makers in 
regional fora or states; perspectives change through understanding (see Figure 2.2). 
Perhaps this is why Hopf stated: “choices are rigorously constrained by the webs of 
understanding of the practice, identities, and interests of other actors that prevail in 
particular historical contexts.”56 However, the way knowledge is exercised by actors is 
determined by the application of wisdom.57 An example of how security concepts have 
interchangeable precedence can be observed by analysing the security culture of the Cold 
War in comparison to contemporary security concerns. The Cold War was characterised 
by a ‘balance of powers,’ prioritising military force as a major security concern. 
However, the current security culture is more complex; globalisation, interdependence 
and changing perspectives from an increase in ‘knowledge’ mean economic security, 
human security or even environmental security will sometimes take precedence over 
military-focused threat perceptions. This does not mean other security issues are of no 
concern, only that the political ‘opportunity cost’ of security issues will determine how 
actors prioritise and decide on the most pressing security issue in a particular political 
environment. This line of thought is most closely reflected in Frédéric Charillon’s 
statement: “[i]n a world characterized by interdependence and exchange, the building of a 
                                                 
55 Jörn Dosch, “Changing Security Cultures in Europe and South East Asia: Implications for Inter-
Regionalism,” Asia Europe Journal 1, no. 4 (2003): 483. This is not dissimilar to Buzan’s security 
conceptualisation, ‘conditions of existence.’ See Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security”, 
International Affairs 67, no. 3 (1991): 433. 
56 Hopf, “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” 177. 
57 See Peter M. Haas, “When Does Power Listen to Truth? A Constructivist Approach to the Policy 
Process," Journal of European Public Policy 11, no. 4 (2004): 569-92.  
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secure regional milieu in a safe international system has become more important than the 
control of new territories and resources.”58 Thus, in contemporary security relations, 
more emphasis is put on non-conventional security concerns, while traditional aspects of 
security have taken a step back.  
 
Interchangeable precedence is also dependent on actual or perceived capabilities. The old 
saying, “if the only instrument you have is a hammer all your problems start looking like 
a nail”59 is a relevant analogy for analysing the capability structures of regional or state 
security. If a region adopts a wide view of security, a greater number of instruments are 
needed to fulfil the requirements that non-conventional security issues create. This will 
give international security cultures greater flexibility in assessing security risks and 
threats. Conversely, the instruments needed may also create a negative response from 
actors due to limited financial or institutional resources. In other words, a wide view of 
security fosters complexity and increases the potential of limited civilian or military 
capabilities, often referred to as the ‘capabilities-expectations gap.’60 However, in 
realising the capabilities-expectations gap and the increasing complexity of non-
conventional security, regional groups or states – who share a similar concept of security 
– will intensify cooperation to manage contemporary security environments. The 
increasing complexity of transnational security will limit any alternative, other than 
cooperation, to maintain international stability.     
 
Although a definition of security has been established, identifying the security 
conceptualisations that regions and nations hold is equally significant. Through 
establishing a succinct understanding of the nature of security, this study can confidently 
analyse the various definitions of security other agents have and how their definitions 
                                                 
58 Charillon, “The EU as a Security Regime,” 522. 
59 Steven Everts and Gary Schmitt, “Is military power still the key to international security?” NATO Review 
(Winter 2002): 17.  
60See Bretherton and Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 206. See also Jolyon Howorth, 
“From Security to Defense: The evolution of the CFSP,” in International Relations and the European 
Union, ed. Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 179-
204. 
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affect the international process.61 From a constructivist perspective, how states and 
regions define security will have implications on the depth of cooperation. For example, 
the EU and ASEAN held “[c]onflicting views on non-traditional security issues… 
[which] had been the most serious intervening variable in Europe-East Asia relations 
throughout the 1990s.”62 This illustrates the potency of ideas and how they can enhance 
or inhibit relations within and between regions and nations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 A personal definition of security means one can analyse other definitions with greater accuracy, while at 
the same time being aware one’s own bias.  
62 Dosch, “Changing Security Cultures in Europe and South East Asia: Implications for Inter-Regionalism,” 
485.  
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3 Regional Security in the Asia Pacific Region 
 
Drug trafficking, transnational crime, nuclear proliferation, illegal arms trade and 
immigration are major security concerns threatening the Asia Pacific region.63 These 
security challenges combined with poor governance, high levels of corruption, inadequate 
education and low living standards have established an increasingly unstable 
environment, encouraging serious inter-state conflict and possible terrorist activities. 
Analysing the Asia Pacific security culture through the lenses of constructivism and 
regionalism reveals a complex network of perspectives from which a specific security-
identity is formed.64 The EU and New Zealand participate in a number of security 
institutions within the Asia Pacific region through formal and informal avenues. The way 
these regional institutions in the Asia Pacific perceive security must be taken into account 
if a succinct understanding of their security-identities is to be realised (see Figure 3.1). 
The norms and values, inextricably tied to the so-called Asian Way, are also critically 
examined in order to establish a better understanding of how and why Asia Pacific 
security institutions behave. This provides greater insight into Asia Pacific security 
culture and reveals the parameters set by the region, within which the EU and New 
Zealand must operate to effectively promote security. Investigating the identities of 
predominant Asia Pacific security institutions and observing how they function, 
contextualises this thesis and clearly defines the current security environment in the 
region. 
 
 
                                                 
63 Richard A. Bitzinger, “The Asia-Pacific Arms Market: Emerging Capabilities, Emerging Concerns,” 
Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies 3 no. 2 (2004): 1-4., http://www.apcss.org/Publications/ 
APSSS/Asia-PacificArmsMarket.pdf. The second biggest arms market in the world exists within South 
East Asia and the Pacific. Europe, Russia, the US and Israel are the major suppliers of arms to the Asia-
Pacific region.  
64 For some major authorities in this field see: Desmond Ball and Amitav Acharya, The next stage: 
preventive diplomacy and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region (Canberra: Strategic and Defence 
Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, 1999)., 
Dosch, “Changing Security Cultures in Europe and South East Asia: Implications for Inter-Regionalism,” 
483-501., Rüland, “Inter-regionalism and the Crisis of Multilateralism: How to Keep the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) Relevant,” 45-63., Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American 
Imperium., Michael Leifer, Selected works on South East Asia, ed. Chin Kin Wah and Leo Suryadinata 
(Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2005). 
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Figure 3.1 describes the area of analysis for this particular chapter. Focusing on section 
‘i’ (Asia Pacific Region) will contextualise the main research aim of this thesis, which is 
based on exploring the form and volume of the EU-NZ security dialogue. In addition, this 
section will analyse Asia Pacific security identities, which will elucidate a clearer 
understanding of the particular decisions Asia Pacific officials make within regional 
settings. 
  
Figure 3.1:  Area of analysis: Asia Pacific Security Culture 
 
3.1 Defining the Concept of Security 
 
If the effectiveness of security discourse is determined by the way actors perceive and 
conceptualise security, the importance of having a similar understanding of security 
within a regional setting is essential for the development of productive security dialogue. 
Accordingly, what Asia Pacific security institutions perceive as viable security challenges 
(or the interchangeable precedence) will directly the affect the volume of dialogue and 
define part of their security culture. Due to the effects of globalisation and the rise in 
prominence of transnational security challenges, the Asia Pacific concept of security has 
become intertwined with non-traditional and human security concerns.65 Despite an allied 
                                                 
65 Simon S. Tay, “A More Insecure World: conflicting Perspectives for Asia,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 3 
(2005): 393., also see Christopher W. Hughes, “Conceptualizing the Globalization-Security Nexus in the 
Asia-Pacific,” Security Dialogue 32, no. 4 (2001): 407-421. 
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definition of security in the region, there has been no real convergence of security 
cultures.66 Indeed, a majority of South East Asian states prefer to deal with security 
challenges on a national basis: transnational security issues such as separatism (including 
cross border implications), international migration and environmental degradation are 
still handled nationally.67 In addition, regional approaches to security challenges are often 
overridden by realist notions such as power balancing, which reduces the amount of trust 
that can be generated through continual social interaction.68   
 
Perspectives can often be underestimated and seen to be insignificant compared to the 
‘realities’ that exist in the international environment. However, it is precisely through 
inter-subjective exchange that helps to determine how institutions such as ASEAN define 
the security environment. Indeed, governments often “fail to recognize the highly 
complex nature of these conflicts and the cognitive processes underlying them.”69 An 
example of the different perspectives held by the EU and South East Asia can be seen in 
the divergent views on the nature of terrorist activities. While actors such as the EU or 
New Zealand see terrorism as a transnational security threat, a number of Asia Pacific 
nations view terrorism as a purely domestic issue, often stemming from historic roots. 70 
While both views are accurate and the security challenges remain the same, the concept 
differs, which creates the possibility for confusion. The underlying conceptual difference 
limits the effectiveness of the security dialogue when an Asia Pacific country vigorously 
objects to an external actor interfering with what is seen as an internal security issue. This 
example highlights the importance of continual dialogue and effective socialisation: 
through increased cooperation and shared knowledge, miscommunication can be reduced 
and dialogue deepened.  
 
 
 
                                                 
66 Jürgen Rüland, “The Nature of South East Asian Security Challenges” Security Dialogue 36, no. 4 
(2005): 545. 
67 Ibid, 538. 
68 Ibid, 538. Indeed, this is often reinforced by US ‘realist’ influence in the region. 
69 Ibid, 558.  
70 Rüland, “The Nature of South East Asian Security Challenges,” 553. 
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Conceptualising Security Threats 
The security threats Asia Pacific countries are prioritising as the most prominent 
challenges for the region continue to widen and are becoming more complex. A survey 
questioning security analysts’ perceptions of security in South East Asia and the Pacific 
illustrates a considerable widening of security challenges, including environmental and 
health-orientated security threats.71 A mixture of traditional and non-traditional threats 
make up the top five short-term security issues; these include North Korean nuclear 
weapons, terrorism, violent Islamic extremism, Taiwan Straights tension and conflict in 
the Korean peninsula. The long-term security challenges were prioritised in order as: 
Chinese nationalism; competition for resources; Sino-Japanese relations; the Taiwan 
Straits; and Sino-US relations.72 Apart from these concerns, drug trafficking, infectious 
diseases, nationalism, and territorial disputes have been cited from other sources as 
credible security challenges for South East Asia.73 In regard to the South Pacific, the 
major security threat perceived by the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) is internal disputes.74 
Other threats as outlined in the PIF Pacific Plan also exist. These include the proliferation 
of small arms, money laundering, border security, transnational crime, bio-security and 
natural disasters.75 The Pacific perception on terrorism remains dormant and is not 
prioritised as a leading security challenge.76 Nevertheless, it is still seen as a possible 
threat and has received considerably more attention after the Bali bombings in 2002. 
There is also some concern that the Pacific will be used as a ‘surrogate target’ in place of 
Australia who backed the US-led war on Iraq.77 While North Korean nuclear weapons, 
terrorism and violent Islamic extremism pervades South East Asian security concerns, 
governance issues will remain the primary focus for the Pacific as this is seen as the 
                                                 
71 Richard W. Baker, Asia Pacific Security Survey 2006 (East-West Center; Washington, 2006), 4. 
72 Ibid, 7-8. The Taiwan and Chinese dispute can also be played out in the South Pacific through ‘check 
book diplomacy.’ For example, Taiwan provides funds to Kiribati, which in turn switches diplomatic 
allegiance from China to Taiwan.  
73 See: Sung Chull Kim, “Appraisal of the East Asia Summit 2005: from a security perspective,” Hiroshima 
Peace Institute (Hiroshima City University 2006), http://project.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/crep/pdf/rj/r8-4.pdf. 
74 Dave Pebbles, Pacific Regional Order (Canberra; Australia National University: Asia Pacific Press, 
2005), 161. 
75 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, A Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and 
Integration, Final Draft: (September 2005), 7., http://www.pacificplan.org. 
76 Interview with New Zealand official, 19 April 2007. Also see Henderson, “Security in Oceania in the 
Post-9/11 and –Bali Era,” in New Zealand in a Globalizing World, ed. Ralph Pettman (Victoria University 
of Wellington, 2005), 78.  
77 Ibid, 79-80. 
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major cause of intra and inter-state conflict. Indeed, the Eminent Persons Group 
preparing the Pacific Plan stated: “[v]ariable standards of governance have produced at 
their worst instability, violence, corruption and a breakdown of democratic 
process…poor governance has a direct impact on the lives of Pacific people.”78  
  
Scholars have argued that security thinking in the Asia Pacific region is still dominated 
by military perspectives that are reinforced by a ‘subordination’ of security related 
planning toward the US. Indeed, it was only recently stated that “Asian-Pacific security 
architecture is utterly inefficient, fragmented, and excessively militarized.”79 While there 
may be some truth in this, it would be wrong to describe the region as being solely 
traditional in its security outlook. The conventional military thinking of many Asia 
Pacific countries is coupled with non-traditional perspectives and other cultural and 
economic elements. Indeed, Asian nations “have a tendency to think of security not 
simply in military terms, but as a synthesis of military, economic, technological and 
social strengths.”80 While the alignment of threat perceptions and security challenges is 
positive, combining security risks with economic and cultural elements will supplant 
transnational security challenges into a national context, making it harder to quantify 
regional solutions as an effective means of dealing with various threats that permeate 
national borders. This highlights the need to encourage a collective regional response to 
transnational security threats as a precursor for a safer environment in the region. 
Additionally, South East Asia and the Pacific must be continually aware of wide security 
challenges and alter their threat perceptions and capabilities inline with new and 
emerging threats, which would encourage post-conflict solutions in the region.  
 
 
 
                                                 
78 Julius Chan, “The eminent Persons’ Group Review of the Pacific Islands Forum,” Statement by the Rt 
Hon Sir Julius Chan GCMG, KBE, Chair of the Eminent Persons’ Group (April 2004), 12, 
www.pacificplan.org/tiki-download_file.php/?fileId=41. 
79 Dirk Nabers, review of the Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order, by 
See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, International Relations of the Asia Pacific 6, no.1 (2005): 2., 
http://irap.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/6/1/117.  
80 Yoishi Funabashi, “The Asianization of Asia,” Foreign Affairs 72 no. 5 (1993): 75-85. In Wiessala, Re-
orienting the Fundamentals, Human Rights and New Connections in EU-Asia Relations, 99. 
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3.2 Regional Security Institutions 
 
Regional institutions are valuable instruments that can encourage a sense of continuity, 
reciprocity, the flow of information and ways to resolve conflicts.81 A number of regional 
institutions exist in South East Asia and the South Pacific that are specifically designed to 
minimize transnational security threats. Within these institutions a number of actors meet 
who each maintain a specific socio-political milieu or security-identity. These security 
identities converge, producing an environment where ideas and policies can be 
formulated resulting in shared interests realised through a process of inter-subjectivity. 
This constructivist formula is played out within the confines of regional mechanisms 
creating a unique regional identity. It is proposed that the volume of dialogue possible, 
within a regional mechanism, is determined by the similarities that exist between the 
security identities of the participating actors. In an effort to understand the basic structure 
of the institutions, the following section outlines the parameters within which this 
particular social interaction can take place. There are over 300 mechanisms dedicated to 
security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region.82 These institutions are often divided into 
two main categories: track-one, which includes official or governmental organisations; 
and track-two, which consists of unofficial organisations who have links to, or influence, 
track-one.83 The following provides relevant and contextual information on the prominent 
regional security institutions in the Asia Pacific region.   
 
 
 
                                                 
81 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (New 
York: Longman, 1997), 39. 
82 According to the Dialogue and Research Monitor for Asia Pacific Security, there were 348 official 
dialogue mechanisms in 2005. See Japan Center for International Exchange, “dialogue and Research 
Monitor: Inventory of Multilateral Meetings on Asia Pacific Security and Community Building,” 
http://www.jcie.or.jp/drm/track1.htm.  
83 See Robert Ayson and Desmond Ball, Strategy and security in the Asia-Pacific (Rows Nest, New South 
Wales: Allen & Unwin, 2006), 272-9. There also exists the so-called ‘track one and a half’ and track three. 
Track one and a half includes a majority of government officials operating under their official role as well 
as others from track two. Track three includes those who do not directly affect decision making but are still 
involved in the security realm.  
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The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) 
Instigated in 1971 the PIF has become the main political regional body for South Pacific 
countries.84 Although the Forum tends to rely on the United Nations (UN) for major 
security initiatives such as the regional peacekeeping forces committed to the Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI), or the Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru (PRAN), many security 
challenges exist that the PIF directly address. Indeed, the PIF is seen as an effective 
institution that can provide multilateral cover for security initiatives when the UN is 
unable to offer its resources, effectively acting out the principle of subsidiairty.  In an 
effort to thwart transnational security threats, the Forum has adopted a number of 
declarations and plans. The Honiara Declaration in 1992, the Aitutaki Declaration in 
1997, the Bikatawa Declaration in 2000, the Nasonini Declaration in 2002 and the Pacific 
Plan adopted in 2006, have all indicated a commitment to strengthening security in the 
South Pacific. Generating peace-building initiatives and ensuring a secure region are the 
cornerstones of the PIF. As outlined under the chapter heading ‘regional priorities,’ the 
Pacific Plan states that its main objective is to “[e]nhance and stimulate economic 
growth, sustainable development, good governance and security for Pacific countries 
through regionalism.”85  
 
Commenting on its security role, the Pacific Plan also outlines a call for the development 
and implementation of strategies and legislation for maritime and aviation security. In 
addition to this, the Plan encourages: surveillance development; strengthening regional 
policing initiatives and law enforcement training; the development of plans to deal with 
natural disasters; and the implementation of a Pacific Islands Regional Security Technical 
Cooperation Strategy (PIRSTCS) on border security.86 The PIRSTCS is designed to 
                                                 
84 Membership includes Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New 
Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu and Vanuatu. New Caledonia and French Polynesia (Tahiti) came under its mandate in 1991. 
85 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “A Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and 
Integration,” Final Draft: (September 2005), 3. 
86 Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, “A Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and 
Integration,”3 and 7. Other Security threats that the Forum outline include money laundering, terrorist 
recruitment, identity fraud, West African fraud, people smuggling, issuing passports of convenience, 
electronic crimes, small arms trafficking, illegally trading in endangered wildlife, drug trafficking and 
organised crime. See Neil Boister, “New Directions for Regional Cooperation in the Suppression of 
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cover transnational crime, bio-security and mentoring for national financial units. The 
strategy also cooperates on inter-regional and sub-regional levels. For example, the PIF 
cooperate with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).87 In conjunction with the 
above mentioned declarations, diplomatic initiatives and military manoeuvres have also 
been initiated. For example, an Election Observation Mission (EOM) and a regional 
intervention force to the Solomon Islands were initiated under the banner of the Bikatawa 
Declaration. Other diplomatic initiatives have been formed to add to security efforts. 
These include the Pacific Islands Law Officers Meeting (PILOM), the Pacific Regional 
Policing Initiative (PRPI), the Customs Heads of Administration Regional Meeting 
(CHARM), the Eminent Persons Group, and the South Pacific Chiefs of Police 
Conference (SPCPC).  
 
Despite the formal efforts of the PIF to confront security challenges in the Pacific, there 
has been little adherence to these agreements: the regional declarations simply do not 
meet national realities.88 Indeed, while the Honiara Declaration provides the passage for 
greater cooperation on intelligence sharing and security assistance, little actual progress 
has been made and no formal security institution or research centre exists with a focus on 
threats in the Pacific.89 While there have been some practical security results in the area 
of fisheries surveillance, there is still a high level of corruption. In a recent forum, an 
interviewee noted that approximately 60 per cent of logging and fishing in the South 
Pacific is corrupt or illegal.90 Although the traditional security capabilities of the PIF are 
seen to be severely limited, the PIF do act under the banner of regionalism, promoting 
                                                                                                                                                 
Transnational Crime in the South Pacific,” Journal of the South Pacific Law (2006): 1., 
http://www.paclii.org/journals/old_JSPL/current/art1/view.html. 
87Adjacent to the PIRTCS, regional law enforcement communities aim to strengthen cooperation through: 
donor collaboration meetings; the working group on Border Management Issues (WGBMI); the Data 
Collection Working Group; the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination centre (PTCCC); the Pacific 
Regional Policing Initiative (PRPI); or the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG-ML). 
88 Boister, “New Directions for Regional Cooperation in the Suppression of Transnational Crime in the 
South Pacific,” 2-3., Also see Greg Urwin, “Regionalism and the Pacific Plan,” International Labour 
Organisation Public Lecture (Suva Fiji 15th November 2005), Phg 7 and 18., http://forumsec.org/_ 
resources/article/files/SG%20ILO%20Public%20Lecture%2015Dec051.pdf. 
89 Pebbles, Pacific Regional Order, 162. Also see Boister, “New Directions for Regional Cooperation in the 
Suppression of Transnational Crime in the South Pacific,” 2.  
90 Interview with the director of a security related NGO, 19 April 2007. This is specifically associated with 
transportation. 
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economic development and good governance, with the aim of promoting security and the 
wellbeing of Pacific Island Countries (PICs).  
 
The East Asian Summit (EAS) 
Through the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) grouping India, New Zealand and Australia have 
combined to form the most recent security institution for the Asia Pacific region. At its 
first meeting, held in December 2005, the EAS was promoted as a forum that could 
provide potential for strategic dialogue and “advance regional co-operation and 
integration.”91 In its first round of talks a number of security issues were raised, such as 
North Korea, terrorism, maritime security, energy security and a ‘Declaration on Avian 
Influenza Prevention, Control and Response’ was presented.92 Whether this institution 
can establish capabilities beyond dialogue is yet to be determined. However, it does have 
the potential to be a formative organisation, promoting Confidence Building Measures 
(CBM), and adding to the Asia Pacific security architecture. 
 
The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Formed as a regional economic institution in 1976, ASEAN was seen to be a solution to 
preserving its members’ freedom from external powers: both communist and the neo-
colonial.93 ASEAN’s political and security milestones are reflected in its institutional 
résumé, which include: the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration in 1971; 
the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia in 1976; the ASEAN 
Declaration on the South China Sea in 1992; the Treaty on the South East Asia Nuclear 
Weapon-Free Zone, the ASEAN Vision 2020 in 1997; and the Declaration of ASEAN 
                                                 
91 Helen Clark, “Old Friends, New Challenges: New Zealand and the United States in the Asia-Pacific 
Century,” Address to Asia Society Luncheon (Fairmont Hotel Washington DC, 21 March 2007), 
http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/ index.html. Interestingly, the US is not a member as it is unwilling to 
accede to the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.  
92 Kim, “Appraisal of the East Asia Summit 2005: from a security perspective,” 1. Interestingly, cultural 
understanding was also featured in the agenda. 
93 Members include Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darassalam joined in 
1984, Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and Cambodia in 1999. For more on ASEAN’s 
beginnings see Amitav Acharya, “Do norms and identity matter? Community and power in South East 
Asia’s regional order,” The Pacific Review 18, no. 1 (2005): 101. See also: Koro Bessho, Identities and 
Security in East Asia (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1999).  
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Concord II in 2003. The APT has also been informally instigated, which comprises 
ASEAN Member States plus China, Japan and South Korea. As of 1994, ASEAN has 
now referred most of its security mandate to the ARF, but also continues to implicitly 
promote security in the South East Asian region through economic, political and cultural 
links between Member States and external observers.  
 
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
The ARF is the major security constituent of ASEAN and the primary regional security 
institution for South East Asia. Members include ASEAN Member States, external 
members, such as the EU or New Zealand, and exclude Taiwan. The ARF was formed in 
1994, largely through the impetus of Japan and other Asian states who were concerned 
about security in the region. The original membership consisted of eighteen countries, 
which quickly grew into 24.94 Although members from outside the region participate, the 
ARF remains largely Asian-driven, affecting the direction and capabilities of the 
institution.95 A milestone for the ARF was the creation of a ‘Concept Paper’ in 1995 
which generally defines the role of the ARF and promotes the three-step process of 
confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict-resolution. The progress of the 
ARF remains limited: it has advanced in the area of confidence building, touched on 
preventive diplomacy and only paid lip-service to conflict-resolution.96 As a result of the 
CBMs, driven by the ARF mandate, military academic exchanges, high level visits and 
training initiatives have been instigated.97 However, for all its good intentions the ARF 
remains limited to a dialogue forum, where ‘social learning’ is seen as the most 
productive component of the institution. Indeed, the ARF has been criticized as being 
nothing more than a ‘talk shop’ or a perfunctory dialogue mechanism.98 In a recent 
                                                 
94 Members include: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, European Union, India, 
Indonesia, Japan, Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, 
Thailand, Timor Leste, United States, Vietnam.  
95 Kim, “Appraisal of the East Asia Summit 2005: from a security perspective,” 4. 
96 This does not mean that the ARF is ignoring other areas of diplomacy, but rather has focussed its energy 
and attention towards confidence building first and will develop other areas at a later stage. See: Ayson and 
Ball, Strategy and security in the Asia-Pacific, 274-5. 
97 Ibid, 274. There are also two Intercessional Support Group Meetings on Confidence Building Measures 
(ISG CBMS) that are conducted through the ARF. 
98 For example, see Ayson and Ball, Strategy and security in the Asia-Pacific, 275. 
 35 
survey on the ARF, security analysts expressed ‘lukewarm’ support for ARF and other 
regional security cooperation.99 One reason for the ARF’s perceived limitations is due to 
the principles upheld within South East Asia such as ‘non-interference’ in the internal 
affairs of other countries. According to Desmond Bell, this limits any potential progress 
on ‘hard-core’ security issues or potential conflicts.100 However, ‘talk shops’ maintain a 
credible function and should not be taken for granted. Dominik Heller defines the 
institutional effectiveness of the ARF as: “member's security is increased by the ARF 
solely BEFORE armed conflicts by increasing the costs of breaching the norm of 
renunciation of force among the members and as an area of social learning, in which 
actors reassess their perceptions and objectives” (original emphasis included).101 
Advances are also being made to increase the effectiveness of the institution. For 
example, the acceptance of the ARF chairman to liaise with the UN and the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has increased inter-regional ties 
and the implementation of an ‘ASEAN-China Joint Working Group on the 
Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.’102 
Although it is uncertain whether the ARF is a credible regional security institution, it 
“remains the only multilateral security framework that even begins to approximate the 
more well-established region-wide mechanisms of Europe.”103 From a constructivist 
perspective, the ARF is seen to be an efficient forum that creates a multitude of CBMs 
through continual inter-subjective exchange, which also generates a unique and defined 
security culture.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
99 Baker, Asia Pacific Security Survey 2006, 3. 
100 Ayson and Ball, Strategy and security in the Asia-Pacific, 275.  
101 Dominik Heller, “The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the 
Asia Pacific,” Contemporary South East Asia 27, no. 1 (2005): 138. 
102 Ibid, 274. Also see Kim, “Appraisal of the East Asia Summit 2005: from a security perspective,” 4. It 
should be noted that the exclusion of Taiwan as an ARF member could alter the balance and direction of 
the institution. 
103 Heller, “The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the Asia 
Pacific,” 275. 
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Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
In 2002 the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) expanded its mandate to include 
a functioning political agenda.104 Through this, the Counter Terrorism Task Force 
(CTTF) was formed and fully instigated in 2006. The CTTF identifies specific security 
needs and coordinates capacity building, technical assistance programmes, provides 
initiatives on food defence, conducts counter-terrorism workshops and secures the flow 
of goods and people through the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) 
framework.105 Through these initiatives, the CTTF is designed to help countries meet UN 
requirements under the counter-terrorism financing obligations and comply with 
international standards. The CTTF also participates in other regional groupings such as 
the ‘total supply chain security’ to protect shipping lanes through the APEC region. 
While these initiatives appear to be promising, the security arm of APEC is still in its 
early stages of development, making it hard to determine its importance for the region. 
Despite this, APEC contributes to the constellation of security initiatives in the Asia 
Pacific region and remains the only regional institution where heads of government meet.  
 
Track-Two Regional Security Initiatives 
Track-two regional security institutions – typically involving semi-governmental think 
tanks, academics and officials – affect and contribute to regional security in the Asia 
Pacific region. Although these organisations are more informal than track-one 
institutions, they do play an important role in creating collective ideas and forming 
security cultures. This is done by aiding track-one initiatives in forming succinct policy, 
ideas and initiatives. Track-two institutions also create new ideas for decision makers, 
shape the climate of opinion in national settings, help build transnational coalitions and 
create environments where the political elite are able to socialise, creating alternative sets 
of norms and identities.106 
                                                 
104 Initiated in 1993, APEC membership includes Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, People's 
Republic of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Papua New Guinea, Peru, The Republic of the Philippines, The Russian Federation, Singapore, Chinese 
Taipei, Thailand, United States of America, and Viet Nam. 
105Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, “Secure Trade in the APEC Region,” htp://www.apec.org/apec/ 
pec_roups/som_special_task_groups/counter_terrorism/secure_trade_in_the.html. 
106 Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium, 143. 
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There are a number of track-two institutions that have a specific focus on security in the 
Asia Pacific region. These include: the ASEAN Institutes for Security and International 
Studies (ASEAN-ISIS),107 founded in 1984 and including members from Brunei 
Darrussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam; the Council 
for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC),108 founded in 1996 and including members from 
Australia, Singapore, Sweden and China; the Council for Security Cooperation in the 
Asia Pacific (CSCAP),109 initiated in 1992 and including members from New Zealand, 
the EU, Russia, China and the US; the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre 
(PTCCC); and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Shangri-La 
Dialogue, which was initiated in 2002 and involves approximately 200 Defence 
Ministers, deputy Defence Ministers, civilian and military officials predominately from 
the Asia Pacific region. It should also be noted that many officials attend track-one and 
track-two level institutions, thereby creating synergies between the levels and creating 
links between the institutions.110 
 
External Security Actors: An Independent Variable 
External actors – regional institutions or countries not directly associated with South East 
Asia or the Pacific – play a significant role in security initiatives in the Asia Pacific 
region. For instance, China, Russia, Taiwan, Australia, India, the US and Japan play a 
considerable part in forming the regional security climate. Other regional actors such as 
the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA), the Australia and New Zealand Army 
Corps (ANZAC) the UN or the EU contribute to security efforts in the region. An 
                                                 
107 Membership Includes CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) and eight member 
institutions: Brunei Darussalam Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies (BDIPSS), Brunei Darrussalam; 
Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP), Cambodia; Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA), 
Laos; Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia; Institute for Strategic and 
Development Studies (ISDS), Philippines; Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Singapore; 
Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS), Thailand; and Institute for International Relations 
IIR), Vietnam. 
108 Membership Includes representatives from Australia, Philippians, Singapore, South Korea, Indonesia, 
Japan, China, France, Sweden, UK and Germany 
109 Membership Includes Australia, Brunei, Cambodia, Canada, China, EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, PDR 
Korea, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papa New Guinea, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, 
Thailand, US, Vietnam. 
110 Heller, “The Relevance of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) for Regional Security in the Asia 
Pacific,” 126. 
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example of external persuasion affecting the Pacific’s environmental security can be seen 
in Japan’s diplomatic effort in Fiji and Tonga. Japanese development aid to the Pacific 
has been seen as an act of conditional diplomacy, whereby votes in the Whaling 
Commission are essentially brought from PICs to enable the Japanese to catch whales for 
scientific purposes.111 Although external intervention can produce negative outcomes, 
continual cooperation with external actors will limit distrust and build social and political 
links. The UN plays a significant role in this aspect and undertakes many valuable 
functions, including: acting as a ‘legitimating function’; a ‘third-party mediator’; 
assisting regional organisations to adhere to the UN conventions on terrorism; and 
facilitating security-related treaties.112 However, the actions of the UN in the Asia Pacific 
region are limited to its set priorities, threat perceptions, institutional dynamics and 
resources. This being said, cooperation and socialisation limits the possibility of 
confusion or conflict between international actors. 
 
The PIF, the EAS, the ARF, ASEAN, and APEC are the prominent security-orientated 
regional institutions for the Asia Pacific region. Although a small amount of overlap in 
the institutions competencies may exist, each organisation plays a particular role in 
contributing to peace and development in the region. Other institutions, from the track-
two arena or external influences, also act as independent variables in the Asia Pacific 
regional security architecture, affecting the depth of dialogue within the institutions and 
the strength of security.    
 
3.3 Norms and Values in the Asia Pacific Region 
 
Values and norms held by countries in the Asia Pacific region influence the security 
culture and identity of the region, and subsequently affect the relationships forged within 
regional settings. A large majority of the regional security institutions adhere to the so 
                                                 
111 For an example of this see the Greenpeace website, “Japanese vote buying sinks South Pacific whale 
sanctuary,” (24 July 2001), http://archive.greenpeace.org/pressreleases/oceans/2001jul24.html. 
112 Rosemary Foot, “The UN system’s contribution to Asia-Pacific security architecture,” The Pacific 
Review 16 No. 2 (2003): Abstract. Also see Martin Ortega, “Building the future: the EU’s contribution to 
global governance,” Chaillot Paper No. 100 (Institute for Security Studies; European Union: Paris, April 
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called Asian Way, which is a collection of values and principles that shape the security 
identities in the Asia Pacific region. 113   
 
The Asia Pacific Way 
The Asian or Pacific Way is an important concept to explore if a reliable analysis of the 
Asia Pacific security culture is to be conducted. The Asian Way provides valuable 
insights into the identity of South East Asia and the Pacific, providing an explanation as 
to why certain decisions are made vis à vis security regimes.  
 
The Asian Way is made up of many different political and cultural values that, when 
combined, generate a collective South East Asian or Pacific security culture. Although 
the Asian Way constitutes different values and principles, there are two norms that are 
prominent, namely non-interference and informalism. These two norms are the socio-
political pillars – as reflected in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation114 – that unite Asia 
Pacific states, contributing to regional stability. Due to large variances in culture, 
language, religion and politics, non-interference is seen as the best way to maintain 
stability. The notion of informalism is well illustrated by Koro Bessho’s statement: 
“ASEAN’s principle of non-interference is crucial to maintaining cohesion… [and thus 
prefers] creating the conditions for compromise, rather than acting through an official 
arbitration capacity.”115  
 
Another underlying factor that reinforces the Asian Way can be found in recent Asia 
Pacific historical events which have constructed deep-seated identities.116 It should not be 
forgotten that many Asian countries have only been sovereign for little over 50 years. 
Indeed, Jürgen Rüland recently stated: “national sovereignty is still the most essential 
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value in the South East Asian security discourse.”117 Many political revolutions and 
conflicts in the region such as the Chinese revolution, the Vietnam War and Timor 
Leste’s independence, have formed a collective and recent memory of continuing 
conflict.118 Recent colonial history has constructed images within much of South East 
Asia and the Pacific, which can affect their actions in regional security fora. This 
‘memory’ has meant that many Asia Pacific countries have shared a ‘subconscious 
assumption’ that they were second-rate.119 The historical memory of conflict and 
colonialism combined with newly found sovereignty has proven to retard the 
formalisation of regional security institutions. Indeed, the notion of informalism rejects 
the Western forms of external relations which are steeped in notions of legalisation.120 
Consequently, the Asian Way can be seen as frustrating, particularly from a Western 
perspective, forming barriers between closer security cooperation; however, advantages 
also exist within this collection of values.  
 
Although the Asian Way has been heavily criticized, clear advantages exist that are often 
mistakenly dismissed. Firstly, agreements made through ASEAN are based on long-term 
relationships, making it less likely that any Member State will defect.121 Secondly, the 
tradition of negotiation within ASEAN places “paramount importance on actors’ 
reputations.”122 This means that ASEAN Member States are even more likely to continue 
to operate even under adverse conditions for fear of falling out. In other words an 
‘insurance policy’ is created by focussing on the future, while at the same time respecting 
the traditions of the past. Thirdly, indirect discussion and non-binding agreements create 
a more flexible environment and dynamic agenda.   
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Regional institutions that are based primarily on socialisation, communication and 
common values have been the most positive outcome of ASEAN or the ARF. Referring 
to the nature of South East Asia’s largest regional institution, the former ASEAN 
Secretary, Rodolfo Severino stated: [t]he general approach is based on dialogue, 
consultation, cooperation, engagement and interaction […] there is no other way.”123 The 
continual process of socialisation has created a regional identity that produces a 
stabilising effect on Member States. For example, Heller describes the ARF as a security 
community, which is based on a collective identity, contributing to stability. 
Consequently, it is through the Asian Way that a fundamental aspect of ASEAN’s 
external policy is realised: an institution based on a collective identity as a means of 
promoting stability. Indeed, a member of the Institute of South East Asian Studies 
(ISEAS) stated that “there is a culture of communication and common values emerging. 
The main common value is avoiding war and conflict to provide stability for sustaining 
economic development.”124 Conversely, the informality of the ARF or ASEAN has not 
been accepted well by a majority of scholars who criticise it for its lack of institutional 
power and ability to do anything but talk.125 However, due to the political and cultural 
complexity in the region, the Asian Way is the common thread that ties all nations 
together. The regional institutions continue to evolve, even if it is seen to be too slow 
from a Western perspective.  
 
As transnational threats continue to pervade the Asia Pacific region, the principle nature 
of the Asian Way has become questioned. A paradox exists at the centre of the Asian 
Way which forces various Asia Pacific regional institutions to favour one value over 
another. The two norms associated with the Asian Way – non interference and non 
intervention – can come into conflict with each other as “[t]he organisation may have to 
become more willing to exert pressure over domestic affairs of some of its members if it 
is to fend off external intervention.”126 In other words, a choice needs to be made if 
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ASEAN values are to remain preserved; this will sometimes mean sacrificing one value 
over another. Although the Asian Way contributes to stability, it also limits and controls 
its own actions. Whether the Asian Way can evolve to fit into a growing interdependent 
security environment remains to be seen. 
 
Despite the inherent need to preserve Asia Pacific values, the region’s norms are 
inappropriate and insufficient to cater for modern security threats.127 As already 
discussed, the rise of transnational crime, terrorism and environmental concerns 
challenge the core principles and security culture of ASEAN. Transnational security risks 
are arguably best addressed by transnational or regional institutions rather than ASEAN’s 
preference for bilateral negotiation. At the very least, when a security risk threatens more 
than two states, it would seem logical to address the problem within a regional 
framework. The norm of non-interference has served ASEAN well in the past. However, 
the accession of Myanmar, conflict in Timor Leste and the ‘Bali bombings’ highlight the 
ineffectiveness of ASEAN and its security constituent, the ARF. Perhaps this is why 
Acharya recently wrote that “while non-interference once exerted a moral appeal against 
the threat of neo-colonialism and superpower interventionism, it now stands implicated 
for sanctioning state repression in Burma.”128 However, even if these norms are being 
challenged and ASEAN’s identity is evolving, it has not filtered down to actual policy 
formation or action. Indeed, ASEAN continues to put little emphasis on regional 
actorness.129  
 
The Asian Way is seen by many academics and political elites, particularly from 
Western-orientated countries, as inappropriate for modern security challenges which are 
often transnational in nature. The notions of informalism and non-intervention reinforce 
this perspective as many institutions are seen as purely ‘talking shops’ with no actual 
capability or international voice. Despite this, through the notion of informalism and non-
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intervention, the Asian Way unites a constellation of languages, cultures, religions and 
political orientations, creating at least a sense of identity and security.  
 
Conclusion 
 
A heightened awareness, greater interoperability and deeper integration will be needed if 
Asia Pacific regional security institutions are to evolve into deeper, active and more 
effective organisations. A multitude of regional security mechanisms have been created 
throughout the last 50 years, giving rise to an intricate web of cultural and political links 
within and outside the Asia Pacific region. Many of these institutions have been a source 
of frustration for a number of Western academics and political elite as the pace of 
evolution is seen as slow. However, as the Asian Way illustrates, the pace must be set by 
the Asia Pacific countries, not those outside the region. Greater effort must be made to 
understand the complex security-identity of the Asia Pacific region. This will enhance 
security initiatives and contribute to peace in the long-term.  Real threats are imminent 
and must be subdued by effective diplomacy through multilateral and bilateral solutions. 
Enhancing the interoperability of Asia Pacific countries’ capabilities and promoting the 
advantages of regional solutions will advance the effectiveness of the institutions and 
promote peace in the region. The ultimate question is whether the regional security 
institutions can be effective enough before the next security incident emerges.    
 
South East Asian and South Pacific concepts of security help to define the various 
security cultures that exist within regional institutions. The prominent institutions 
including the ARF, ASEAN, the PIF, the EAS and APEC provide the structures for 
continual inter-subjective exchange, building effective dialogue over the long-term. As 
constructive knowledge-sharing continues, the apparent hurdles represented through the 
Asian Way may become less of a hindrance in regional security consolation. By 
examining the various norms, values, concepts of security and regional security 
institutions, a clear image emerges of the current regional security environment in the 
Asia Pacific region. These issues contextualise this thesis, enabling a succinct analysis to 
be undertaken on the EU-NZ security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region.     
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4 European Union and New Zealand Security 
Dialogue in the Asia Pacific Region 
 
The European Union on the one side, and New 
Zealand on the other130 
Joint Declaration on Relations between the EU and NZ 
 
While geographic distance will always separate the European continent from Australasia, 
common values, perspectives and interests will constantly unite Europe with New 
Zealand. Built upon strong economic and trade commitments, the EU and New Zealand 
have enjoyed a buoyant diplomatic relationship over the last 23 years. The focal point 
and underpinning structure of this relationship can be found in shared values such as 
democracy and human rights. These factors have created a firm base from which a 
security dialogue has emerged in the last decade. Although the EU and New Zealand may 
possess varying interests that they wish to protect in the Asia Pacific region, the 
approaches and the advantages in cooperating are widely recognised. These concepts, 
combined with a similar preoccupation with security concepts and a firm commitment in 
effective multilateralism to counter threats in the Asia Pacific region, has created the need 
and desire for a substantial EU-NZ security dialogue for the region. From an explorative 
outlook the types of dialogue that exist, and the alternative avenues within which EU and 
New Zealand officials are able to cooperate, reflect an EU-NZ security culture in the Asia 
Pacific region. Analysing the consultative processes also helps to determine the current 
volume of dialogue. In addition to this, how EU and New Zealand officials perceive the 
relationship, what subjects are discussed in the agenda and what outcomes the security 
dialogues have produced, reflect the volume of EU-NZ security dialogue in the Asia 
Pacific region.  
 
The EU-NZ security consultation processes also contain a social and cultural theme, 
which help to explain and characterise the dialogue: an element seldom analysed and 
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often overlooked by political scientists. However, as international relations become 
increasingly interdependent, sensitivity to cultural and normative processes are becoming 
more acute. This is clearly demonstrated in a recent European Commission 
Communication on ‘A European Agenda for Culture in a Globalising World.’ Explaining 
the Communication, the Commission’s Delegations to Australia and New Zealand noted: 
“[t]he EU has a unique role to play in promoting its cultural richness and diversity, both 
within Europe and worldwide. It has been acknowledged that culture is an indispensable 
feature to achieve the EU’s strategic objectives of propensity, solidarity and security, 
while ensuring a stronger presence on the international scene.”131 Regular social and 
political contact increases the possibility of creating common ideas and perspectives, 
while also creating effective confidence building measures. This provides for deeper and 
more productive cooperation that, when associated with security in the Asia Pacific 
region, can help to secure a safer and increasingly peaceful environment.  
 
4.1 Foundations of the European Union and New Zealand 
Security Dialogue  
 
Formal diplomatic relations between the EU and New Zealand have matured over the last 
two decades, encompassing social, economic and political interaction.  Forged through 
trade and economic interests in 1984, the relationship has developed to include security-
related concerns within its regular political consultations. The introduction of a European 
Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP) in 1993, and its considerable growth over the 
last 15 years - including a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), an 
External Action Service, a High Representative, and military and civilian missions - has 
expanded the EU’s role around the globe. The increasing political and economic strength 
of the EU in the Asia Pacific has acted as a catalyst by encouraging formal security 
dialogue and promoting a desire to increase the political consultation between the EU and 
New Zealand. The establishment of a Joint Declaration on Relations between the 
European Union and New Zealand, signed in 1999, and an up-dated Action Plan agreed 
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upon in 2007, has formalised the relationship, allowing for a larger volume of dialogue 
including security related issues. A number of formal and informal meetings, summits 
and forums have developed out of this dialogue, creating an extensive network of 
relationships involving interaction from the political elite to military personnel.  
 
A mixture of normative, self-interest and altruistic motives has formed a dialogue process 
between the EU and New Zealand that has now matured to include a substantial security 
component in the agenda. Most New Zealand and European officials agree that the 
relationship is based on common values and a similar perspective on the international 
environment. These values include effective multilateralism, liberal democracy, the rule 
of law and human rights. While these values underline the relationship and undoubtedly 
assist in creating a common outlook of security in the Asia Pacific region, they do not 
represent a viable reason to maintain a close dialogue; they only constitute a reason to 
form a dialogue process. A number of other themes shared by both parties illustrate the 
current momentum behind the dialogue process. Firstly, the growing importance of the 
Asia Pacific region, as a maturing economic region, has strengthened the grounds for a 
deeper dialogue process on the basis of economic security.132 Secondly, the EU and New 
Zealand share a similar preoccupation with traditional and non-traditional security 
threats. Nuclear non-proliferation, terrorism, money laundering, environmental security 
and China and Taiwan rivalry, are issues that are of interest to both the EU and New 
Zealand in the Asia Pacific region.133 Thirdly, from an arguably altruistic perspective, the 
EU and New Zealand are concerned for the stability and development of the South 
Pacific.134 Further reinforced by close political, economic, historical and cultural ties,135 
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cooperation between New Zealand and the European Union on these and other issues is 
the raison d'être of the EU-NZ security dialogue.     
 
Considering New Zealand’s economic dependence upon the EU, it is not surprising that 
the New Zealand’s MFAT describes the EU-NZ bilateral dialogue as a ‘bedrock 
relationship.’136 The EU is New Zealand’s third largest export market and second largest 
merchandise partner, which accounts for 28 per cent of New Zealand’s Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI).137 While this remains highly important, looking at the EU through the 
lens of agriculture and trade produces a distorted perspective of the actual EU-NZ 
relationship. The current New Zealand Defence Minister stated that because the common 
agricultural policy of the EU is effectively set until 2013, the short-term implication of 
the CFSP will be highly significant.138 New Zealand’s chief concern with the EU will 
remain focused on trade and access to the European market; however, the security 
dialogue continues to play an important role, with official rhetoric on both sides issuing 
the desire to increase security cooperation. Building on the foundations of the security 
consultation, and in order to maintain a more precise view of the EU-NZ relationship, the 
security dialogue must also be examined.    
 
4.2 The European Union and New Zealand Security 
Agenda 
 
The validity of a dialogue process between two or more political actors is largely 
determined by the content of the agenda; what is discussed and not discussed will directly 
affect the volume of dialogue that is achievable. While some European and New Zealand 
officials place a great deal of importance on the normative aspects of their relationship, 
the primary objectives of the EU and New Zealand continue to rest heavily on self-
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interest. While this self-interest is not liable to dramatically change, through a process of 
continual social learning both actors can develop an understanding of what motivates the 
participating actors to prioritise a particular set of objectives. This will make it easier to 
accommodate, discuss and create a more efficient dialogue process leading to actions that 
can be formed from collective interests rather than the original self-interest. The 
following provides an overview of the current set of objectives the EU and New Zealand 
have in relation to their security focussed agendas.   
 
Recognising that the agenda will predominately change in form depending on new and 
emerging security challenges, a number of objectives remain constant. From a New 
Zealand perspective these include: encouraging the EU to be more active in global 
affairs; welcoming the EU’s efforts in strengthening multilateralism; influencing the EU 
on issues important to New Zealand; and encouraging the EU in its effective 
contributions in development aid and peacekeeping activities.139 New Zealand also 
wishes to be regularly informed on current European security thinking in order to remain 
relevant as a valid security partner. From an EU perspective, the Union is motivated to 
work with New Zealand in strengthening multilateral institutions, such as the UN, and 
creating an international environment with effective global governance.140 Cooperating 
with New Zealand will also aid EU interests in the Asia Pacific region. Through 
cooperating on security issues such as environmental development, anti-terrorism, cyber-
crime, money laundering, and non-proliferation initiatives, the EU can secure economic 
interests. For example, keeping critical communication and shipping lines open, as well 
as maintaining global and environmental security, can affect the European continent.      
 
Under the heading of ‘Common Goals’ the Joint Declaration outlines eight objectives, of 
which six are related to traditional and non-traditional security concerns. The main 
security interests that are prioritised include: international disarmament; arms control; 
non-proliferation; environmental security; and development assistance.141 Promoting 
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regionalism, supporting the UN, democracy, the rule of law, and human rights are also 
outlined as major priorities for New Zealand and the EU.  The updated EU-NZ action 
plan, agreed upon in 2007, is designed to complement the Joint Declaration by providing 
a larger number of specific areas to work together. These specific issues include a 
number of security related initiatives such as development and stability in the Pacific, 
human rights, the environment, and education.142 Other issues discussed in the EU-NZ 
security dialogues include the Middle East, Asia, the Asia Pacific region, the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, the Pacific, the EU's energy action plan, and counter-
terrorism issues in the region.143  
 
Both New Zealand and the European Union recognise the importance of cultural links 
and shared values. New Zealand and the Union place a high importance on forging 
people-to-people contact, working holiday visas and academic links.144 Creating social 
networks are increasingly seen as a fundamental to any serious dialogue process. In 
addition to the joint declarations there are several sectoral agreements that, although not 
explicitly related to security, solidify the EU-NZ relationship. These agreements – which 
were the first types of agreements the EU signed with a third country – include the areas 
of science and technology, agriculture and an agreement on mutual recognition on 
conformity assessment.145 These three areas build cultural and political links which 
underpin the EU-NZ dialogue and generate a sense of validity in continuing the 
consultation processes. How many EU-NZ security dialogues exist, how they function, 
and the effectiveness of the various mediums within which the dialogues are played out, 
must also be explored in achieving a respectable view of the relationship.  
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4.3 The European Union and New Zealand Security 
Dialogues  
 
The EU and New Zealand cooperate and meet together on various implicit and explicit 
fronts. Official ministerial meetings, track-one and track-two regional institutions, and 
Member States bilateral dialogue are all used as effective mediums in expounding the 
EU-NZ security dialogue on the Asia Pacific region. A complicated network of formal 
and informal dialogue exists that can not possibly be covered within this thesis. However, 
the major institutions and mediums used to effectively encourage and deepen an EU-NZ 
security dialogue are analysed. While cooperation between the EU and New Zealand is 
currently based on diplomatic initiatives in the Asia Pacific region, there is much value in 
meetings, interlocution and knowledge sharing; in an increasingly independent world, 
states can no longer act alone if they wish to promote a stable and secure environment.  
 
Direct European Union and New Zealand Bilateral Dialogue 
A substantial amount of regular contact between New Zealand and the EU subsist in the 
form of ministerial meetings, high level visits, or through other mediums such as EU 
permanent Delegation Mission to Australia and New Zealand. Other direct ministerial 
dialogues such as human rights consultations provide an added value to the overall 
political and security relationship. This is achieved through direct interlocution on 
security issues combined with social learning and knowledge sharing: increases in social 
and political contact improve the possibility of a unified security-identity, which enlarges 
the likelihood of decisions being made from collective interests.  
 
The most formal and direct EU-NZ security dialogue is conducted though a biannual 
ministerial consultation process between the EU Troika – the EU Council Presidency, the 
EU Commissioner for External Relations and the EU Council High Representative – and 
the New Zealand Foreign Minister. There also exists biennial ministerial consultation 
between the Commissioner responsible for external relations and New Zealand’s Foreign 
Minister in Wellington. In addition to these ministerial meetings, periodic visits to New 
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Zealand by Commissioners and Members of the European Parliament (MEP) also act to 
reinforce a continual process of dialogue between New Zealand and the EU. For 
example, in the last five years, Commissioner Poul Nielson, Pascal Lamy, Christopher 
Patten, Mariann Fischer Boel, Ferrero Waldner and the European Parliament delegation 
for Australia and New Zealand visited New Zealand. These meetings are considerably 
important for both New Zealand and the EU; however, the ministerial meetings have 
been criticised as not maintaining an appropriate level of representation as the actual 
participants are not always at the highest level of representation.146 Furthermore, it has 
been argued that meeting twice a year is too extensive and that the EU and New Zealand 
should focus on one annual meeting with a higher representation and with an enlarged, 
concise agenda.147 It should also be noted that the dialogue encompasses a security 
agenda that deals with not only the Asia Pacific region, but also other key interests of 
concern such as Afghanistan and energy security in Russia. As security in the Asia 
Pacific will not always be a significant point of concern for the EU and New Zealand, the 
security dialogue is not as important and effective as it might first appear.  Despite these 
arguments, New Zealand and the EU are fortunate to meet biannually: the process itself is 
valid in contributing to a higher understanding of each actor, providing the possibilities 
for deeper dialogue.  
 
Reinforcing the ministerial visits, annual senior official political consultation meetings 
(SOM) are conducted with the Commission’s Directorate General for External Relations 
and New Zealand officials. The SOM offers New Zealand a substantial amount of 
exposure to the EU and covers a wide range of topical issues from science, education and 
visa agreements, to Middle Eastern security concerns.148 The SOMs are seen as more of a 
‘working session’ where participants are firmly connected with the issues, providing for 
an effective and valuable dialogue that underpins the ministerial visits.  
 
In addition to the SOMs, ministerial consultation through the EU Troika format on 
Human Rights reveals another avenue where New Zealand and the EU work together to 
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promote security in the Asia Pacific region. While not specifically aligned with security, 
the dialogue will usually contain a number of security issues.149 These meetings are seen 
as valuable as they provide for cultural and political links, and act as sufficient 
preparatory meetings in anticipation for the UN Commission on Human Rights and the 
UN Third Committee, where the EU is a key player and can expound values similar to 
New Zealand’s interests. It is through these events that a mutual process of influence can 
take place between New Zealand and the EU, forming a distinctive security culture. This 
dialogue can be further strengthened by adjacent meetings including post forum 
dialogues and the positive effects of ‘corridor diplomacy.’ 
 
Affiliated with New Zealand’s MFAT, New Zealand’s International Aid and 
Development Agency (NZAID) also works together with the EU on projects in the South 
Pacific, encouraging and promoting a deeper EU-NZ security dialogue. An important tool 
in preventing conflict in the long-term is through effective development aid. One aspect 
of this aid is the promotion of education in developing countries. Commenting on 
political aspects of the EU-NZ dialogue, the head of the European Unit for New 
Zealand’s MFAT stated that the “interrelationship between development and security is 
well established. In particular, we cooperate very closely in the education sector.”150 An 
example of this is through the education Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp). Initiated in 
1999, SWAp provides external education funding to developing countries by adopting 
common approaches and cooperating with and relying on the developing nation’s 
government to disperse the funds. Both the EU and NZAID have been involved within 
this framework and plan on cooperating together in the future to enhance education 
reform in the Asia Pacific region.151 The Pacific Regional Initiatives for the Delivery of 
basic Education (PRIDE) is another education based framework that is designed to 
strengthen the Ministries of Education in 15 PICs. The PRIDE project is jointly funded 
by the EU and New Zealand: through the European Development Fund, the EU has 
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allocated €8 million in the period 2004-2009, while NZAID has donated a total of $NZ 5 
million to the project.152 The Project Steering Committee (PSC) for PRIDE is comprised 
of EU, New Zealand, PIC officials and observers from the UN, UK and other aid 
agencies.153 This provides a pertinent example of a separate avenue where EU and New 
Zealand officials are able to meet and discuss development issues that are related to 
security.   
 
As one of the largest New Zealand embassies in Europe in terms of staff, the New 
Zealand Mission to the European Union in Brussels is an area where alliances are formed 
between the EU and New Zealand. Although economic interests remain of prime 
importance, security relationships also exist. For example, immediately following the 
Fijian Coup in 2006, meetings between the EU Commission and New Zealand diplomats 
took place in order for the EU to issue a qualified statement on the Coup.154 Besides 
sporadic events such as the Fijian Coup, other initiatives that help maintain a New 
Zealand presence in the heart of Europe include: organising events; building contacts 
with the European Parliament, Commission and Council; facilitating formal visits; and 
unofficial and official diplomacy. A pertinent example of how New Zealand diplomats 
cooperate on security issues with the EU can be seen in New Zealand’s influence on the 
European Council’s Working Group responsible for Asia and Oceania (COASI). The 
New Zealand ministerial visits and the New Zealand Mission to the European Union 
influenced COASI by convincing the working group to provide Commission funds for 
the RAMSI mission.155 Of equal importance to the Mission in Brussels, the European 
Commission’s Delegation to New Zealand also coordinates and builds on the EU-NZ 
relationship.156           
 
                                                 
152 The University of the South Pacific, “the PRIDE project,” USP Fiji, http://www.usp.ac.fj/index.php?id 
=pride. 
153 The University of the South Pacific, “the PRIDE project.”  
154 Personal correspondence between the author and diplomatic staff in Brussels, 4 December 2006.  
155 Phill Goff, “New Zealand and the European Union a year after enlargement,” 71. 
156 New Zealand embassies in Europe also contribute by creating links and establish relationships with 
individual Member States of the European Union. However, they are also limited in financial and human 
resources. For example, the Polish embassy has three permanent staff and represents a large section of 
Eastern Europe.     
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The following Figure (4.1) depicts the current forms of security-related involvement 
between the EU and New Zealand in the Asia Pacific region. The three primary 
categories, under which various consultative mechanisms are listed, are ‘bilateral (a),’ 
‘regional (b)’ and ‘other(c).’ While ‘a’ and ‘b’ are directly related to the overlap between 
the EU, New Zealand and Asia Pacific (see area ‘A’ in Figure 1.1), category ‘c’ is an 
influencing factor on the direct dialogue procedure (see area ‘ii’ in Figure 1.1).    
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Avenues of European Union and New Zealand Security 
Dialogue on the Asia Pacific Region 
 
Another form of association relevant to the EU-NZ security dialogue is through the 
European Commission's Delegation to New Zealand. The Delegation was opened in 
Wellington in 2004 and, while it does not have any direct dialogue with New Zealand on 
security issues in the Asia Pacific, the Delegation does reflect the EU’s commitment to 
European Union and 
New Zealand 
Security Dialogue 
on the Asia Pacific 
Region 
EU-NZ Bilateralism 
 
(a) 
Regional Security 
Institutions  
(b) 
Other 
 
(c) 
Ministerial 
- Biannual and 
biennial political 
consultation 
involving EU 
Troika, EU 
Commissioners, NZ 
PM and Ministers.    
Formal 
Consultation 
- Annual senior 
official political 
consultation 
meetings (SOM) 
Informal 
Consultation 
- Visits to Brussels 
and Wellington by EU 
and NZ officials 
responsible for 
security 
- Cultural and Social 
links 
Track one: 
 ASEAN, ARF, 
APEC, FPDA, UN, 
PIF, NATO, EAS 
 
Track two: 
CSCAP, IISS 
Shangrila Dialogue, 
et cetera. 
 
EU Member States 
France 
Britain 
Germany 
Portugal 
Delegations and 
Embassy’s 
- EU Delegations to 
South East Asia, the 
Pacific, New Zealand 
and Australia.  
- EU Member States 
to Asia Pacific region 
- New Zealand 
 55 
maintaining a close relationship with New Zealand. Indeed, commenting on the role of 
the Commissions Delegations, Wiessala poignantly notes that Delegations are the “prime 
agents for the translation of CFSP instruments into practice.”157 This is demonstrated 
through cooperation on various fronts such as education, trade and politics. The 
Delegation will regularly communicate with Brussels on developments in New Zealand 
and assist in promoting and organising bilateral cooperation.158 Indirectly, the Delegation 
caters for security under the rubric of development by administering Overseas 
Development Aid (ODA) to the South Pacific. A recent initiative within the European 
Commission’s Delegation to Australia has been the appointment of a security officer 
whose responsibilities cover the South Pacific area including New Zealand. Another 
security officer for the South East Asia region is due to be appointed in the later stages of 
2007. The officer’s do not have any direct security interests in the Asia Pacific region 
except for ensuring stability, cohesion and the security of European staff.159 While this 
may not be directly relevant to prioritised security challenges in the region, the 
appointment of a security officer does reflect the continual growth of the Delegations and 
EU’s interest in New Zealand. From a social perspective the physical presence of the 
staff in Wellington and Canberra supports continual information and knowledge sharing, 
enhancing the general EU-NZ security relationship. Indeed, informal diplomacy is often 
taken for granted but can contribute to significant success in the future.  
 
Informal networking and social interaction is the life blood of EU-NZ security dialogue. 
Unofficial meetings between NZ and the EU on security issues are hard to quantify but 
do happen on a frequent basis. The last two years has seen a considerable growth in 
dialogue. An assortment of security related meetings held in the first half of 2007 
include: consultation between the New Zealand Defence Minister and the EU High 
Representative in January, where they discussed a wide range of security issues including 
                                                 
157 Georg Wiessala, More than Distant Neighbours: CFSP and Asian Countries.” In Common Foreign and 
Security Policy: The first ten years, edited by Martin Holland, 89-111. London, New York: Continuum, 
2004), 91. 
158 The European Commission's Delegation to New Zealand “EU/New Zealand Political Relations,” 
http://www.delaus.ec.europa.eu/newzealand/EU_NZ_relations/politicalrelations.htm. 
159 E-mail correspondence with the EU security officer for the South Pacific and the Author, 19 February 
2006. 
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the South Pacific and South East Asia;160 a meeting held in June between New Zealand 
and EU defence officials in Brussels; a New Zealand defence representative has recently 
finished a tour of Brussels; and the head of the International Defence Relations Branch 
travelled to Paris in April for talks on defence with France.161 These and other informal 
meetings in Brussels and Wellington act to strengthen the multifaceted security dialogue 
between New Zealand and the European Union. New Zealand officials have shown some 
signs of frustration, noting that it is often hard when new EU Member States or staff do 
not have any knowledge of the Asia Pacific region. Consequently, sympathy for New 
Zealand interests can not be expected.162 This highlights the importance of official and 
informal dialogue between EU staff in Wellington and Canberra and, perhaps more 
importantly, those in Brussels.  
 
Regional Security Institutions 
Regional security institutions in the Asia Pacific region are useful networks within which 
security consultation can take place. Both the EU and New Zealand hold membership or 
observer status in a number of security institutions in the region. These include ASEAN, 
the ARF and the PIF. Other regional groupings implicitly connected to the EU-NZ 
security dialogue include track-one and track-two institutions including the FPDA, the 
UN, CSCAP, the IISS Shangri la Dialogue, and the PSI. These institutions, as outlined in 
the previous chapter, exist in an effort to maintain peace and promote security. Social 
interaction within these institutions also helps to build cultural, political and social links 
outside its formal settings. It is through these indispensable links that the dialogue can 
become more effective as knowledge sharing and cultural understanding are enhanced. 
The following section highlights one specific area of the EU and New Zealand dialogue: 
interaction through regional institutions. 
 
The ARF provides for an effective and constructive security dialogue between the 
European Union and New Zealand. Officials from the EU and New Zealand place 
considerable importance on the ARF as a forum for constructive dialogue on political and 
                                                 
160 Goff, Letter from the Minister of Defence to the Author, 13 March 2007. 
161 Interview with New Zealand official, 19 April 2007. 
162 Phill Goff, “New Zealand and the European Union a year after enlargement,” 71. 
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security issues. The ARF not only acts as a medium for consultation, but also acts as a 
bridge for an EU-NZ security dialogue. Indeed, the current New Zealand Defence 
Minister stated that “New Zealand’s main vehicle of interaction with the EU on defence 
and security issues in the Asia Pacific region is through the ASEAN Regional Forum.”163 
When EU and New Zealand officials were asked about the effectiveness of the ARF, a 
large number considered the institution to be of significant importance. Although most 
interviewees mentioned that little concrete action has resulted from the multilateral 
dialogue process; contra scholarly analysis, the officials did not subscribe to the idea that 
the institution was merely a talk shop.164 The head of the International Defence Relations 
Branch for the New Zealand Ministry of Defence stated that although the ARF can not 
effectively resolve conflict it has “become a useful forum for discussion on regional 
security issues and has spurned an amazing web of confidence building measures 
covering a wide range of security issues.”165 As the current co-host of the forum, the EU 
is very active in the ARF. EU officials that were interviewed believe the ARF is 
progressing well and that many advantages exist in talking.166 As an institution solely 
dedicated to regional security in the Asia Pacific region, the ARF provides for the most 
effective individual dialogue between New Zealand and the European Union, encourages 
peace and promotes effective multilateralism to deal with regional security in region.  
 
The PIF is regarded as an important security institution for the South Pacific region. 
However, unlike the ARF, it is not seen as the most appropriate institution to provide a 
substantial security dialogue for the EU and New Zealand. Similarly, ASEAN does not 
offer a comprehensive environment for EU-NZ security dialogue. Indeed, as these 
institutions’ agendas are divided between security, trade and other objectives, the focus 
on security in the Asia Pacific region can become limited. Despite this, social interaction 
does take place with these institutions. Even if security does not enter into official or 
unofficial dialogue, the political and social links created between EU and New Zealand 
officials should not be underestimated.  
                                                 
163 Goff, Letter from the Minister of Defence to the Author, 13 March 2007. 
164 See Chapter 2 for a more exhaustive explanation of the ARF.  
165 Interview with New Zealand official, 19 April 2007. 
166 Interview EU official, 17 April 2007. 
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Another regional forum that can be often overlooked as a provider of security in the Asia 
Pacific region is the OECD. The Institutional branch of the OECD, the Development Co-
operation Directorate (DAC) and the DAC Network on Conflict, Peace and Development 
Co-operation (CPDC) offer another avenue for EU-NZ security dialogue to take place.167 
The normative value of the DAC-CPDC can be found is in its promotion of a ‘culture of 
conflict prevention,’ which promotes knowledge sharing and cooperation amongst aid 
donors and other regional organisations such as the UN and EU.168 Consequently, the 
security branch of the OECD provides for security cooperation between European and 
New Zealand officials, providing both agencies adopt a proactive stance in their 
relationship.   
 
The UN is of prime importance to both the EU and New Zealand as the global bastion of 
effective multilateralism, the promoter of liberal democratic values and human rights. As 
a substantial partner to the UN, the EU works effectively in areas such as conflict 
prevention, environmental protection and peacekeeping. The UN is an appropriate forum 
for the New Zealand Mission to the UN to cooperate with and influence the EU on issues 
important to New Zealand’s interests. However, influence can be limited by the decision-
making process of the EU: when 27 Member States have gone through a complicated 
process of agreeing on a particular piece of legislation, it is hard for any outside voice to 
be heard. Nevertheless, EU-NZ cooperation within the UN should not be undervalued; 
building relationships on a political and social level will have long-term effects that, 
although not quantifiable, may reap substantial rewards.   
 
New Zealand is also involved with certain areas of the ESDP, which “enables New 
Zealand to remain engaged with European security policy thinking and developments.”169 
Maintaining effective interoperability vis à vis communications and other capabilities 
reinforces New Zealand’s presence as an effective security partner of the EU. 
                                                 
167 The “OECD-DAC provide a good reference for [EU-NZ] dialogue.” See: New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs Archival material: Pacific Donor Consultations, File No: AID/PAC/9, Vol. 3. 
168 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “OECD-DAC,” 
http://www.oecd.org/document/32/0,2340,en_2649_34567_33800224_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
169 Goff, Letter from the Minister of Defence to the Author, 13 March 2007. 
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Relationships that are forged through cooperation in civilian and military fields can have 
positive repercussions for the EU-NZ security dialogue in the long-term. Although many 
of these military operations are played out through New Zealand’s involvement with the 
UN in areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Afghanistan, the continual interaction 
between the two parties benefits the overall EU-NZ security relationship, making it easier 
to discuss security issues in the Asia Pacific region. Similarly, New Zealand’s 
involvement with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) offers another 
possibility for unofficial political and social links to be formed. New Zealand is 
becoming increasingly aligned with NATO as seen in the 2006 US-UK agenda on the 
‘Food for Thought’ on ‘Global Partnerships,’ which seeks to include Australia, Japan and 
New Zealand into a closer alliance with NATO.170 This development will encourage a 
greater NZ-NATO relationship, which also means indirect access to EU personnel. 
Knowledge of operating procedures, compatibility in communications, and 
complementarity in other civilian and military capabilities will strengthen EU-NZ 
military relations and provide for a smoother transition if EU-NZ military actions were to 
eventuate.    
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) provides another implicit avenue for a 
European and New Zealand security dialogue. While the EU is currently not involved 
with PSI, a number of the EU Members States are involved with this security mechanism 
such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Consequently, the so called desktop 
activities and ‘real world’ exercises that have been instigated around the globe – 
including Singapore, Japan, Australia and New Zealand – provide for military and 
customs involvement, including political leaders’ consultation.171 Other events attached 
to PSI also act in accommodating closer networks with Europe and New Zealand such as 
a recent PSI Operational Experts Group meeting held in Auckland in 2007. Reinforcing 
the notion of building social and political contacts through the PSI, European official 
                                                 
170 Uzi Arad, Oded Eran, and Tommy Steiner, “Anchoring Israel to the Euroatlantic Community” in NATO 
and Global Partners: views from the outside, ed. Ronald D. Asmus, Riga Papers (Riga, Latvia: November 
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171 Phill Goff, “Cooperating for Non-Proliferation,” Opening address of the Proliferation Security Initiative 
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noted that the PSI’s main achievement is to have “managed to create a community of 
people working on security issues in the partners countries…the Americans, the British, 
the New Zealanders, the Australian’s – they know each other: they can e-mail each other 
when they have a problem, they can decide to do a supplementary meeting between a few 
countries if they want.”172 Emphasising the significance of social interaction, the official 
went on to describe these connections as being just as important as signing a treaty. 
Consequently, PSI provides an opportunity to increase social and political ties between 
the operating countries.   
Other track-one and track-two institutions also provide opportunities for EU and New 
Zealand officials to meet. Although the calibre of people who meet may not be in a direct 
position to make decisions or enhance the EU-NZ security dialogue, forging links with 
EU and New Zealand practitioners may be beneficial in the long-term, if they enter into a 
decision-making capacity in the future. Furthermore, cooperating and learning from each 
other will influence and build the security culture of the EU and New Zealand in the Asia 
Pacific region. Examples of institutions that represent the EU, its Member States or New 
Zealand include: the IISS Shangri La Dialogue; the FPDA; CSCAP; or the Korean 
Peninsula Energy Development Organisation (KEDO).173  It is interesting to note that the 
IISS Shangri La Dialogue 2007 agenda provides for one and a half days of informal 
bilateral meetings between Defence Ministers and officials.174 This example illustrates 
the rising importance and value seen in promoting informal networks to provide closer 
cooperation between states and regions.    
Regional institutions can quantify the EU-NZ relationship by providing a meeting place 
for both parties to discuss security-related issues on the Asia Pacific region. It is an 
efficient and cost-effective avenue for New Zealand officials to expand and deepen 
relations that can produce a greater volume of dialogue in the future. The ARF, as a 
specific security institution, offers the best avenue for New Zealand security consultation 
                                                 
172 Interview with European official, 17 April 2007. 
173 NB: this organisation is now effectively moribund as the main project, the Light Water Reactor Project 
(LWRP), has been cancelled. 
174 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The IISS Shangri-La Dialogue,” 
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with the EU. The other institutions mentioned, while not all specific to security in the 
Asia Pacific region or directly relevant to the EU-NZ security dialogue, do offer the value 
of establishing vital links by encouraging social and political interaction. This will 
certainly enhance the security culture amongst EU and New Zealand officials in the Asia 
Pacific region.  
 
EU Member State’s Bilateral Dialogue 
Three influential Member States of the EU – France, Germany and Britain – have 
security-related interests and dialogue with New Zealand on the Asia Pacific region. 
Portugal also maintains some interest in the region, which is mainly limited to East Timor 
for historical reasons. Although these interests are not directly involved with the EU, 
Member States do influence the decisions made within EU’s institutions. The limited 
interests of Member States can also act as a precursor for greater EU-led involvement in 
the region.  
 
British involvement continues to be substantial vis à vis its diplomacy in the Asia Pacific 
region. Britain is no longer a significant trading partner with the Asia Pacific region; 
however, it does share a solid loyalty with the region, which is reflected in its provision 
of 15 per cent of the EU’s development funds to the Pacific.175 Several factors lodge 
Britain’s interests firmly in the Asia Pacific, these include: its three ‘Realms’ – Papua 
New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu – in the South Pacific; deep historical 
roots; and the fact that Britain wishes to maintain influence over PICs connected to the 
Commonwealth as they make up more than 10 votes in the UN. Due to the above 
mentioned factors, maintaining formal dialogue with the South Pacific would seem an 
obvious vocation for Britain. It comes as some surprise then, that Britain has recently 
closed down diplomatic missions in Tonga, Kiribati, Vanuatu and East Timor, and has 
ended bilateral aid through the British Department for International Development 
(DFID). Commenting on this, British officials noted that “this has created an impression 
of UK withdraw from the Pacific…this perception has weakened our ability to influence 
                                                 
175 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival material: Europe, “FCO Strategy for the Pacific 
2007-2009,” Executive summary (October 2006), File no. AID/EUR/DA/1, Vol. 1. 
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developments in the region and possibly cost votes in the UN.”176 However, Britain aims 
to change this image by cooperating more closely with PICs through bilateral and 
regional dialogues with New Zealand and Australia in general and with the EU in 
particular.177 Concern over its image, and its resolve in amending the negative effects of 
its actions, will encourage Britain to promote the EU-NZ security dialogue as an 
“effective multiplier of the UK position”178 and act as an alternative means of 
maintaining an interest and influence in the Pacific. Consequently, it can be expected that 
a certain amount of British lobbying for a deeper EU-NZ dialogue will eventuate.   
 
France is currently the largest European influence in the Asia Pacific region. Indeed, its 
dependencies – New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Funtana – account for 
its significant diplomatic and military presence in the region.  New Zealand enjoys close 
security relations with France, which are founded on two primary agreements: the Joint 
Declaration on Maritime Surveillance and Combating Illegal, Unregulated and 
Unreported (IUU) Fishing, signed in 2006; and the ‘FRANZ’ agreement on disaster relief 
between France, Australia and New Zealand, signed in 1993. The disaster relief efforts by 
France, such as the recent Tsunami in the Solomon Islands, have been heralded by New 
Zealand officials as complimentary and effective.179 In regard to fishing surveillance, the 
agreement signed in 2006 attempts to avoid duplication by providing close 
communication and intelligence. In addition to the joint collaboration on surveillance, the 
New Zealand Army cooperate with New Caledonian troops. There is currently a good 
level of complementarity between the forces as they participate in regular exercise 
programmes, fisheries surveillance and disaster relief programmes.180 French embassy 
staff also meets with New Zealand’s MFAT staff approximately every three or four 
months to discuss matters of interest including security in the Asia Pacific region. The 
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withdraw of the British in the Pacific and limited efforts of the US, combined with 
increasing Japanese and Chinese involvement has, arguably, increased New Zealand’s 
relationship with France and possibly enhanced the EU-NZ security dialogue.181 Constant 
interaction between New Zealand and France through a number of effective avenues, 
pertaining to security in the Asia Pacific region, encourages closer cooperation and 
provides French officials with a higher understanding of New Zealand culture, its values, 
crisis management, customs processes and diplomatic procedures. France is currently the 
only EU Member State that cooperates on a military basis and continues to be the most 
active European security partner with New Zealand. Security relations between France 
and New Zealand contribute to security efforts in the Asia Pacific region and will 
continue to prove to be a viable and implicit means of increasing the EU-NZ security 
relationship in the Asia Pacific region. 
 
Germany’s focus on security is not as strong as French or British influences in the Asia 
Pacific region. However, it often consults with New Zealand’s MFAT, maintains 
trilateral political planning staff meetings between Australia and New Zealand, and 
supports regional integration through diplomatic efforts.182 Germany is also involved 
with track-one and two regional security institutions and seminars. For example, 
Germany co-sponsored the ARF Workshop on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) 
in 2005.183 Historical links with the South Pacific may keep Germany’s interests in the 
Pacific, but it currently remains limited as an effective avenue for EU-NZ security 
relations.  
 
Visits by EU Member States to New Zealand have functioned as a catalyst by enhancing 
the EU-NZ dialogue. A medium-term objective of New Zealand’s MFAT, as outlined in 
it annual report, is to “strengthen New Zealand’s engagement with Europe.”184 This has 
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been done by hosting a number of European officials. In 2006 visits included: the 
Belgium, British, Ireland and Malta Prime Ministers; Ministers from Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Switzerland and the Ukraine; 
Governor-General to Ireland and Greece; the President of Lithuania; the French Minister 
for Overseas Territories; and senior members of the European and French Parliaments 
and the Spanish Senate. According to MFAT, these visits have increased engagement 
with the EU and key members over a full range of New Zealand interests…[culminating 
in] closer EU/NZ cooperation.”185   
 
4.4 The Importance of the EU-NZ Security Dialogue 
 
How officials and practitioners perceive the importance of the EU-NZ security dialogue 
for the Asia Pacific region will affect the decisions and actions they make. Thus, from a 
constructivist perspective, exploring the perceptions of EU and New Zealand officials 
involved with security or international affairs in the Asia Pacific region will help 
elucidate why the current volume of dialogue exists and how it might develop. The 
following outlines the responses of 10 interviews conducted in Brussels and Wellington 
in 2006 and 2007. 
 
While official rhetoric trumpets the significance of the EU-NZ security dialogue,186 there 
was a mixed response from EU and New Zealand officials when questioned on the 
importance of the security consultations in regard to the Asia Pacific region. Over half of 
the interviewees considered the EU-NZ security dialogue to be ‘important’ to ‘very 
important’ for the Asia Pacific region. However, the interviewees either had alternative 
ideas about what the security relationship constituted or possessed little understanding of 
what actually exists: for example, the biannual ministerial consultation between the EU 
Troika and the New Zealand Foreign Minister was barely mentioned or alluded to. The 
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186 See Helen Clark, “Facing a complex future: Prime Minister Helen Clark congratulates the NZIIA on 
reaching another significant milestone and outlines her government's approach to foreign affairs in the new 
millennium.” New Zealand International Review 29, no. 5 (Sept-Oct 2004): 3.  
 65 
minority who did have a coherent understanding of the relationship were more cautious 
in their analysis, noting the importance of the dialogue as ‘not greatly significant.’ 
However, they did not underestimate its growing significance, predicting a closer 
relationship with the EU in the future.187 The increasing role of the EU in the Asia Pacific 
region was seen as the major incentive to deepen dialogue as there would be more 
security issues to discuss and cooperate on. Indeed, it has only been in the last few years 
that the Asia Pacific region has come into the agenda.188 Lastly, one participant 
concluded that the relationship was of limited importance, branding New Zealand as a 
limited player too far removed from the EU to be effective. 
 
The amount of resources available to the EU and New Zealand directly affects the 
volume of dialogue possible. For example, the French would like to step up the 
involvement of exercise programmes with French troops but New Zealand has declined 
due to its limited resources. Indeed, a number of EU and New Zealand official’s noted 
that limited human resources were the primary reason for not having a deeper dialogue.189 
The lack of resources also illustrates the importance of the dialogue for the EU and New 
Zealand. If the dialogue was prioritised more highly, and if it was accepted that 
increasing the volume of dialogue would be beneficial for the EU and New Zealand, 
human and financial resources would become less of a hurdle. While accepting that the 
volume of dialogue can be heavily influenced by human and financial resources, the 
capacity of the EU-NZ security dialogue can increase with careful planning and effective 
preparation.  
 
While resources will always be limited, how officials perceive the EU will have a 
dramatic effect on the future volume of EU-NZ security dialogue. As it stands, the 
relationship is seen as important but not overly significant. New Zealand and the EU both 
have interests in the Asia Pacific region and certainly understand the positive 
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implications of cooperation. However, until the EU increases its political profile in the 
Asia Pacific region, the volume of dialogue will not substantially increase.       
 
4.5 Results of the European Union and New Zealand 
Security Dialogue 
 
Looking at the results of the EU-NZ security dialogue provides an appropriate method to 
determine the effectiveness and value of the relationship. However, this is largely 
determined by how success is defined. In line with the theoretical constructs of this 
thesis, a constructivist approach would place high value in the quality and quantity of 
social interaction. In this regard, increasing political ties and social interaction on security 
issues in the Asia Pacific region – which is further reinforced by recent diplomatic 
manoeuvres, international developments, and the evolving nature of the EU’s political 
role in the world – can be viewed as successful. While it is difficult to quantify the effect 
of informal dialogue and link social interaction and learning to political actions and 
decisions, continual formal and informal bilateral dialogue between New Zealand and the 
EU will increase the likelihood of closer security cooperation. Through knowledge and 
information sharing greater coordination and complementarity can be developed, 
promoting a better regional security environment for the Asia Pacific region in the future. 
Apart from forming closer links, the dialogue has also resulted in the signing of an 
updated Action Plan in May 2007, enhanced cooperation in environmental and 
development assistance, and an EU-NZ joint support for the policing system in 
Bougainville.190 Through a constructivist lens, the measurement of success will be 
dependent on the long-term outcomes of the dialogue; however, it would appear that the 
developing dialogue is certainly positive.  
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Conclusion 
 
Perceptions matter in international relations. The choices actors make are determined by 
a number of intervening and independent variables; social interaction and cultural 
perceptions are variables seldom analysed in political science, yet are an essential aspect 
of the international environment. As international actors continue to pay more attention to 
the effects of social and cultural links in global politics, the appropriateness of a 
constructive approach seems warranted. A complex network of EU and New Zealand 
dialogue systems exist with an implicit or explicit association to security in the Asia 
Pacific region. The most effective form of dialogue is found through the ARF as this 
provides a defined and appropriate forum to discuss issues explicitly pertaining to the 
Asia Pacific region. All areas of dialogue – from ministerial consultation meetings to EU 
Member State activities in the PSI – form a conglomerate matrix within which the EU-
NZ security dialogue can be defined. While the importance of social and cultural themes 
in the dialogue are paramount in achieving a complete understanding of the consultation 
processes, the link between self-interest and the collective-interest warrants further 
examination to support a liable constructivist approach. Bound together by common 
values and interests and supported by a plethora of economic, political and cultural links, 
EU-NZ security cooperation is seen as largely significant. The increasing 
interdependence, the rise in regional security issues and a growing EU presence in the 
Asia Pacific region certainly provide fertile grounds for the growth of security dialogue. 
However, the limits of the dialogue are set by the perceptions of EU institutions, the New 
Zealand government and the associated political actors: the security dialogue will only 
develop according to the attention it receives from EU and New Zealand officials.  
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5 New Zealand’s Security-Identity in the Asia 
Pacific Region 
 
Security and defence policies are largely determined by the existing perceptions of the 
ruling elite. These perceptions will help determine the effectiveness and form of bilateral 
or multilateral relationships forged between countries or regions. By analysing New 
Zealand’s approach towards its security and defence policies and investigating what 
affects officials’ perceptions, a specific security-identity can be observed. Reviewing a 
selection of factors within the socio-milieu will help to determine New Zealand’s security 
identity in the Asia Pacific region and, subsequently, determine the depth and volume of 
the EU-NZ security relationship (see Figure 2.1). When New Zealand representatives 
participate in bilateral, multilateral or (sub) regional settings, the various identity 
formations will react with each other, through the process of socialisation, contributing 
towards possible increases in discourse volume.191 Not all socio-cultural or socio-political 
factors can be analysed; however, certain elements that are seen to be vital to the EU-NZ 
security dialogue are examined. These include: the influence of historical perceptions; 
New Zealand’s Asia Pacific connection; the impact of geography and size of New 
Zealand; its perceived threats; and capabilities. How New Zealand officials comprehend 
and prioritise their security environment, and define security, is also analysed in this 
section. These factors are analysed through the lens of the Labour government’s values 
and principles which provides the impetus and reveals the direction of New Zealand’s 
current foreign policy. New Zealand’s security-identity formation will be later analysed, 
compared and contrasted against an EU security-identity, resulting in a concise 
understanding of the EU-NZ security relationship.         
 
Political rhetoric, echoed through certified documents, interviews and speeches, are used 
to explore the official position of New Zealand’s security and defence policies in the Asia 
Pacific region. It is recognised that political rhetoric may not match political reality: 
                                                 
191 See Figure 2.1. The factors that contribute to the security identity of New Zealand and the European 
Union, while not complete, have been chosen due to their socio-political tenants, accessibility of data and 
diverse characteristics.  
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values and norms can be compromised in order to achieve a particular agenda or to 
manoeuvre around diplomatic barriers. However, from a constructivist perspective, 
political rhetoric serves a purpose in illustrating intent and revealing the various facets 
that contribute to the formation of a security-identity. Furthermore, the content of 
political rhetoric remains useful as it is connected to and affects stereotypes and shapes 
perspectives.  
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the area of analysis that this section will focus on. In order to 
establish a clear understanding of ‘A’ (NZ-EU Security Dialogue in the Asia Pacific 
Region), area ‘B’ (New Zealand Security Culture in the Asia Pacific Region) will be 
analysed in this chapter.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1:  Area of analysis: New Zealand’s security culture in the Asia 
Pacific region 
 
 
 
 
Key 
A: NZ-EU Security Dialogue in the Asia 
Pacific Region 
B: New Zealand Security Culture in the Asia 
Pacific Region 
C: EU Security Culture in the Asia Pacific 
Region 
(i):  Asia Pacific Region  
(ii): EU-NZ security cooperation outside of the 
Asia Pacific region 
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5.1 Historical Perceptions 
The alternation of forgetting and remembering 
etches the path of power.192  
Matha Minow 
 
New Zealand’s security and defence involvement in the Asia Pacific region has laid the 
social and political foundations upon which current New Zealand foreign policy is built. 
This section will determine what elements of the past – from the Second World War to 
the present – contribute to the outlook of current New Zealand foreign policy on the Asia 
Pacific region. In the last 62 years New Zealand has built strong social, cultural and 
economic networks in South East Asia and the Pacific. This, combined with past 
diplomatic and military endeavours, may prove valuable for the EU-NZ security 
dialogue. By providing appropriate socio-political information to EU officials, a culture- 
focused aspect of the dialogue can develop. Recognising the various aspects within the 
formation of New Zealand’s security-identity will enable a succinct comparative study to 
take place between the EU and New Zealand. A number of themes run through the last 60 
years of New Zealand’s security relationship with Asia Pacific. These factors include 
collective security, effective multilateralism, an evolving independent foreign policy and 
a shared history, producing intimate diplomatic relations.  
  
New Zealand’s defence planning was moulded around its unquenchable loyalty to Britain 
in the first half of the 19th century, as its primary security provider. However, during and 
after the Second World War New Zealand began to change its approach. This did not 
mean a departure from its defence relations with Britain but rather marked the start of a 
collective security approach: a search for appropriate allies that could ensure security. 
Although weapons continued to be procured from Britain, and English military traditions 
were maintained after the Second World War, New Zealand acquired a stronger security 
                                                 
192 Matha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass violence 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), 119. In Jan-Werner Müller, “Introduction: the power of memory, the 
memory of power and the power over memory,” in Memory and Power in Post-War Europe: Studies in the 
Presence of the Past, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge; United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), 30. 
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partnership with Australia – under the Canberra Pact – and with the US.193 A strong 
commitment to multilateralism through the UN, combined with British, Australian and 
US security cooperation, set the foundations of New Zealand’s foreign policy for the first 
three decades after the War. The 1970s marked a period of change for New Zealand 
foreign policy. British entry in to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 and 
New Zealand’s firm stance against nuclear weapons diminished the US and British 
security dialogue. This meant that closer defence and security alliances were forged with 
Australia and support for regional security mechanisms grew. Recent efforts involving 
New Zealand personnel in Cambodia in the early 1990s, the deployment of troops to the 
Solomon Islands under the auspices of RAMSI in 2003, and to Timor Leste in 1999, 
reflect a continuum of regional support and adherence to collective security in New 
Zealand foreign policy. This, and occasionally sounding an independent voice in the 
international arena – such as Labour’s stand against Nuclear weapons in the 1980s – 
continue as major themes in New Zealand foreign policy.          
 
The Pacific Island Countries (PICs) 
In the post colonial period of New Zealand’s security involvement in the Pacific, 
diplomatic and cultural ties were deepened. New Zealand’s colonial heritage created firm 
links with the Pacific, which provided a firm base for continual contact. This was often in 
the form of development aid, diplomatic assistance and military interventions.   
 
The first key regional initiative directly aimed at the Pacific, after the Second World War, 
was the creation of the SPC (South Pacific Commission) in 1947. During the 1950s and 
1960s New Zealand’s approach towards the Pacific was bound in idealism and 
optimism.194 Open immigration policies and diplomatic assistance increased socio-
political and cultural links between the Pacific and New Zealand. The 1970s saw a 
marked change in New Zealand’s external polices. Diplomatic perspectives looked past 
                                                 
193 Peter Greener, “New Zealand and the Push for Peace: Developing an independent Foreign Policy” in 
Push for Peace, Commemorating the Past, Reflecting on the Present, Resolving Conflict in the Future, ed. 
Peter Greener (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2005), 51. 
194 Stephen Hoadley, Pacific Island Security Management by New Zealand & Australia: Towards a New 
Paradigm (Wellington, New Zealand: Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 
2005), 6. 
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their colonial responsibilities towards a greater recognition of the strategic importance of 
the Asia Pacific region. 195 Fraudulence and corruption, mixed with environmental 
disasters, created a heightened awareness of the various problems associated with the 
Pacific. This resulted in a redirection and expansion of New Zealand’s aid programme to 
maintain stability.196 Greater alliance systems also developed, including a movement 
towards regionalism as a vehicle for dialogue, such as the South Pacific Forum197 and the 
Forum Fisheries Agency, established in 1971 and 1977 respectively.198 Diplomatic 
thought also stressed the so-called Pacific Way; a notion coined by Ratu Sir Kamisese 
Mara, which stresses ideals of non-intervention and tolerance. This diplomatic approach 
has certainly influenced Pacific leaders, resulting in intimate bilateral and regional 
dialogue. The philosophic introduction of the ‘failed state’ concept in the 1990s also saw 
a growth in the New Zealand and Australian management of Pacific affairs to ensure 
stability. This could often be in the form of development aid or military interaction. 
Through the Biketawa Declaration, under the auspices of the PIF, regional security 
manoeuvres could be authorised, such as military involvement in Bougainville, the 
Solomon Islands, Nauru and Tonga. Maintaining peace and stability through 
development aid, diplomatic manoeuvres and military interventions, as well as promoting 
New Zealand values, has characterised New Zealand’s involvement in the Pacific. The 
colonial zeitgeist may influence the current strategy in the Pacific; however, the primary 
motivation for a peaceful Pacific has been the security of New Zealand. 
 
South East Asia 
Despite a continual and earnest presence in the Pacific during the second half of the 19th 
century, South East Asia was a primary focus for New Zealand’s strategic interests. 
During the first two decades after the Second World War, New Zealand’s main approach 
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in the region was defence and development.199 During the Cold War struggling regimes 
in South East Asia, coupled with a perceived threat of communism, provided the impetus 
to promote regional stability.200 Thus, the ‘forward defence’ strategy was implemented to 
preserve physical, ideological and economic interests. Apart from keeping the 
communists at a distance, the second objective of the ‘forward defence’ was to retain the 
capabilities and presence key allies – Australia, Britain and the United States – in South 
East Asia.  
 
Although collective security and development aid continued, New Zealand’s philosophy 
began to alter. In the 1970s, the Kirk government chose to eliminate ‘forward defence’ in 
favour of a ‘moral’ foreign policy.201 During the following decades, New Zealand 
improved its diplomatic and economic relations with South East Asia, including the 
recognition of China in 1972. The bilateral contacts based on defence and aid slowly 
changed to a multilateral approach based on trade and aid development. Although New 
Zealand may have lost some diplomatic intimacy with the narrowing of its bilateral 
dialogue, other social, economic and military links were maintained, such as exchanges, 
increases in trade links, and the decision to keep New Zealand forces in Singapore until 
1989.202 The forward defence strategy has long been out of use, however, one aspect 
remains: a reliance on the capabilities and presence of allies. Due to a limited budget and 
defence capabilities, New Zealand’s dependence on Australia, America and Britain has 
been a constant theme for New Zealand foreign policy. Indeed, New Zealand’s Foreign 
Minister noted, “[w]e need the United States, as well as Australia, to be intimately 
engaged in the Pacific if we are to be successful in our own endeavours.”203 
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Collective Security 
New Zealand’s commitment to collective security has developed from its inauguration 
into the UN in 1945 to paramountcy in current foreign policy perspectives.204 New 
Zealand’s regional security efforts in the Asia Pacific region have been active for over 
half a century. The political, diplomatic, social and economic networks established during 
this time have provided New Zealand with an intimate knowledge of the region and an 
awareness of regional security institutions. In an effort to counter the spread of 
communism, the Colombo Plan was established in 1950, which was designed to alleviate 
poverty through development assistance and aid.205 Other regional defence and security 
institutions were also created, such as ANZAM (Australia, New Zealand and Malaya) in 
the 1950s, the AMDA (Anglo-Malayan Defence Alliance) in 1957, the PIF, and the 
FPDA, which took over the AMDA in 1971. Apart from these regional efforts, New 
Zealand also committed troops to the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve, 
participated in SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organisation) and formed an official 
dialogue process based on defence cooperation with ASEAN in 1975.206 Although the 
PIF, the FPDA and ASEAN are the only surviving institutions, the network of regional 
and bilateral relations New Zealand supported in the Asia Pacific region introduced New 
Zealand to Asia and deepened bonds in the Pacific. The Colombo Plan instigated 
exchanges between South East Asia and New Zealand, technical staff were provided to 
assist in administrational duties and even the, now moribund, SEATO proved to “increase 
New Zealand’s awareness of South East Asia and of issues related to regional security, 
defence and development.”207 Civil-society networks were also established and economic 
links grew in reaction to the narrowing of the British market. Other institutional ‘spin-
offs’ developed along side ASEAN, such as post-ministerial conferences, the Shangri-La 
Dialogue and the ARF.  
 
New Zealand’s long history in regional groupings has created an intimate knowledge of 
regional processes and strong contacts, which creates a socio-political advantage in its 
                                                 
204 For more on the evolution of New Zealand’s adherence to regionalism and collective security see 
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relations with South East Asia. Although officials have been cautious in joining regional 
bodies, often questioning ‘value for money,’208 there remains little opportunity to secure 
peace other than through regional dialogue mechanisms. 
  
The legacy of New Zealand’s current foreign policy approach, steeped in morality and 
chosen out of necessity, has formed a unique and somewhat predictable security-identity. 
Traits from the past continue to add to the formation of a specific security-identity, such 
as reliance upon regional structures and allies, an independent voice in external relations, 
close cultural and economic ties, and successful diplomatic prowess. The historical 
approach to foreign policy has evolved to become more assertive, while maintaining an 
air of impartiality. The direction of the continually evolving foreign policy will be guided 
by the policies inherent in national politics.  
 
5.2 National Politics  
 
Labour and National approaches to Foreign Policy 
A marked difference exists between Labour and National approaches to foreign policy. 
Although there are exceptions to the rule, it is generally recognised that the current 
Labour-led government pursues a more active, yet idealistic, perspective toward its 
foreign policy. It takes on a broader definition of security, limiting its military efforts 
primarily to the South Pacific and multilateral endeavours, such as NATO or the UN.209 
Conversely, the National Party maintains a traditional and more inward approach to 
foreign policy, concerned with homeland security and trade.210 National’s focus is 
primarily directed towards establishing close relationships with large powers that can 
offer a security umbrella for New Zealand, essentially “configuring its defence force to fit 
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in with alliance requirements.”211 When Labour took over government in 1999, one of its 
key priorities mentioned in its manifesto was to create a new approach to defence.212 The 
following analysis primarily focuses on Labour’s ‘new’ perspective on New Zealand’s 
foreign and security policies. 
 
5.3 New Zealand’s Concept of Security  
 
Defining Security  
The structure of New Zealand’s security and defence polices is conditioned by how state 
actors define the concept of security. It unequivocally affects how the government 
approaches international relations, such as the EU-NZ security dialogue. If New Zealand 
maintains an alternative or dissimilar concept of security to the EU, the volume of 
dialogue can become limited. Thus, it is vital to explore the security conceptualisations 
inherent in New Zealand foreign policy. The current Labour government’s 
conceptualisation of security can be seen in its Defence Policy Framework, produced in 
June 2000: “[d]efence policy and foreign policy are a partnership aimed at securing New 
Zealand’s physical, economic, social and cultural well being, and meeting our regional 
and global responsibilities.”213 More specifically, New Zealand’s current definition of 
security holds a non-traditional outlook. In a recent speech made by the current New 
Zealand Defence Minister, the Hon Phil Goff stated: 
 
Our strategic perspective is that while New Zealand at present is not threatened militarily 
by another state, we face non-traditional security threats in areas such as biosecurity, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, trans-national crime and terrorism. We 
have other concerns about the destabilisation of our region from the availability of black 
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market military weapons, natural disasters, and state fragility and failure in the Pacific 
and beyond.214 
 
Echoing Labour’s perspectives on security, Goff depicts a wide view of security, which 
encompasses the idea of ‘human security’ and accepts traditional and non-traditional 
security issues.215 In contrast to New Zealand’s understanding of security during the Cold 
War, it is now understood that security encompasses areas not aligned with traditional 
concepts of security, such as military and state-to-state conflict.216 The impact of 
globalisation and technology has created an environment of transnational security threats, 
highlighting the need for increased multilateral cooperation. Some critics are concerned 
that a wide view of security will militarise or securitize previously non-traditional 
activities.217 However, New Zealand’s need to prioritise security challenges according to 
officials’ perspectives and capabilities reduces the disadvantages of a wide outlook on 
security. How New Zealand officials perceive threats also helps to further define a clear 
concept of New Zealand’s strategic outlook. 
 
Perceived Security Threats to New Zealand  
New Zealand has a unique strategic perspective as a country that does not see itself as a 
threat, nor believes that there are any immediate security threats against its national 
sovereignty or well-being. Former Prime Minister, David Lange, once wrote that “New 
Zealand is a dagger pointed at the heart of Antarctica.”218 Although the nature of security 
has changed considerably from the time Lange talked about images of security, New 
Zealand officials continue to see themselves as non-threatening and consider real security 
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threats to New Zealand to be severely limited. Despite this, there are security challenges 
that, while not affecting New Zealand security directly or in the traditional sense, could 
impinge on the well-being of New Zealand. From a constructivist point of view, what a 
nation defines as a security threat will generally be the major security issue at one point 
in time. Thus, as stated by two leading security officials in the current government, the 
perceived security challenges that New Zealand recognises for the Asia Pacific region 
include: terrorism; transnational crime; disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons; the environment; HIV/AIDS; and the illegal movement of people, drugs and 
weapons.219 The security challenges outlined are all important to New Zealand’s strategic 
environment, however, what state actors prioritise as the major issues will have an effect 
on the final security-identity formation.  
 
New Zealand officials prioritise terrorism as the current largest, transnational security 
challenge. Political rhetoric portrays concern that terrorism could threaten the “rule of 
law, and freedoms that are inseparable from our way of life.”220 Both the government’s 
Communication Assessments Bureau report and the New Zealand Security Intelligence 
Service report for the year ending 2005 stated that counter-terrorism continues to be the 
main focus for their departments.221 Although terrorism is currently prioritised as the 
leading security challenge, other threats also remain in New Zealand’s security 
consciousness. 
 
Perceived Security Threats to the Asia Pacific Region  
The strategic environment within the Asia Pacific region remains a crucial security 
challenge for New Zealand. Officials are aware that poverty and weak governance 
                                                 
219 See Goff, “Transformation of the New Zealand Defence Forces.” And Marian Hobbs, “Securing Peace: 
New Zealand’s Role” in Securing a Peaceful Pacific, ed. John Henderson and Greg Watson (Christchurch, 
New Zealand: Canterbury University Press, 2006), 21. 
220 Winston Peters, “Security Policy Responses to a Challenging World,” Address to the Centre for 
Strategic Studies Conference: ‘The Asia Pacific: Future Strategic Perspectives’ (13 December 2006), 
www.beehive.govt.nz.  
221 New Zealand’s Security Intelligence Service, Report of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service: 
Report to the House of Representatives, 2005 (Wellington, 30 June 2005), 6., http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/ 
publications/. Also see New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau, The Government’s 
Communications Security Bureau Annual Report, (Wellington, 30 June 2005), 5., http://www.gcsb. 
govt.nz/publications/annualreports/2005/.  
 79 
contribute to potential security threats. Transnational crime, HIV/AIDS, the illegal 
movement of people, drugs and weapons, environmental issues – such as competition for 
marine resources and global warming – are real security challenges that can occur as a 
result of political and social instability.222 New Zealand highly values contacts in the Asia 
Pacific, including trade, economic, political and defence ties and other linkages through 
migration, education, cultural and private sectors. These factors create a complicated 
network that can be jeopardised by conflict or internal insecurity.223 New Zealand’s 
Foreign Minister recently stated that there is currently a growing anxiety amongst New 
Zealand officials in assuring the general stability of the Asia Pacific region.224 Apart from 
key interests in the Pacific, areas of concern in the wider geo-strategic area include the 
Taiwan Straits, the Korean Peninsula and South Asia.225 Other strategic flashpoints, such 
as the Spratly Islands or protecting key sea lanes are also recognised as possible security 
challenges. Competition between Japan, Korea, Taiwan, the US and China for fishing 
access in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of Pacific Islands also generates 
considerable concern amongst New Zealand officials.226 However, the general attitude 
amongst top New Zealand diplomats is that actual conflict is unlikely, as this could affect 
critical Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and dependent economic needs in South East 
Asia.227 For many New Zealand officials who were interviewed, the primary security 
concern in the Pacific region is the fragility of PICs, which is connected to transnational 
crime and poor governance issues. In South East Asia, terrorism and nuclear non 
proliferation were mentioned as the dominant security challenges. Other security threats 
that continue to plague the minds of New Zealand officials were China-Taiwan rivalry, 
Sino-Japanese relations, transport issues, climate change, population and health issues. 
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Another transnational issue is New Zealand’s strong conviction against the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons and supporting disarmament initiatives. This has long been a security 
concern for New Zealand that is deeply woven into the fabric of New Zealand society. 
The New Zealand government firmly believes in a collective approach to the global 
ratification of an all-inclusive Nuclear Test Ban treaty.228   
 
Looking at security through a wide or non-traditional lens, the current Labour-led 
government considers its administration to be in a privileged position as a country that 
has no direct security threats. Specific security challenges that are predominantly 
transnational in nature continue to direct New Zealand’s foreign and security policy. 
Understanding how New Zealand conceptualises security and what the explicit security 
challenges are, will mean that a comparative analysis can be performed against EU 
conceptualisation to ascertain where divergences and convergences lie.   
 
5.4 ‘The Book End of Asia:’ Geographical Perceptions of 
New Zealand in the Asia Pacific Region  
 
Defining the Asia Pacific Region 
How New Zealand officials perceive their immediate and peripheral security environment 
has a considerable affect on the security relationships that are forged within the Asia 
Pacific region and beyond. The volume of EU-NZ security dialogue can also be affected 
by how state actors define the Asia Pacific region. Even though “perceiving Asia is but 
an indispensable national experience of New Zealand in confronting its Asian destiny,”229 
little scholarly work has been undertaken on New Zealand’s perceptions of Asia. For 
these reasons it is necessary to identify how New Zealand understands and perceives its 
geographic location and the Asia Pacific region. Indeed, this sentiment is reflected in the 
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New Zealand’s Foreign Minsters own words:  “It is the nation in the mirror that shapes 
how we look in and how we look out in the Pacific.”230 
 
It is generally understood that New Zealand officials see South East Asia and the Pacific 
as two separate entities. Three major reasons for this have been accredited to trade, 
geography and culture. The difference in trade relations between the South Pacific and 
South East Asia has been substantial, which reinforces an imaginary demarcation line 
between the Pacific and South East Asia.231 New Zealand’s position and its commitments 
in the South Pacific, such as its responsibilities for the security and defence of Tokelau, 
the Cook Islands and Niue, creates an environment in which New Zealand is compelled 
to prioritise its diplomatic and security efforts towards the South Pacific.232 Although 
South East Asia and the Pacific are generally separated, political rhetoric will often 
combine the two as Asia Pacific. New Zealand’s MFAT defines Asia Pacific as the 
“[c]ountries of Asia from China South to Indonesia, with Australia, New Zealand and the 
Pacific Islands.”233 Despite this, New Zealand foreign policy clearly defines South East 
Asia and the Pacific separately. The economic, cultural and security needs of the two 
regions clearly provide the impetus for this policy trend.234 Indeed, the physical location 
of New Zealand also influences its understanding of the region.  
 
Conceptualising the Geographical Position and Size of New Zealand 
Geographical isolation combined with the small size of New Zealand’s population, land 
area and economy have created fixed perceptions on how foreign and security policies 
are made.235 The alleged images of New Zealand’s economy, demography, and 
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geography affect how state actors view themselves and perceive their own security 
environment.  
 
New Zealand’s geographical position has created a feeling of security and a non-
threatening environment.236 However, there have been some critics of this position, who 
argue that technology and globalisation have “collapsed distance and abridged the 
tyranny of New Zealand’s remoteness.”237 Indeed, terrorist activities in the Asia Pacific 
region, such as the Bali bombings, draw New Zealand closer to international security 
concerns.238 New Zealand’s tendency to promote multilateral dialogue and its advocacy 
for regional forums, such as the PIF or the ARF, also dilutes the potency of New 
Zealand’s geographical reality. Don McKinnon stated, “while all of the economic, 
political, cultural and people-to-people linkages between New Zealand and the rest of the 
Asia Pacific may be encouraging a sense of New Zealand's regional identity, these have 
not been sufficient to completely undermine the sense of distance in security terms.”239 
The transnational nature of New Zealand’s security challenges seemingly creates a closer 
connection with the world. Nevertheless, as is often the case in politics, perceptions can 
override reality. The future may entail a change in outlook; however, New Zealand’s 
perception of itself remains primarily as a geographically isolated country. The principle 
outcome of this perception is a firm belief that the likelihood of any direct threat on New 
Zealand is very small.240 This has provided New Zealand with an ability to focus more on 
international relationships and regional peacekeeping missions.   
 
The size of New Zealand has created attitudes and stereotypes of how officials see New 
Zealand, which affects foreign policy outcomes. New Zealand’s small and export-
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orientated economy, its population of approximately four million, and its land mass of 
only 268,680 km² contributes to a perception of New Zealand as a small nation. New 
Zealand’s MFAT states that the size of New Zealand “limits its military and diplomatic 
capabilities.”241 Indeed, some officials believe that New Zealand as a small and distant 
country creates vulnerability.242 The current New Zealand Foreign Minister stated that “it 
is axiomatic that remoteness no longer ensures security.”243 Furthermore, a New Zealand 
official interviewed noted that “our biggest limitation is our place, we are so far away 
from anywhere…even if money was no object we would be hard placed to defend 
ourselves simply because of our location and our coastline.” However, in defence of 
these shortfalls, the advantages inherent in soft-power have been promoted.244 New 
Zealand’s diplomatic approach to security challenges will often be through negotiation 
and promoting its own values. The advocacy for multilateral or regional dialogue has, 
thus, been favoured to reduce the disadvantages seen in being a small country. Terrence 
O’Brian argues that New Zealand favours a balance of interests over a balance of power: 
the “absence of critical mass diminishes NZ negotiating leverage in bilateral dealings. It 
is active, therefore, in multilateral diplomacy.”245 However, this does not mean that 
multilateral settings are perceived to be better than bilateral dialogue, rather they should 
be viewed as complementary.  
 
5.5 Normative Values 
 
A Good Global Citizen 
Under the rubric of the Labour-led government, supporting the ideas and values that 
reinforce international legal norms remains a substantial aspect for New Zealand foreign 
policy. The principles contained within the UN charter and Western-orientated values are 
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the primary foundations of New Zealand’s security and foreign policies.246 Due to its 
emphasis on soft power, New Zealand pursues an active and zealous policy in promoting 
impartiality, justice, nation-building, peace and security. Indeed, New Zealand has been 
ranked forth in the world for its quality in development and peacekeeping efforts.247 The 
foreign policy of New Zealand has created an identity of a ‘good global citizen.’ MFAT’s 
Statement of Intent identifies that “the main rationale for our [security] involvement may 
be values-based or motivated by good international citizen considerations.”248 Perhaps 
the impetus behind this rationale can be found in New Zealand’s perception of itself as a 
small country with limited capabilities that feels compelled to ‘punch above its weight’ in 
order to gain recognition in the international system. Complying with international 
standards, such as the Legal Counter-terrorism Framework and the UN Conventions on 
Terrorism reflects a standard approach of New Zealand’s foreign policy.249 
 
Cultural Values: New Zealand’s Pacific Connection and South East 
Asian Ties 
New Zealand’s unique affinity with the South Pacific and growing connection with South 
East Asia has a significant affect on its security policies in the region, and is reinforced 
by its cultural and geographic identity. New Zealand has adopted a Pacific identity,250 
which places its security policies in a more fixed position and adds to the formation of a 
security-identity.  
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The demography of New Zealand illustrates a considerable and increasing amount of 
immigration by Asian and Pacific Island peoples; 6.9 per cent of New Zealand’s 
population are from the Pacific Islands, while the proportion of Asian people living in 
New Zealand is 9.2 per cent. The combined Asia Pacific population of New Zealand is 
16.1 per cent, which is higher than the current Māori population of 14.6 per cent.251 Thus, 
the Asia Pacific element portrayed in New Zealand’s population, including Māori, is 30.7 
per cent, a figure approaching a third of the total population in New Zealand. This large 
proportion of the population firmly establishes New Zealand with an Asia Pacific 
identity. Culturally, this grounds New Zealand in the Pacific and provides an added 
advantage for New Zealand security policies and practices in the wider Asia Pacific 
region.  
 
Apart from Asia Pacific demographics, geography and past cultural linkages influence 
New Zealand’s security policies, which seemingly place a larger emphasis on the Pacific 
as opposed to South East Asia. Economic dependence on Asia, coupled with the rising 
power of China and India, focuses New Zealand’s attention increasingly towards South 
East Asia. The establishment of a ministerial task force to Asia and the launch of the 
‘Seriously Asia’ programme is evidence of increasing ties with the wider Asia Pacific 
area.252 From a trade and security perspective, South East Asia commands a great deal of 
attention. However, for a number of cultural, social and historical reasons, New 
Zealand’s affinity with the Pacific remains strong and arguably paramount in importance. 
Indeed, the perception Asian countries have of New Zealand’s identity also determines 
how New Zealand perceives itself. The Chinese Foreign Secretary, in 2002, noted that 
New Zealand will not be voted into ASEM by China under the pretence that New 
Zealand and Australia are not Asian countries.253   
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An example of New Zealand’s socio-political links in the Pacific is well illustrated by the 
effective links forged through the Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs (MPIA). Fuimaono 
Les McCarthy, the Chief Executive of MPIA, argues that substantial Pacific Island 
networks within New Zealand contribute to peace building.254 This is New Zealand’s 
added advantage when approaching security issues in the South Pacific. The MPIA acts 
as a liaison between the government and Pacific communities. Indeed, Les McCarthy 
hints at the idea that there may be a correlation between the Pacific representation in New 
Zealand and peace between those countries.255 New Zealand’s past involvement and its 
relaxed style is well regarded in the Pacific.256 This provides a viable justification to 
deepen bonds, contributes to the well being of PICs, and gives New Zealand a unique 
advantage over other international actors who have an interest in the Pacific. New 
Zealand’s Pacific connection also creates opportunities to impact PICs in ways that other 
international actors cannot. For example, the EU can be perceived as a neo-colonial 
power, whereas New Zealand may be perceived as more of a diplomatically close 
neighbour.  
 
It is interesting to note that while New Zealand tends to be comfortable with its 
diplomatic and cultural position in the Pacific, it remains at times ‘uncertain’ of its 
position in South East Asia. Referring to this, a New Zealand official noted that “we are 
just not quite sure how far we want to go and that creates a sense… [that] we are seen as 
being a little stand offish.”257 In other words, how New Zealand presents itself and how it 
perceives itself in the region will determine the quality of dialogue. The official went on 
to mention that confusion over New Zealand’s membership status vis à vis security 
forums in the Asia Pacific region, can also compromise its ability to be effective. New 
Zealand must understand and assert its identity in the international environment; this will 
help other actors know where New Zealand stands, thereby creating a stable platform for 
security dialogue. Despite this identity-related confusion New Zealand increasingly sees 
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itself as a part of the Asia Pacific region, which has a major significance both politically 
and strategically.258  
 
New Zealand’s focus on the Pacific, as opposed to spreading its security capabilities over 
a wider area, will mean that New Zealand’s security policy will be less dependent on the 
fluctuations prevalent in the international community. This will have the effect of 
creating a strong relational bond with Pacific countries, enabling New Zealand to 
strengthen its strategically committed goal as a mature mediator and security player in the 
South Pacific. This does not mean that New Zealand’s security interests are limited to the 
Pacific, but it must balance its primary concern in the Pacific with regional and 
multilateral efforts outside of the region.  
 
Ensuring a Consent Environment 
Establishing a consent environment – warranting internationally accepted intervention in 
another nation’s sovereignty through informal and formal permission - is closely aligned 
with New Zealand’s commitment to international norms and values. Referring to its 
foreign and security policy, the Prime Minister of New Zealand stated that values and 
diplomacy are synonymous in importance and that establishing a consent environment is 
the hallmark of its diplomacy.259 This echoes a contentious dilemma seen in international 
relations theory: the ethics of intervention. As stated in an official MFAT document, New 
Zealand recognises the rising tension “between the need to maintain international peace 
and security and the UN principle of respect for the territorial integrity and political 
independence of Member States.”260 Although official documentation may hint at ethical 
frustrations, New Zealand continues to adhere to international norms. New Zealand’s 
sensitivity in abiding by international norms and values creates a specific security-
identity that will react negatively or positively in international dialogue. Security and 
defence capabilities also influence the unique security-identity formation of New 
Zealand.   
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5.6  Capabilities: New Zealand’s Contributions to Security in 
the Asia Pacific Region 
 
The security tools that the New Zealand administration possesses can affect the 
perceptions decision makers have on the security environment in the Asia Pacific region. 
Understanding what capabilities New Zealand has provides insight into the nature of its 
foreign policy and allows a comparison to be made with the EU security culture. New 
Zealand has a multi-pronged approach to security challenges in the region. Development 
assistance, military initiatives, and diplomacy are the three primary capabilities analysed 
in this section. New Zealand’s involvement with institutional initiatives and regional 
security are also explored in order to understand the effectiveness of its security relations 
in the Asia Pacific region. As stated by the current Foreign Minister, using all of these 
capabilities together, the New Zealand government can effectively tackle security 
issues.261 
 
Institutional Assistance 
A heightened awareness of global terrorism has had a considerable effect on the 
capabilities of New Zealand defence. Internal security services have enlarged the budget 
of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS), which increased after the 9/11 
terrorist attacks.262 New Zealand has accepted all 12 UN Conventions on Terrorism and is 
involved with the OECD finance operating team. Under the Defence Sustainability 
Initiative (DSI) the current government also plans to inject NZ $4.6 billion into defence 
over the next 10 years.263 However, the overall defence budget has dropped since 9/11, 
from 1.83 per cent of national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1988 to 0.88 per cent in 
2003-2004.264 Despite this, New Zealand’s security institutions remain adamant in their 
                                                 
261 Peters, “Security Policy Responses to a Challenging World.” 
262 Vaughn, “New Zealand, A Small Nation's Perspective,” 207-8. In Jan 2002, the New Zealand 
Government announced its intention to increase security services (mainly internally as a result of 
heightened awareness of terrorism) and also passed a Terrorism Suppression Act 
263 The Labour Party of New Zealand, 2005 Defence Policy, Labour’s Vision, (2005), 
http://labour.org.nz/policy/foreign_affairs_and_defense/2005policy/Pol05-defence/index.html. 
264 Vaughn, “New Zealand, A Small Nation's Perspective,” 210. 
 89 
commitment to the security of New Zealand and the wider region, as represented in their 
political rhetoric and emerging initiatives.  
 
Development Assistance  
Aid can be used as a form of conflict prevention and can promote anti-terrorism measures 
by promoting good governance and sustainability in developing countries.265 The 
security-orientated rationale for promoting good governance is that ‘failed states’ can 
provide breeding grounds for terrorism. Indeed the current New Zealand Minister of 
Defence stated that failed or failing states act as magnets for terrorist groups.266 Military 
personnel and aid workers are becoming more involved with post reconstruction, such as 
rebuilding the Timorese public sector and assisting in the reconstruction of the local 
Police Force and leadership systems in the Solomon Islands. Education is another area 
that is seen as a valuable tool in promoting security. Disadvantaged youths, high 
unemployment, bad living conditions and ethnic tension culminate to produce fertile 
grounds for corruption and possible terrorist activities. Providing the infrastructure and 
financial support for education, such as NZAID’s contribution in the Solomon Islands,267 
is seen as a long-term solution to limiting the level of corruption in the Asia Pacific 
region. Indeed, the primary focus is about conflict prevention rather than intervention. 
NZAID also assists in areas of law and justice, economic development, capacity building, 
civil society and financial management. For example, in 2004-2005, NZAID provided 
funds for the statistics office, technical assistance and training to customs, and assistance 
to the department of fisheries in Solomon Islands.268 Overall, in 2006-2007, NZAID 
contributed NZ $166.6 million to the Pacific. Despite these aid initiatives, New Zealand’s 
ODA accounts for only 0.23 per cent of New Zealand’s GDP, which is a far cry from the 
UN indicator for ODA at 0.7 per cent. Although New Zealand’s distribution of aid 
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remains relatively low, New Zealand is making real efforts to use economic and cultural 
initiatives to promote security.  
 
Military Initiatives  
New Zealand military capabilities remain a fundamental tool for New Zealand security 
polices. Phil Goff stated that “[i]t is the Army that has had the greatest utility for us in the 
past and this is likely to remain so in the immediate future.”269 Labour’s approach to 
security and its defence capabilities are based around the need to “focus on the intense 
operational demands of the present”270 instead of maintaining traditional capabilities 
against a possible major threat. The New Zealand Defence Forces have become more 
streamlined and focused. Small, deployable peacekeeping units are favoured to assist in 
regional security efforts. New Zealand is also well recognised for its contribution to 
logistical support and long-range communications. With an aim of restoring peace or 
preventing conflict, New Zealand has deployed military units to areas such as the Papua 
New Guinea island of Bougainville, East Timor, Tonga and the Solomon Islands 
(RAMSI).271 Another area of cooperation often underestimated in the security domain is 
customs. New Zealand custom officials work closely with PICs in order to bolster the 
islands’ security. In 2002, under the Defence Long-term Development Plan, the 
government approved more than NZ $3 billion dollars to update and improve essential 
military equipment such as re-winging the Royal New Zealand Air Force’s (RNZAF) 
Orions.272 Continued concentration on interoperable capabilities combined with funding 
and a dedicated component of the New Zealand’s Police Force, are areas that must be 
maintained and strengthened if New Zealand wishes to play a constructive role in the 
international arena.273 New Zealand’s contributions are significant; however, its 
capabilities remain limited leading towards a noticeable reliance on Australian military 
capabilities and assistance. 
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Cooperation within the Pacific continues, allowing for constant interaction which 
promotes interoperability and provides an awareness of different procedures, standards 
and equipment. Although Bruce Vaughn argues that insufficient defence funding will 
mean that the New Zealand Defence Force capabilities will be limited and its policy 
objectives may not be attainable,274 through bilateral or multilateral cooperation, security 
can be better assured. New Zealand’s involvement with various forums – such as the 
Chiefs of Defence Conference (CHODs), the Pacific Air Chiefs’ Conference, or the 
Pacific Armies Chiefs’ Conference as well as mutual assistance programmes275 with 
PICs, Australia and France – increases vital socio-political links in the region. These 
programmes cultivate important cultural knowledge and may enhance the effectiveness of 
regional assistance missions in the future. Furthermore, these missions provide New 
Zealand with an increasing knowledge of the socio-political and security intricacies 
apparent in various corners of the Pacific. Knowing ones neighbour can reduce distrust 
and increase stability in the region. New Zealand military capabilities may not be strong, 
but this can be countered by active participation in regional missions. 
 
How New Zealand Defence Forces are perceived is crucial to the outcome of a particular 
mission. Although the unique, bicultural element in New Zealand’s military is often 
overlooked, the considerable percentage of Māori personnel has created an image of 
harmony amongst races. From Afghanistan to Timor Leste, this image has had a 
“powerful demonstrational effect that shouldn’t be underestimated.”276 This added 
cultural benefit not only impacts the perceptions of foreign observers but also continues 
as an increasingly important feature in a world dominated by sensitivity from race and 
religion.  
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Diplomatic Initiatives 
The use of diplomacy in order to maintain a stable environment in the Asia Pacific is a 
valuable and primary security tool. New Zealand has chosen a logical, multi-pronged 
approach: choosing to operate through regional, multilateral and bilateral contacts in 
order to contribute to and maintain a secure region.  Due to New Zealand’s limited 
capacity to operate militarily, its adherence to international norms and New Zealand’s 
perception of itself as a small country, diplomatic solutions to international security 
threats are often favoured.  
 
In terms of actual capabilities, the budget and number of diplomatic postings to the Asia 
Pacific region have recently increased.277 Based on the number of permanent New 
Zealand diplomatic staff stationed at postings around the globe, currently one quarter of 
all New Zealand diplomatic posts are situated in South East Asia and the Pacific.278 The 
diplomatic missions endeavour to monitor possible security threats and manage crises. 
The missions also attempt to encourage Pacific and Asian countries to promote 
intelligence sharing, adopt internationally recognised legal frameworks, such as the UN 
Conventions against Terrorism, look at ways to enhance security cooperation and limit 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons and illegal arms. For example, diplomats mediated a 
peaceful settlement in Bougainville and give constitutional advice to Fiji and the 
Solomon Islands upon request.  New Zealand also maintains valued bilateral defence 
arrangements with key countries in the Asia Pacific region. From a cultural and historical 
point of view, New Zealand must also maintain its diplomatic support and commitments 
to the Cook Islands and Niue upon request. The Treaty of Friendship with Samoa also 
loosely obligates New Zealand to cooperate on defence with Western Samoa.279 This, 
combined with the 1975 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, aligns New Zealand closely 
with the Pacific, and increasingly Asia, as the primary diplomatic partners in security.  
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Closer ties have also been made in South East Asia to ensure effective security dialogue, 
such as the Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism with 
ASEAN and the establishment of a new Asia Security Fund. Officials are increasingly 
becoming aware that long-term approaches to stopping terrorism through cultural and 
social avenues are important. New Zealand’s involvement in regional interfaith dialogues 
is evidence of a wider approach to security in the Asia Pacific.  Exchanges and nurturing 
future state actors has also been a long-term diplomatic approach in ensuring stability. 
Continuing along the same rubric as the Colombo Plan, set out in the 1950s, the Mekong 
Institute continues to provide training for private and public sector recruits, which 
maintains educational links to South East Asia.280 However, there is still a need to 
cultivate future personnel for ‘international agency positions’281 if New Zealand plan on 
continuing its presence in the Asia Pacific region. 
 
Both EU and New Zealand officials that were interviewed noted that informal contacts 
are an essential element of diplomacy. Indeed, the current New Zealand Defence Minister 
noted that “there is no substitute for well developed people-to-people contacts to 
underpin political relationships.”282 It is through these links that common ideas and 
perceptions can be forged, expanding the content and capability of dialogues. An 
example of informal networking is best described through an account of former US-New 
Zealand relations. Unofficially, Richard Nixon was the most favourable US president to 
New Zealand: if New Zealand had a request, the White House would be often more than 
willing to accommodate. The reason behind Nixon’s generosity was not vested in official 
declarations nor was it the result of technical diplomacy. Social links and memories 
formed during Nixon’s military post in the Pacific, with a New Zealand battalion in the 
Second World War, left a great impression that accounted for close relations in the 
future.283 While more could be done to enhance informal links, initiatives such as 
academic exchanges, supporting EU-based research centres and instigating working-
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holiday schemes have certainly encouraged greater people-to-people links. Although 
informalism is difficult to quantify, it is a valuable diplomatic tool that should never be 
underestimated.        
 
Although New Zealand’s defence capabilities have proven to be successful, such as 
RAMSI, New Zealand is also a consumer of security rather than a provider, which is also 
becoming increasingly true in South East Asia.284 Australia’s strong presence in the Asia 
Pacific and America’s influence in the region also has an effect on New Zealand’s 
capabilities. It has been argued that Australia’s assertive role in the Asia Pacific may 
restrict New Zealand to having lead roles only in Polynesia.285 This consumption of 
security and possible regulation of security roles from Australia will have a considerable 
effect on the New Zealand security-identity in the Asia Pacific. Within a regional context, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that “military capabilities are not particularly 
important…except as a supplement to those of Australia.”286 New Zealand’s Foreign 
Minister also stated that US “strategic presence in the Asia Pacific region helps underpin 
regional security diplomacy.”287 Despite some improvements to the security structure 
over the last five years, New Zealand’s military capabilities remain limited. New Zealand 
continues to rely on other nations for a collective approach to security in the Asia Pacific. 
Living under Australia’s perceived shadow for strategic support emphasises New 
Zealand’s impartial and soft approach to security threats, which has left a positive mark 
on its diplomatic record and created a sense of respect in the South Pacific.288 This 
reliance will also provide the impetus for a wide ranging network of security dialogue 
with partners to ensure the stability of the Asia Pacific and New Zealand’s needs and 
values.   
 
Admitting that New Zealand is reliant upon Australia in a number of security-related 
areas, and the diplomatic approach Australia takes, particularly in the Pacific, further 
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defines New Zealand’s security-identity in the Asia Pacific region. Australia’s diplomatic 
style, which is often perceived to be condescending, in the Pacific has been seen by some 
observers as being counter productive in its security actions.289 Primarily driven by 
Australian politicians, foreign policy actions have often generated hostility as Australia is 
often very direct with PICs. The goals of Australian foreign policy are not wrong, 
however, the methods used to achieve them leave much to be desired from a 
constructivist point of view.   
 
Regional Security  
New Zealand foreign and security policy is largely determined by its promotion of 
regional security mechanisms. Indeed, the current Labour-led government favours the 
multilateral security dialogue style of the ARF.290 New Zealand’s Associate Minister of 
Foreign Affairs stated that “regional co-operation reinforces our collective sense of 
security.”291 Consequently, it is through regional linkages that New Zealand security is 
guaranteed. MFAT plans to improve its security goals by positioning “New Zealand in 
the evolving architecture in Asia and reinvigorate links with key Asian partners.”292 In 
order to achieve this goal, New Zealand participates in the EAS, the ARF, APEC, the 
PIF, the Shangri-La Dialogue, the FPDA, NATO, the UN (such as, INTERFET, 
UNTAET or UNPROFOR), the OECD and maintains a formal dialogue process with 
ASEAN. In addition to these linkages, New Zealand also participates in regional security 
exercises, such as PSI or RAMSI. As a strategic partner, New Zealand also works with 
NATO members on a number of different fronts. While this may not be specific to Asia 
Pacific security, maintaining security links and keeping up to date on current operational 
thinking may be valuable for New Zealand in the future. Regionalism is a tool used to 
provide and guarantee security as it reduces distrust and fear. If distrust is proliferated in 
the international environment, the possibility of coercive pre-emption and conflict is 
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more likely.293 Furthermore, the ‘Pacific flavour’ inherent in regional missions such as 
RAMSI legitimises New Zealand’s commitment in the Pacific and deflects any negative 
images of New Zealand as a ‘big brother.’ It has been argued that regionalism is the 
saviour of ‘failed states’ in the Pacific.294 However, it is also the saviour of New 
Zealand’s security and defence policy in guaranteeing a peaceful Asia Pacific region.  
    
Conclusion  
 
A fervent promotion of New Zealand values and international legal norms, the influence 
of historical phenomenon, national politics, how state actors define security and perceive 
threats, capabilities and the Asia Pacific region, all contribute to the formation of a 
specific security-identity. The effect of cultural links to the South Pacific or specific 
defence capabilities – militarily or diplomatic – will affect how New Zealand officials 
approach security threats in the Asia Pacific region. The volume of EU-NZ security 
dialogue will be directly influenced by the distinct character of New Zealand’s security-
identity. Although it is well recognised that identities are dynamic and continue to change 
form, it is still possible to analyse the variances apparent between the EU and New 
Zealand security identities within a specific timeframe. This section demonstrated the 
diversity apparent within a particular identity and how that identity is formed. Knowing 
that it is impossible to represent all intervening variables within an identity, the factors 
chosen will aid in discovering the effect socialisation has within a regional context when 
the New Zealand security-identity is contrasted against the EU security-identity. 
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6 The European Union’s Security-Identity in the 
Asia Pacific Region 
 
One dimension of the European Union’s external policy is a commitment to promoting 
peace and security in the Asia Pacific region. The Directorate General for External 
Relations (DG RELEX) in the European Commission devised a Strategic Framework for 
Enhanced Partnerships with Asia in 2001. Within this document, the Commission stated: 
“[i]n contributing to peace and security in the region and globally, the EU should work 
in particular to strengthen our engagement with Asia in relation to old and new global 
and regional security issues, both in our bilateral and regional relations, and in the UN 
framework”295 (original emphasis included). In the last six years, the EU has strengthened 
its ties with the Asia Pacific region, with a particular focus on effective multilateralism, 
regionalism and the promotion of democratic governance. Although the Union’s 
institutions may be resolute in facilitating effective coherency and complementarity, the 
EU does participate through intricate webs of multilateral and bilateral relations, 
advancing their agenda and promoting peace at the antipodes of Europe.  
 
Analysing aspects of the Union’s security involvement in the Asia Pacific region 
illuminates the external identity of the European Union (see Figure 6.1). The volume of 
security dialogue between New Zealand and the European Union is conditioned by the 
divergent or convergent interests associated with the identities of state and regional 
actors. Greater converging interests – made more likely through a process of continual 
interaction – will create a better environment to encourage closer security dialogue. The 
demonstrational value of regionalism, cooperation with security-orientated mechanisms, 
the use of effective multilateralism and promoting human rights in the Asia Pacific 
region, reflect some of the issues that culminate to form a collective external identity.296 
Historical perceptions, institutional frameworks, capabilities, conceptualisations of the 
                                                 
295 European Commission, Europe and Asia: A strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships, 
Communication from the Commission (Brussels, 4 September 2001), 15,   
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/asia/doc/com01_469_en.pdf. See also Wiessala, “More than 
Distant Neighbours: CFSP and Asian Countries,” 96. 
296 See Figure 2.1. 
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Asia Pacific region and how the Union defines security, are also questioned throughout 
this chapter, revealing a distinctive and unique regional actor and security-identity. 
 
Figure 6.1 depicts the area of analysis for the particular section, namely the EU security 
culture in the Asia Pacific region. As areas ‘B’ and ‘i’ have been analysed in chapters 3 
and 5 respectively, exploring area ‘C’ will provide for a balanced analyses of the EU-NZ 
security dialogue as well as providing relevant contextual information for this thesis.      
  
Figure 6.1:  Area of analysis: The European Union’s security culture in the 
Asia Pacific region 
 
6.1 Historical Perceptions  
 
European history in the Asia Pacific involves a constellation of various activities, 
forming unique and varied perceptions that continue to affect the disposition of the EU-
Asia Pacific dialogue. Although European countries share long and complex histories in 
the region, the EEC/EU relations with South East Asia and the Pacific are a lot less 
profound. Nonetheless, looking at the EEC/EU past involvement with the region does 
help to explain the nature of current EU-Asia Pacific security discourse. History or 
memory “is not a vessel of truth or a mirror of interests, but a process of constructing 
Key 
A: NZ-EU Security Dialogue in the Asia 
Pacific Region 
B: New Zealand Security Culture in the Asia 
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(i):  Asia Pacific Region  
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meaning.”297 This section explores the memory of past EU and Asia Pacific relations and 
how this constructs an image of each entity in the present. 
 
Regionalism 
The diplomatic history of the EEC/EU in South East Asia since 1945 has centred on 
regional initiatives. Relations between the EEC and ASEAN began on an unofficial note 
in 1972. Increasing its involvement with the ASEAN-EC biennial Foreign Ministers 
meeting in 1978, the EEC relations with South East Asia evolved into the Cooperation 
Agreement with ASEAN in 1980. Although this institutional milestone is significant, it 
has been only in the last decade that the EU has paid considerable attention to the region. 
Focus on EU enlargement, the Middle East and the African continent, combined with 
British predominance in the South East Asia region, fashioned a distanced or even 
‘neglected’ EU-ASEAN relationship.298 To be sure, the EEC did contribute to 
humanitarian efforts through the European Political Community (EPC), but only through 
limited constitutional and diplomatic links.299  Despite some auguring of an even more 
limited relationship after 1989, due to the expired anti-communist strategic agenda, the 
EU increased its position in South East Asia. The EEC/EU enhanced its contacts with 
ASEAN, primarily through economic schemes. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 
the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), the Initiative ASEAN Integration (IAI), and the Bali 
Concord II Programme were instigated in an effort to diversify and build economic 
links.300 The political economy in the 1990s did not develop at the same rate as the 
financial initiatives. Differences in perspectives became more acute after 1989, such as 
the alternative approaches of the EU and ASEAN in their outlook on environmental 
sustainability or human rights.301 Despite this, political relations have continued with 
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signs of greater toleration from both sides in regard to the respective values and 
principles of each agency. Increasing awareness of the effects of globalisation and UN-
backed promotion of ‘security task sharing’ provided the impetus for greater security-
orientated regional building initiatives in the Asia Pacific region.302 Security crises in 
South East Asia, such as the Bali Bombings in 2000, the attack on the Marriott Hotel in 
Jakarta in 2003, or the arrests of the Jemaah Islamiah members in Indonesia, have also 
steered and developed the EU’s relationship with the region.303 The ARF, APEC and the 
APT were either created or injected with a security element in the 1990s. Other security 
relationships have also recently been built such as EU and NATO cooperation with the 
South East Asian region through ASEM.304 Economic links, juxtaposed with greater 
strategic and humanitarian involvement in the wake of 9/11 and the Tsunami, have 
created greater EU-ASEAN intensity in political dialogue; however, there is still room 
for improvement.   
 
The first EEC contact with the Pacific was through the Lomé Convention in 1975, which 
included the PICs of Fiji, Tonga and Samoa. Through the Convention, and other regional 
financial instruments such as the Regional Indicative Programme, the EU administered a 
total of €165 million from the period 1975-2002.305 Major initiatives for the Pacific have 
been in the field of regional transport, energy, tourism, sustainable development and 
natural resources.306 Alongside continued development assistance, regionalism has been 
promoted by the EU, particularly in the 1990s, with the EU as a ‘dialogue partner’ in the 
PIF. Economic initiatives have also been launched, creating stronger economic ties such 
as the European Union’s Pacific Regional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) or the 
Pacific Agreement for Closer Economic Relations (PACER). Apart from continual 
economic and development aid links, the EU must also face a Pacific that maintains a 
memory of the colonial past.  
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The legacy of Colonialism  
The aftermath of the Second World War left the Asia Pacific region in disarray. Although 
many European countries released their colonial ties during the next two decades, the 
memory of the colonial past remains with many Pacific and South East Asian countries. 
This memory contributes to part of Asia Pacific countries’ identities and consequently 
their actions. This rationale can be explained as: “national historical memory…can have 
concrete political consequences. How states and societies engage their pasts effects how 
they develop.”307 The past experiences in the Asia Pacific region under colonial rule 
means that many PICs have only experienced being a sovereign nation state for three or 
four decades. This has presented problems for EU-Pacific relations, when the EU’s 
preference to promote regional structures is, at times, coolly received by many Pacific 
people who do not wish to cede any of their newly required sovereignty.308 The Asian 
and Pacific Way – a norm related to non-intervention and informalism – is also 
reinforced by the legacy of colonial rule. India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, 
believed that the norm of informalism was “a bulwark against colonialism and great 
power interventionism.”309 Although this notion is certainly beginning to change, as 
Amatav Acharya argues,310 colonial memory can reinforce negative images, making it 
harder to deepen regional initiatives. The spectre of colonialism continues to haunt EU 
Member States in the Asia Pacific region. French interest through its dependencies 
remains dominant, while Britain, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands maintain links 
through implicit avenues. While not positing that Member Sates suffer from a bad 
conscience inherited from a colonial past, the contact these countries had and maintain 
with the Asia Pacific region continues to affect their policies. Despite historically-built 
perceptions of Europe that may involve pessimistic images, regional initiatives and 
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contacts, primarily through economic and development links, continue to flourish firmly 
placing the EU inside the Pacific region.   
 
Under the regional umbrella, economic and political initiatives have slowly evolved from 
early contacts made by the EEC – through the Lomé Convention and ASEAN links – to a 
deeper and more complex relationship involving up-dated agreements and an assortment 
of regional fora. The revised Cotonou agreement of 2005, the ARF, the APT and ASEM 
have created the institutional framework for a closer partnership that is envisaged to 
deepen.       
    
6.2 Internal Politics  
 
The efficiency of EU institutions is impaired by defective coordination and coherence, 
which can lead to ineffective and slow decision making, particularly in the Union’s 
foreign policy capacity. This can reduce dynamism in the Union’s external relations and 
implicitly affect the EU’s security dialogue with other partners.  Indeed, George Wiessala 
notes that “internal affairs have an external dimension; problems and change on the 
inside alter perceptions and ultimately influence actions and priorities of the EU on the 
outside.”311 EU security competencies in the Asia Pacific region cut across all three 
pillars of the EU institutional framework, creating unnecessary complications. The first 
pillar deals with trade, development assistance and external relations, the second with the 
CFSP and the third with police and judicial cooperation. These institutional divides can 
create horizontal challenges in policy making and implementation. Indeed, coordination, 
complementarity and coherence are often limited by cross pillar confusion, reducing the 
ability of the EU to act as a distinct global actor.312 Any pillar two decisions are usually 
made by consensus in a formal setting. This can produce the lowest common 
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denominator and encourage watered down texts with little substance. In an attempt to 
promote greater coordination a collection of Directorate Generals in the Commission 
have joined loosely under the banner of Famille RELEX313; however, greater 
coordination is still largely determined by the current President of the Commission.314 EU 
institutions can also act as a catalyst by enhancing the efforts of the EU in the Asia 
Pacific region. For example, the European Parliament has proven to increase the profile 
of Asia and significantly influence the course of CFSP in the region.315 Despite this and 
other attempts to create greater coherence, such as institutional changes depicted in the 
proposed Constitution, institutional inconsistency continues to pervade effective 
decision-making in the Union’s external relations. Other independent variables such as 
the future direction of the EU Constitution, the effects of enlargement and other internal 
factors, such as the legitimacy crises of the Union, can also affect the external policies of 
the EU. 
 
In addition, a similar lack of coherence can be found in Member States’ willingness to 
concede national sovereignty. The Union’s external ambitions remain a sensitive topic for 
Member States, who jealously guard their foreign policy as the “ultimate expression of 
national sovereignty.”316 This has created considerable challenges for the effective 
integration of foreign policy, as Member States are unwilling to entrust their foreign 
policy to a supranational body. The limited sovereignty that Member States have 
entrusted to the second pillar/CFSP has to be organised around 27 divergent identities, 
typically limiting foreign policy decisions to intergovernmentalism and unanimity.317 
Indeed, this raises the question of whether the EU can justify the ‘C’ in CFSP.318  
Although sub-systemic coherence and new institutional initiatives, such as the External 
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European Action Service (EEAS), may streamline and make decision-making more 
effective, the CFSP’s institutional capacity remains limited. This is particularly apparent 
in the static nature of the decision-making process. For example, the institutional 
character of CFSP assumes a ‘linear path of decision-making,’ which complicates the 
process of amending decisions.319 In addition, the challenge of maintaining a division of 
labour amongst Member States vis à vis EU foreign affairs, is another area that can lead 
to internal stagnation and limited external capabilities.320 Although decisions are often 
formed around non-contentious issues and despite the apparent incoherence in its 
institutional design, decisions and strategies are devised and endorsed. Indeed, through 
the impetus and support of COASI and CORespodence EUropéenne (COREU), an 
eastern chapter of CFSP is slowly developing.321 Common elements, such as human 
rights, security and stability are found within the evolutionary character of Europe’s 
CFSP, helping to frame the EU as an incipient political power on the world stage. 
 
6.3 The European Union’s Concept of Security 
 
Defining Security 
How state or regional actors understand the concept of security and what they prioritise 
as credible threats shape the external identity of a region and subsequently reflect the 
differences that exist in (sub) regional dialogue. Conceptual frames built around security 
challenges are dynamic in nature and can shift in precedence. This is not dissimilar to 
Barry Buzan’s ‘conditions of existence,’322 which, as an independent variable, has an 
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ability to affect how actors perceive security. With this in mind, present security 
perspectives – both endogenous and exogenous – are analysed in this section providing 
socio-political insight into why the EU participate in security ventures in the Asia Pacific 
region and how this corresponds to the EU-NZ security dialogue setting.         
 
In the last two decades, a ‘definitional sleight of hand’ has changed how state actors view 
security.323 Concepts of security have evolved from dogmatic perceptions steeped in 
traditional security ideals during the Cold War to non-traditional and humanitarian-
focused security. The EU has not been exempt from this conceptual movement; with its 
strong adherence to UN norms, the Union has developed non-traditional frames, such as 
human security, alongside more traditional concepts. Reflecting this notion, the current 
European Commissioner for External Relations clearly states that “[t]he Commission is a 
strong supporter of the concept of human security - putting individuals at the heart of 
security concerns.”324 The institutional and legal framework of the Union clearly reflects 
this wide concept of security. Stemming from the institutional milestones of Europe’s 
CFSP, namely the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 and the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, five 
primary objectives have been laid out. Two of these objectives deal specifically with the 
wellbeing of the Union, while the other three focus on the preservation of peace outside 
Europe’s borders. The two endogenous aspects are: to strengthen security and to 
safeguard the fundamental interests and independence of the Union. The three exogenous 
objectives deal with preserving peace and strengthening international security; promoting 
international cooperation; and consolidating democracy, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights.325  
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Endogenous Perspectives     
Björn Hettne, a scholar specialising in regional theory succinctly noted: “EU external 
actions are determined by its endogenous preconditions.”326 In other words, specific 
security threats that affect Europe are important to recognise if an analysis of its external 
threats is to be considered. Commenting on the European Security Strategy, Javier Solana 
outlined two specific security challenges for the EU: the proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) and terrorism.327 Other traditional security threats also 
continue to be of concern, such as the on-going Israeli-Palestine dispute and territorial 
disagreements within or at the fringes of Europe.328  
 
It has been argued that European security – the safeguarding of values such as the rule of 
law, democracy and human rights – is significantly dissimilar to Member State security, 
the latter being more bound to territorial integrity and citizen protection.329 While there is 
some truth to this, the Union attempts to combine Member State security needs with a 
much broader European focus that is committed to values and principles. This is clearly 
stated in Javier Solana’s definition of foreign policy which “is in essence about managing 
change, about safeguarding our people, [and] about promoting our values and 
interests.”330 The safeguarding of European principles as a security measure is also used 
as a means of stemming threats outside its borders; an intriguing transition from 
protection to promotion.  
 
Apart from the conservation of European values as a security challenge, four major 
threats facing Europe’s homeland security transcend the borders of Europe as 
transnational security concerns. The New Defence Agenda notes that due to the 
restructuring of international relations, largely as a result of globalisation, new threats 
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must be taken into account. The threats listed include terrorism, international crime, 
collision between fundamentalists, and cyber-terrorists.331 All of these issues can be 
regarded as encompassing a wide view of security; a theme that continues in the Union’s 
exogenous threat perceptions.    
   
Exogenous Perspectives  
EU threat perception in the Asia Pacific region is varied. Conditioned by regional 
perspectives, economic environments, altruistic or normative motivations, the Union 
prioritises security threats that are seen to be most relevant. Despite these and other 
independent variables, themes do emerge. For example, the EU recognises that political, 
social and economic governance is vital in ensuring security; consequently, the Union 
focuses on development-orientated threats in the emerging democratic PICs. Other issues 
such as terrorism, illegal arms trade, environmental security, non-proliferation, 
fundamentalist Islam and border security are also recognised, particularly in South East 
Asia, as security concerns.   
 
The EU’s focus on security threats in the Pacific is somewhat divergent from the Union’s 
threat perception of South East Asia. Specific security-related priorities in the Pacific 
include arms proliferation, drug trafficking, fisheries, HIV/AIDS, food security, 
improving education, infrastructure and institution building.332 More specifically, the 
Cotonou agreement defines security threats as: “arms trade, excessive military 
expenditure, drugs and organised crime, or ethnic, religious or racial discrimination.”333 
In the same context the agreement also includes the provision for a “regular assessment 
of the developments concerning the respect for human rights, democratic principles, the 
rule of law and good governance.”334 Liberal values and a commitment to humanitarian 
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aid are consolidated with more traditional security aspects, confirming a wide view of 
security. 
 
China is another growing concern for the EU in the Pacific. As a region with substantial 
natural resources, competition amongst external actors, including Japan, Taiwan, China 
and the US, is likely to produce strained relations. Augustin Oyowe, the European 
Commission’s International Relations Officer for the Pacific, noted that China, as a 
competing donor, was seen as the greatest threat to the Pacific and global security: “if 
China contributed to the deforestation of Pacific islands, this may one day lead to climate 
change in the northern hemisphere. If the money China pumps into the region goes to 
corrupt officials or arms purchases then it’s a security concern for the EU.”335 In addition, 
competition between China and Taiwan for ‘recognition,’ through investments and 
development aid, can implicitly encourage corruption and destabilise the sometimes 
fragile governments of Pacific countries.336   
 
The 2003 European Commission’s paper, entitled ‘New Partnership with South-East 
Asia,’ outlines six major priorities of the Union in South East Asia. Out of the six points, 
five priority issues are directly or indirectly related to security.337 Defining its threat 
perception in South East Asia the Union outlines ‘harder’ or traditional security concerns. 
DG RELEX defines the following as security threats for South East Asia: border 
management, maritime security, immigration control, organised crime, human 
trafficking, piracy and money laundering/combating terrorism financing.338 The Union 
                                                 
335 The Christchurch Press, “EU ambitions emerge.” Another motivation for external influence in the 
Pacific is the votes individual countries have in the UN.  
336 New Zealand Herald, “Europe’s south seas strategy,” (3 June 2006). 
337 The six issues are: supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism; promoting human rights, 
democratic principles and good governance; mainstreaming justice and home affairs issues; injecting a new 
dynamism into regional trade and investment relations; continuing to support the development of less 
prosperous countries; intensifying dialogue and cooperation in specific policy areas. See European 
Commission, A New Partnership with South-East Asia, Communication from the Commission (2003), 
Directorate General for External Relations, 2004, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_ relations/library/ 
publications/09_sea_en.pdf. For a succinct review on this agreement see Georg Wiessala, “A Holistic Re-
Invigoration - The EU’s New Partnership with South East Asia,” EURAsia Bulletin Vol. 7, (Brussels: 
European Institute for Asian Studies, EIAS: September 2003). 
338 European Commission, Regional Indicative Programme 2005-2006: ASEAN, Directorate General for 
External Relations, 2004, 15., http://ec.europa.eu/external_ relations/asean/intro/index.htm. Also see 
 109 
also defines Islamic fundamentalist movements as a possible security threats on EU 
values and its strategic economic position in the Asia Pacific region.339  
 
Collectively, unstable political regimes in the Pacific and South East Asia are also seen as 
credible threats to the Union’s economic and normative interests. A strong belief exists 
within EU decision-making bodies that promoting human rights and democracy will 
encourage stability. The philosophy behind this idea is that democracies will generally 
not go to war with each other and that human rights violations can create unstable 
environments, increasing the likelihood of conflict. 340 Consequently, the promotion of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law are intertwined in legal and institutional 
strategies, agreements and declarations: Article 11 of the EU Treaty, the European 
Security Strategy, the Copenhagen Criteria and the Cotonou agreement all contain 
explicit references to the promotion of EU values outside its own borders.341 
 
Reviewing the endogenous and exogenous security perceptions of the EU in the Asia 
Pacific region illustrate two major themes. The distinctive threat perceptions of the EU in 
South East Asia and the Pacific, both entail, to a varied extent, a wide view of security 
and the preservation and promotion of liberal values. These perspectives will influence 
the policies directed towards the two regions and represents part of the EU’s security-
identity formation.     
 
6.4 Geographical perceptions 
 
European socio-political perceptions of the Asia Pacific region affect the volume of 
interaction and dialogue in (sub) regional settings. Julie Gilson clearly defines this 
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339 European Commission, A new partnership for South East Asia, 12. 
340 Marise Cremona, “The Union as a Global Actor: Roles, Models and Identity,” Common Market Law 
Review 41 no. 2 (2004): 558-9. Also see Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Indonesia and the European Union: 
building on common ground, Speech delivered at the EU-Indonesia Day: ‘Pluralism and Democracy: 
Indonesian Perspectives’ Brussels, 7 December 2006.  
341 Michael Meyer-Resende, “Exporting Legitimacy: The Record of EU Election Observation in the 
Context of EU Democracy Support,” Centre for European Policy Studies Working Document no. 241 
(Brussels, March 2006), 2. www.ceps.be.      
 110 
rationale: “[w]hat is understood by 'region' in the context of Asia-Europe relations will 
depend to a large extent upon how Asian and European participants view themselves and 
each other within, and a result of, the process of interaction.”342 Exploring how the Union 
defines the Asia Pacific region will reflect a part of the EU’s security-identity formation.   
 
Defining the Asia Pacific Region 
How Europeans perceive the Asia Pacific region influences the policies they formulate 
and determines the possible depth of sub-regional and regional dialogue. Expressing an 
underlying concept of EU perceptions on Asia, the former External Relations Minister for 
the European Commission, Christopher Patten, remarked: “[g]iven the sprawling variety 
of Asia it is absurd to think of a monolithic EU-Asia relationship.”343 Asia has been 
carved into different regions, corresponding to varied policies and approaches, and 
determined by the perceptions of the European Union’s institutional bodies.    
 
The EU has divided the Asian region into five separate regional divisions: South Asia, 
South East Asia, Northeast Asia, Central Asia and Australasia, while the Pacific region is 
defined separately as one of the three African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) regions.344 
Consequently, the Asia Pacific region is quite clearly split into two regions with two 
different approaches. The South East Asian region has been made distinct from the rest of 
Asia, as well as the Pacific, due to its level of development, aid-based relationships and 
different legal basis.345 The perceived cultural, political and economic diversity, that 
manufactures imagined regional borders within Asia, affects how security polices are 
formulated and helps to define the identity of the Union’s external policy.  
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Asia Pacific countries are rising in economic and political significance affecting the way 
European officials view the region. European bureaucrats provide varied responses when 
asked what images come to mind when the Asia Pacific region is mentioned. While 
accepting that a majority of Europeans think about tropical paradises,346 others 
understand that security threats exist, albeit from a geographical context; North Korea, 
China, the Solomon Islands, Timor Leste and Papua New Guinea were mentioned in 
particular. Another official predominantly talked of China, India and Japan: three 
countries that are technically not part of the region. Although, economic and development 
frameworks divide the Pacific apart from South East Asia, some European still tends to 
see the South Pacific region as Asia. It was also mentioned that despite the long distance, 
European economic importance in the region, combined with a global responsibility, 
meant that the EU feels that it has a role to play. Indeed, the Regional Indicative 
Programme for South East Asia states that the major motivation for increasing ties with 
the region can be contributed to the rise in the political and economic prowess of China 
and the economic growth of South East Asia. This has turned the region into “one of the 
most dynamic growth engines for the world economy… [that the] EU cannot afford to 
neglect.”347 As stated by a high level official from New Zealand: “the distance from 
Europe to New Zealand is greater than from New Zealand to Europe.”348 This 
geographically-defined perception has certainly affected European officials; however, the 
distance may become more equal as South East Asia continues to grow in prominence.   
 
6.5 Normative Values  
 
EU relations with South East Asia are characterised by a web of multilateral and bilateral 
arrangements. These relationships are instigated and legitimised through common 
interests and values, such as a dedication to peace and stability. Cultural awareness is 
making considerable progress as a recognised tool in advancing regional security 
dialogue. Indeed, the European Commission’s Delegation to Australia notes: “[t]he EU 
has a unique role to play in promoting richness and diversity, both within Europe and 
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worldwide. It has been acknowledged that culture is an indispensable feature to achieve 
the EU’s strategic objectives of prosperity, solidarity and security, while ensuring a 
stronger presence on the international scene.”349 The EU also exports values that are 
perceived to be in the interest of Asia Pacific countries, such as the promotion of 
regionalism and democracy. Indeed, it has been argued that the EU has a particular need 
to “spread these norms around the world.”350  It should be noted that to perceive the EU 
as just a normative power would be naïve. Self-interest undoubtedly plays a role in the 
Union’s association with the Asia Pacific region. The control of potential resources, 
communication lines or UN votes, amongst others motivations, would certainly have a 
significant impact on the EU’s objectives in the region. The prevention of money 
laundering, internet and cyber-crime and maintaining a strategic position are also areas of 
interest that could override philanthropic tendencies. With this in mind, this section’s 
analysis of the common values shared by the EU and the Asia Pacific will aid in 
determining the EU’s external identity as an international actor.  
   
Normative or cultural values are seen as a starting point in developing security dialogue 
with the Asia Pacific region. In a statement by the Council of the European Union, “[t]he 
Ministers reiterated that the ASEAN-EU relationship is based on shared historical and 
cultural, economic, scientific and educational ties, and commitment to the promotion of 
peace, stability and development in the two regions.”351 This is essentially the rhetorical 
glue that creates the pretext for dialogue: common values builds trust and encourages 
cooperation. Another, somewhat paradoxical value that unites the Asia Pacific region 
with EU is the notion of diversity. The EU claims that diversity is central to the EU-
ASEAN dialogue, as a common value of both regions. 352 Indeed, both Indonesia and the 
EU share the same motto: Bhinneka Tunggal Ika or Unity in Diversity. It would seem that 
common and diverse values unite the two regions.   
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In close association with the values enshrined in the UN charter, the external policy of the 
EU is inextricably entwined with the rule of law, democratic principles, respect for 
human rights and principles of liberty, combined with a strong emphasis on effective 
multilateralism.353 Title 17 of the Treaty of the Maastricht Treaty reflects a deep 
adherence to these values and illustrates the strategic aim of the European Community in 
defending European values, ensuring peace and strengthening international security.354 
Reflecting this sentiment the High Representative, Javier Solana, commented: the EU 
must “face up to its responsibility for global security and contribute rigorously to 
extending the scope of international law, to strengthening the institutions of world 
governance and to developing closer regional cooperation.”355 These normative values, 
legitimized through the UN, are exported to other nation-states through dialogue 
mechanisms and upheld with legal structures. Regionalism and effective multilateralism 
are seen as the most appropriate vehicle to present these values, while simultaneously 
representing the significance of regionalism itself.  
 
Another foreign policy goal of the European Union is to “develop and consolidate 
democracy and rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”356 
This bourgeoning and politically-orientated conditionality, produced through multilateral 
and bilateral arrangements between the EU and Asia Pacific countries, reflects the 
Union’s commitment to its values and perspectives on security.  Explaining the 
connection between democracy and security, Benita Ferrero-Waldner stated: “[i]t has 
long been recognised that democracies are less likely to engage in conflicts than non-
democratic regimes. Similarly, at the national level, democracies provide a political 
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channel for tensions and disputes which might otherwise end up in conflict.”357 This 
rationale is a driving force in EU external policy; however, normative values, such as 
human rights and democracy can be brushed to the side in favour of more urgent security 
priorities. The current Foreign Minister of Denmark, Per Stig Møller, stated that in order 
to curtail terrorism “we have no choice but to accept deeper involvement with 
governments having less than perfect records on human rights and democracy, but 
willing to progress in the right direction.”358 In a similar vein, a British MEP recently 
questioned the ethical nature behind the Union’s exportation of values: “we put great 
store by democracy but does the whole world want our sort of democracy?”359 Indeed, 
the EU is not always a unified proponent of normative values. Despite these deflections 
from EU norms, the Union continues in its propensity to promote normative concepts in 
dialogue with other regions and nations. A European Commission communication stated 
that assistance and cooperation initiatives should support functional democratic structures 
and fundamental human rights, including the abolition of the death penalty.360 This is 
primarily achieved through ‘essential element’ clauses that are to be included in all future 
bilateral agreements with South East Asian countries.  
 
European Union rhetoric on values and norms can be detrimental to the Union’s image as 
a global actor. An example of this can be seen in the Union’s approach to Fiji. As part of 
its 12 strategic priorities listed in the European Commission joint annual report on Fiji, 
the EU aims to enhance security, law and order. This will be achieved by promoting 
national reconciliation and unity, alleviating poverty, strengthening good governance, 
reviewing the constitution to achieve political stability, and resolving the land issue.361 
From a liberal democratic perspective, these are noble values; however, the EU risks a 
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potential values-based expectations-capability deficit if these goals are not meet. For 
example, promoting national reconciliation requires efforts that must affect society, the 
identity of Fiji and its political orientation.362 If the EU is serious about promoting 
national reconciliation in Fiji it must examine the ethics involved in development 
intervention and its periphery image as a neo-colonialist. Political rhetoric without valid 
action will reduce the EU’s bourgeoning image as a global political player.    
 
‘Regionalist ideology’ inherent in EU foreign policy illustrates a particular normative 
value that the EU fervently promotes outside its borders.363 This ideology also contributes 
to the EU security-identity, affecting inter-subjective exchange within regional fora. 
Through various regional institutions, such as the PIF or ASEM, the EU export 
regionalism to the Asia Pacific region (such as the Vientiane Plan adopted at the 10th 
ASEAN summit which fosters greater regional integration and development). The 
Union’s promotion of regionalism is believed to encourage reciprocity, socialisation and 
identity-building. Indeed, the Commission stated that “The EU’s regional strategy will 
focus on a single priority: support for ASEAN Integration and region-to-region dialogue 
… [which is intended to have a] multiplier effect, whereby information, ideas and best 
practices can be exchanged across the region.”364 Furthermore, a recent Commission 
report on the Pacific prioritised regionalism as one of its three main priorities. The EU 
claims that regional integration has the “clearest manifestation of the common interests” 
of the Union and the countries of South East Asia. The ‘New Partnership for South East 
Asia’ claims that both sides have realised that creating a regional entity will result in 
economic development, which reinforces security.365 Yet, within South East Asia and 
parts of the Pacific, an observed frustration between EU values and Asian principles can 
be observed.  
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Scholars, such as Georg Wiessala, Julie Gilson, Björn Hettne, Hanns Maull, Jürgen 
Rüland and Axel Berkofsky, mention or allude to a frustration in EU and Asian values, 
which can limit the effectiveness of security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region.366 Some 
scholars have even gone so far as to contrast the ‘orient wisdom’ against the occident 
value of the rule of law.367 Berkofsky subtly refers to this as a “contradiction in terms of 
perspective.”368 The Asian Way – which shares conspicuous similarities with the ‘Pacific 
Way’ – can come into conflict against the “OSCE practice of ‘interference’.”369 The Asia 
Pacific adherence to these norms is seen as vital in maintaining an informal sense of 
cohesion between the diverse range of political, social and cultural environments that 
exist in South East Asia and the Pacific. Thus, the tendency to create formal structures 
within inter-regional dialogue mechanisms or other multilateral arrangements goes 
against the Asia Pacific concepts of stability – informalism and non-interference – 
limiting the potential depth of multilateral or bilateral dialogue. Reinforcing these 
differences, the Union’s agenda on human rights and democracy in the Asia Pacific have 
also created tensions.370  
   
Despite the apparent frustrations resulting from the divergent values between the EU and 
Asia Pacific, the Union does acknowledge the ‘contradiction in terms of perspective’ (at 
least in political rhetoric). The Union’s Regional Indicative Programme for 2005-2006, 
and the Commission’s strategy for the Pacific Islands, stated that the EU’s relationship 
with ASEAN is primarily based on shared values, such as respect for diversity in culture 
and mutual awareness.371 Plans adopted through the ‘New Partnership with South East 
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Asia’ communication contain a ‘two-way value added test’ which is to be applied before 
EC regional projects can be initiated. This test has been designed “to identify priority 
areas from an ASEAN point of view where the EU can provide particular added 
value.”372 This official rhetoric is also reinforced by an interview with an EU official in 
the Commission who stated that the EU must be careful not to be patronising and is 
slowly changing its negotiating style to accommodate positive perceptions. Perhaps the 
European’s have finally taken note from one of their own scholars, Jürgen Habermas, 
who comments: “[i]t now appears as if Europe as a whole is being given a second 
chance…[by using] a non imperial process of reaching understanding with, and learning 
from, other cultures.”373 This is Europe’s culturally-orientated intellectual challenge. 
 
6.7 Capabilities  
 
The various security capabilities that the Union has at its disposal will implicitly 
condition the approach EU officials will take in the Union’s multilateral and bilateral 
discourse. The main objective of the EU in the Asia Pacific is to “contribute to peace and 
security in the region and globally, through a broadening of our engagement with the 
region.”374 In other words, the major tool used from the EU external relations tool box is 
dialogue. It is believed that through promoting similar values and information exchange 
through inter-regional or sub-regional dialogue, a peaceful environment can be assured. 
However, other emerging capabilities are also being added to the EU foreign policy tool 
kit. These include civilian, police and military crisis management bodies, along side more 
traditional capabilities connected with development assistance and the promotion of 
regionalism and effective multilateralism. In close guidance with UN principles, the EU 
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assists and shares experiences in the Asia Pacific region through working agreements, 
declarations, legal and financial support.375  
 
Diplomatic and Political Initiatives 
 
Soft power capabilities such as norms, diplomatic assistance, dialogue, and institutional 
or legal initiatives, have grown substantially in South East Asia in the last seven years. 
Commenting on these capabilities Frédéric Charlillon succinctly noted that if “we 
consider security as a matter of dialogue, exchange, trust building and civilian action 
more than military superiority, then the EU has a role to play.”376 Major security issues 
for the EU, such as terrorism and non-proliferation of WMD are dealt within a myriad of 
security-orientated programmes and multilateral and bilateral agreements.     
 
The European Union has contributed to a vast amount of legal agreements and emerging 
institutional structures related to security in the South East Asian region. These include: 
the Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism at the 14th EU-ASEAN 
meeting, which saw the creation of a dispute settlement mechanism;377 judicial support in 
the fight against financing terrorism in Indonesia; assistance to the Philippines border 
management and money laundering under the EC Rapid Reaction Mechanism; support of 
a counter terrorism centre in Malaysia; and legal support for the ASEAN Biodiversity 
Centre (ABC), which promotes environmental protection.378 With a specific terrorist 
prevention focus, the Union also supports the International Law Enforcement Academy 
(ILEA) in Bangkok, the South East Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism 
(SEARCCT) in Kuala Lumpur and the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
(JCLEC) in Semarang.379 Further institutional initiatives related to the security of South 
East Asia also include the adoption of the Copenhagen Cooperation Programme on 
Fighting International Terrorism at the fourth ASEM summit. This has provided a 
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framework for participating countries to work more closely on security issues at a UN 
level, such as anti-money laundering, counter terrorism, and prevention of the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.380 The EU also wish to strengthen the South 
East Asian-EU dialogue in areas such as visa agreements, asylum, energy security 
immigration and other policies related to the free movement of people.381 Apart from 
specific security-related initiatives, other events associated with ‘wide security’ include: 
Interfaith Dialogues; immigration meetings; and workshops on HIV/AIDS and Avian 
Influenza Control.382 While many of these initiatives have in the past been the cause of 
‘over-institutionalisation’ and ‘forum fatigue’ the EU has been making efforts to clarify 
and strengthen its competencies in the region.383 These agreements and initiatives, 
combined with other economic and cultural links, build connections and develop an 
awareness of South East Asia. By constructing these substantive contacts, greater 
cooperation and understanding of the two regions can be made possible, which reduces 
distrust and enhances cooperative measures.  
 
The Union’s growing concern for non-proliferation issues offers an example of its 
political, institutional and diplomatic capabilities. The European Union has made 
significant steps in promoting this agenda in the Asia Pacific region. The Council 
established a fully fledged ‘EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD’ in 2003. This was 
the first comprehensive strategy paper from the Council. The EU relies on diplomatic and 
political preventive channels, which are cross pillar in nature and involve both 
Community and CFSP elements.384 Dialogue with strategic partners in multilateral and 
bilateral settings combined with effective multilateralism provides the context to utilise 
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these tools. Conditionality is also used as the EU’s ‘harder’ power to extend these 
interests. Indeed, all new agreements with third countries have specific clauses such as, 
non-proliferation of WMD or actively supporting the Security Council resolution 1540.385 
 
Promoting international legal norms and improving officials’ cultural perceptions of 
nations or regions are two strong themes directed toward the Asia Pacific region and 
driven by EU diplomacy. Under the New Partnership Communication 2005-2006 – 
designed to create greater cooperation – 26 different policy areas have been created.386 
Within the institutional makeup of the New Partnership two frameworks have been 
designed to govern EU-ASEAN dialogue. TREATI (Trans-regional EU-ASEAN Trade 
Initiative) is dedicated to trade and investment, while the other, READI (Regional EC 
ASEAN Dialogue Instrument), provides a framework for all other specific dialogue 
areas, such as security. There are three main dialogues under READI that are either 
implicitly or explicitly related to security. The EU plan to maintain further ASEAN 
integration by supporting: the fight against terrorism; the ASEAN secretariat, through 
APRIS II; the creation of the ‘New Partnership’ Information and Communication 
Programme.387 The specific objective of the latter is to “improve South East Asian 
countries’ perception of the EU,”388 which is a novel addition to the Union’s external 
relations. In supporting ASEAN with anti-terrorist measures, the EU endeavours to 
provide assistance in implementing all UN Security Council resolutions. The EU has also 
prioritised border management and is working closely with willing members of ASEAN. 
For example, RELEX envisages a minimum of five regional or sub-regional conferences 
with 20 participants on border management in the future.389 This detailed framework, 
facilitating deeper security dialogue with South East Asia, illustrates not only a growing 
awareness of the ASEAN states, as viable security partners, but also demonstrates an 
underlying constructivist approach to external relations. Growing concern in how security 
partners’ cultures and values affect political dialogue, and generating initiatives to 
increase the volume of dialogue possible through a greater appreciation of the ‘other,’ is 
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certainly a novel position to take in an international system that has long been dominated 
by realist ideology.        
 
Development Assistance  
The European Security strategy stresses the need to address root ‘causes of poverty’ and 
‘weak governance’ to ensure stability.390 The preamble of the Cotonou agreement 
expands this foreign policy rationale stating that “a political environment guaranteeing 
peace, security and stability, respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule 
of law, and good governance is part and parcel of long-term development.”391 
Development assistance is, thus, a significant apparatus in the EU security tool box. 
Although the Union is the second biggest donor to the Pacific after Australia, the EU 
contributes just three per cent of its total aid to the Pacific and plans are underway to 
narrow this budget line.392 This clearly illustrates a preference for EU development 
assistance with a focus on African states within the ACP grouping. Indeed, a report 
published by the European Commission in April 2005 on HIV/AIDS, Malaria and 
Tuberculosis, did not even mention the Pacific, despite HIV/AIDS being a growing 
concern in the Pacific.393 Irrespective of any preferential treatment to African countries, 
the EU facilitates and funds development projects in the Pacific, with current initiatives 
focused on education, institution building and good governance.394 The prime example of 
EU development aid in the South Pacific is the sugar subsidies in Fiji, which have largely 
kept the Fijian economy stable. Other EU projects contribute to the development of PICs, 
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for instance: providing funds for the Transparency International chapter in Fiji; the 
jointly-funded, recent opening of the Rewa Bridge in Nausari, Fiji; and the large 
involvement of the EU Delegation to the Pacific vis à vis good governance in Fiji and 
article 96 of the Cotonou agreement. Jointly funded projects do provide the EU with the 
ability to build trust and deepen relationships, which may include and encourage security 
dialogue in the long-term. 
 
From an economic perspective, the EU is currently facilitating EPAs, which will replace 
the initial trade and development agreements from the 2000 Cotonou agreement, due to 
run out in 2008.395 Created in accordance to World Trade Organisation (WTO) standards, 
the EPAs are envisaged to protect developing countries from the negative effects of 
globalisation, while integrating their economies into the world market.396 An example of 
this would be the EPAs ‘everything but arms’ initiative or the sugar subsidies in Fiji. 
These initiatives are an attempt to support and encourage the economies of developing 
countries by targeting tariff preferences and subsidising primary exports. Thus, 
development assistance to the Pacific, through trade agreements, contributes to the 
overall wellbeing of PICs and promotes security. In this context, the EU will have an 
added benefit in its international relations if it maximises its perceived role as a “neutral 
but influential broker that is not involved with narrow issues and perceived national 
agendas.”397  
 
Education has become a major area of development assistance in the Asia Pacific region. 
During the period 2001-2007, the EU supplied $US 28 million to education reform in 
Cambodia under the SWAp scheme. Apart from this, the EU has also assisted other Asia 
Pacific regions such as Vanuatu.398 EU education support to the Solomon Islands is also 
                                                 
395 The European Commission’s Delegation to the Pacific, The European Union and the Pacific Region, 
EU and ACP countries meet to push forward Economic Partnership Agreements (Brussels 1 March 2007), 
http://www.delfji.ec.europa.eu/en/index.htm.  
396 Ridolfi, “Europe Day Speech.” 
397 Mike Ratcliffe and Murray Macrae, “Sector Wide Approaches to Education – A Strategic Analysis,” 
Education Research Paper No. 32 (Europe-East Asia Think Tank Dialogue, 1999), 67., 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/secappedpaper32.pdf. 
398 Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDR), Cambodian Rehabilitation and Development Board 
(CRDM), http://www.cdc-crdb.gov.kh/cdc/practices_chapter6.htm. 
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substantial. Through the EDF and the Système de Stabilisation des Recettes d'Exportation 
(STABEX) funds, the EU currently provides €83.3 million towards education, rural 
development and NGO support. The revised STABEX 99 also accommodates for post-
conflict areas of the Solomon Islands, providing substantial economic recovery.399 The 
EU has also established a National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE), which is a 
financing initiative valued at €800,000 for civic and voter education in Fiji.400  
 
The promotion of democratic governance through political dialogue, and often reinforced 
through conditionality, is another strong tool used by the Union to prevent conflict in the 
Asia Pacific region. Formal agreements are often used as a pretext for this dialogue, 
which also create boundaries around the extent to which conditionality can be used. 401 
For example, the Cotonou Agreement – the legal gateway for the EU to promote security 
in PICs – promotes democratic governance and provides development assistance. Article 
eight of the agreement specifically acknowledges that through “dialogue, the Parties shall 
contribute to peace, security and stability and promote a stable and democratic political 
environment.” 402 However, in countries where democratic governance fails, such as in 
Fiji after the 2000 coup, conditionality was used as a means of promoting democratic 
governance by disqualifying development aid. Indeed, the latest coup in 2006 has led to a 
considerable amount of diplomatic pressure by the EU on Fiji to hold elections in 
2009.403   
 
 
 
                                                 
399 Solomon Islands Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, “Speech for Honourable Fred Fono – 
Europe Day, 9th May,” 2005, http://www.pmc.gov.sb/?q=node/9. 
400 See EVD internationaal ondernemeh en samenwerken, “Fiji: National Initiative for Civic Education,”   
http://www.evd.nl/business/zoeken/ShowBouwsteen.asp?bstnum=174292. 
401 Van Veen, “Order in world Politcs: an inquiry into the concept, change and the EU’s Contribution,” 42. 
402 European Commission, The Cotonou Agreement, Title II, Article 8.  
403 Carlos Santiso, “The Reform of EU Development Policy, Improving Strategies for Conflict Prevention, 
Democratic Promotion and Governance Conditionality,” CEPS Working Document no. 182 (Brussels, 
March 2002), 43-6. Also see Michael Green, “Further pressure on Fiji to hold elections within 2 years,” 
Radio New Zealand International (25 April 2007), http://www.rnzi.com/pages/news.php?op= 
read&id=31744., The Delegation of the European Commission for the Pacific, Programming of the 10th 
European development Fund (EDF 10); Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) European Commission 
(EC) and Non State Actors (NSAs); Consultation Forum, Report (Suva, Fiji. 22 August 2006), 
http://www.delfji.ec.europa.eu. 
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Military Support  
 
In line with the ‘St Petersburg tasks’ – involving humanitarian, peacekeeping and combat 
forces in crisis management – the ESDP has become an inextricable aspect of the Union’s 
external policy. In addition to Europe’s soft power, the Union has facilitated civilian, 
police and military crisis management bodies under the framework of ESDP. Although a 
majority of ESDP civilian and military orientated missions have been within a close 
geographic proximity to Europe, the Union has expanded its missions mandate to the 
South East Asian region, demonstrating an emerging notion of the Union as a political 
power in a globalised context. Instigated in only 1999 through the Amsterdam Treaty, the 
ESDP already demonstrates an impressive track record, with six completed missions and 
11 ongoing missions to date.404 It should also be noted that the Union has no illusions 
regarding the strength of is hard power. Indeed, the Union’s lack of military capability is 
highlighted as a major weakness in the EU’s Crisis Management/Conflict Prevention 
toolbox.405 Despite this, initiatives to strengthen the military capacity of the Union 
continue. For example, the new EU Headline Goal for 2010 has created projects such as 
the operational battle groups and the European Defence Agency. 
 
The EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) in Indonesia provides a useful example in 
illustrating the extent of EU involvement in South East Asia. On request of the 
Indonesian government, the EU was seen as the most appropriate external actor to lead a 
multinational monitoring group to oversee the implementation of the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU).406 Under the framework of the ESDP, the Union allocated a total 
of €9 million specifically for the civilian mission. The ASEAN nations of Brunei 
Darrussalam, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand participated in the AMM, 
creating numerous cultural and political links between the South East Asian region and 
Europe. Commenting on the successful end of the mission in December 2006, the Finish 
Secretary of State noted: “[i]t has proven an opportunity to strengthen EU ties with the 
                                                 
404 European Voice, “EU’s long-term defence vision,” European Voice 13, no. 22 (7-13 June 2007), 27. 
405 Mawdsley and Quille, The EU Security Strategy: A New Framework for ESDP and Equipping the EU 
Rapid Reaction Force, 12-13. 
406 Council of the European Union, Presidency Report on ESDP, 10. See also: Council Joint Action on the 
European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia), (Brussels 9 September 2005), in “EU Security 
and defence: Core documents 2005,” Chaillot Paper 6 no. 87 (March 2006): 251. 
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government of Indonesia and has also led to a successful cooperation with ASEAN 
countries who participated in the mission.”407 In a wider context, the EU has also 
supplied a €260 million package to the region in humanitarian aid and reconstruction 
efforts after the 2004 Tsunami. Of this €260 million, €25 million has been channelled 
towards sustaining peace. The main instruments used in support of peace have been 
economic recovery, promoting the rule of law, human rights and democracy.408 More 
specifically, the support package has involved the organisation of the local elections, 
reforming or improving the police, justice system, local government and public 
administration.409 Continual support from other EU institutions, such as the European 
Parliament has also contributed to the ongoing peace process. For example, Glyn Ford 
MEP led an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Aceh in December 2006. 
 
EOMs offer another avenue for EU security involvement in the Asia Pacific region. The 
Union is the major, and only, regional player that conduct EOMs in the Asia Pacific, 
which in the last six years has sent EOMs to Indonesia, Cambodia, East-Timor and Fiji, 
spending a total of €77 million since 2000.410 These missions help to promote 
development assistance, conflict prevention and support the establishment of legitimate 
governance in both the Pacific and in South East Asia.411 This has fostered regional links 
between the Asia Pacific region and Europe, deepening political and cultural bonds.  
 
Regional Security 
The Union’s tendency to favour regionalism as its preferred mode of dialogue is well 
illustrated in the Asia Pacific region and is used as a tool to advance the Union’s agenda. 
European officials are often quick to point out that no war has been fought on European 
soil since the Common Coal and Steal Community facilitated the Franco-German 
                                                 
407 Pertti Torstila, “Address by Mr Pertti Torstila, Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
Representing the EU Finnish Presidency,” Speech to the Assembly of the Western European Union 
(Paris, 18 December 2006), Phg.16., http://formin.finland.fi/public/Default.aspx?culture=en-
US&contentlan=2. 
408 Ferrero-Waldner, Indonesia and the European Union: building on common ground. 
409 Ibid. 
410 EU Observer, “Official missions for Asia and Africa,” (2 March 2006), http://euobserver.com/9/21057. 
Also see Meyer-Resende, “Exporting Legitimacy: The Record of EU Election Observation in the Context 
of EU Democracy Support,” 4. 
411 Ibid, 2. 
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rapprochement. Consequently, the success of regionalism is deemed appropriate to spread 
across the world. The EU, as a model of regionalism, is used to stimulate regionalism in 
the Pacific and South East Asia. 412 It is believed that by promoting regional integration 
and effective multilateralism, peace will be ensured. Indeed, as stated by a Brussels 
policy analyst: a “strong ASEAN is probably the best guarantee for peace and stability in 
the region.”413  
 
Regional mechanisms can also be used to deepen bilateral contacts. This has been the 
case in current negotiations with Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore.414 Despite the 
Union’s preference for effective multilateralism and regional structures, it is not quixotic. 
The principle of subsidiarity is clearly reflected in that the EU will favour bilateral 
arrangements with South East Asian states unless a regional approach is deemed more 
suitable.415 The rationale for this lies in lessons learnt. Past ASEAN-EU dialogue has 
taught the Union that South East Asian regionalism does not function in the same way as 
EU regional integration. The EU has found that regional “cooperation has proven to be 
more complex than bilateral cooperation.”416 This quite clearly demonstrates the 
constructivist principle of socialisation, where continual cooperation has resulted in a 
better understanding of the ‘other,’ culminating in closer and deeper dialogue. 
 
Cooperation with other international actors and regional security institutions also reflect a 
strong aspect of the EU’s commitment to security and multilateralism. In its Strategic 
Framework for Enhanced Partnership with Asia, the EU stated that it “should in 
particular play a pro-active role in regional cooperation fora such as the ARF, and in 
inter-regional dialogues such as ASEM”417  in order to promote shared experiences and 
create long-term confidence building measures. Even though direct security dialogue is 
severely limited within ASEM, it would be wrong to discount it from the EU agenda. 
                                                 
412 For example, the EU Ambassador to the Pacific, Roberto Ridolfi, explained in a speech that the EU is an 
example of regional integration and has been used to nurture Pacific regional integration. See Ridolfi, 
“Europe Day Speech.”  
413 European Commission, A new partnership for South East Asia, 12. 
414 See Delegation of the European Commission to Australia and New Zealand, “EU increases engagement 
with South East Asia,” News@EU (16 March 2007), http://ec.europa.eu/devlopment/ index_en.htm. 
415 European Commission, Regional Indicative Programme 2005-2006: ASEAN, 5. 
416 Ibid, 4. 
417 European Commission, Europe and Asia: A strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships, 15-16. 
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Indeed, the latest report on ASEM 6 from the Commission states that “security and anti-
terrorism co-operation…has become a priority for ASEM.”418 Cooperation with other 
regional actors include: NATO, under the NATO-EU Declaration on the ESDP and the 
Berlin plus agreement; the UN, such as participation in the RAMSI and East Timor;419 
the OECD; the ARF; the PIF; and ASEAN. Scholars have argued that EU security 
presence in the Asia Pacific region is limited by the unilateral preferences and political 
strength of the US and other credible international players such as China, Japan and 
Russia.420 However, waning military interest by the US in the region,421 combined with 
the Union’s unique regional approach, is providing room for the EU to establish security 
relationships with Asia Pacific countries. Regionalism is seen as a value to export while 
at the same time offers opportunities for the EU to deepen is security relations through its 
own regional identity and emphasis on institutional and legal structures within inter-
regional mechanisms.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The identity of the EU as an external power consists of a number of important features 
that react against a process of socialisation, contributing to convergent or divergent 
views. The perceptions of individual regional actors influence the depth of dialogue 
possible in an inter-subjective environment implicitly contributing to security policies 
and initiatives. This chapter has outlined a number of important themes that culminate in 
forming a unique European security-identity in the Asia Pacific region. For example, the 
EU definition of wide security combined with a preference to promote liberal values such 
as the rule of law, democracy and human rights, has lead the EU to focus on particular 
security issues in a particular manner. The capabilities available to the Union and its 
                                                 
418 European Commission, 10 Years of ASEM: Global Challenges – Joint Responses, (September 2006), 
11., http://www.asem6.fi/news_and_ documents/en. See also: European Commission, Europe and Asia: A 
strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships.” The main aim of the Framework is to ‘promote peace 
and security in Asia, pursue poverty alleviation, and promote Human Rights and democratic awareness.’  
419 European Commission, EU relations with the Pacific Islands – A strategy for a strengthened 
partnership, 4. See also Wiessala, The European Union and Asian Countries, 9. 
420 See Maull, Segal and Wanandi, Europe and the Asia Pacific, 127. 
421 Peter W. Preston and Julie Gilson, The European Union and East Asia: inter-regional linkages in a 
changing global system (Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2001), 120. 
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historical memory have also contributed to and shaped its external identity. Identities are 
not static, but change freely depending on a variety of intervening variables. The current 
external identity, mapped out in the chapter, will enable a comparative analysis between 
the New Zealand and EU external identities, resulting in a formative evaluation of the 
current EU-NZ security dialogue.  
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7 A Comparative Analysis of the European Union’s 
and New Zealand’s Security Cultures in the Asia 
Pacific Region 
 
As a loyal ally of Britain, New Zealand’s former Prime Minister, Richard Seddon, looked 
upon New Zealand as the main authority and primary representative of Britain’s interests 
in the South Pacific.422 Similarly, the European Union currently sees New Zealand as a 
close and respected partner in the Asia Pacific region. While this relationship is not 
envisaged to change significantly, the depth of dialogue may alter depending on how 
closely EU and New Zealand social and political interests are aligned. The apparent 
similarities and subtle differences observed in EU-NZ concepts of security in the Asia 
Pacific region provide a base upon which productive and pragmatic cooperation can be 
advanced. Similarly, how New Zealand and the EU perceive the Asia Pacific region, in 
relation to their own geographical proximity, contribute to the effectiveness of the 
security relationship. Diplomatic methods, military endeavours and the size of a 
country’s economy, amongst a number of other factors, combine to produce a definite 
image of a country or region that will either strengthen or weaken bilateral and 
multilateral relations. The psychological impact of these factors affects how New Zealand 
and the EU perceive each other and will, consequently, determine the depth of the 
security dialogue.   
 
When the separate EU and New Zealand identities interact within a sub-regional security 
setting, a unique security-identity emerges that is solidified through inter-subjective 
exchanges and a high frequency of repeated interaction. During EU-NZ security 
consultations, similarities and differences become apparent through a process of 
knowledge and information sharing. Understanding cultural and diplomatic customs of 
the ‘other’ may enhance the possibility of a more efficient dialogue process by reducing 
misunderstandings. The evolving security-identity can also increase the possibility of 
                                                 
422 Hoadley, “New Zealand’s Pacific Island Security Policies,” 123. 
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decisions and actions being made through common-interest, as opposed to purely self-
interest motivations. The previous two sections outlined the separate EU and New 
Zealand security identities in regard to the Asia Pacific region. This chapter looks at the 
overlap between the two identities to determine why the current level of dialogue exists 
and how it might increase.  
 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the process of EU and New Zealand security-identities in the Asia 
Pacific region. Chapters 5 and 6 analysed specific socio-political aspects that make up the 
security-identity of the EU and New Zealand. This chapter focuses on the interaction that 
takes place between the two agencies. Through the dynamics of inter-subjective exchange 
similarities and differences become apparent, highlighting areas of interest that overlap. 
This results in a specific sub-regional identity formation.    
 
Figure 7.1 describes 
 
Figure 7.1:  Sub-regional process of the European Union and New Zealand 
security identities within the context of the Asia Pacific region 
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7.1 Defining the Concept of Security 
 
A majority of officials from the Asia Pacific region, the European Union and New 
Zealand share a similar preoccupation with the concept of modern security threats. The 
idea of human security and the notion of widening strategic interests have been accepted 
as a growing norm vis-à-vis security concepts in the international environment. Primary 
security threats that are prioritised by the Asia Pacific region, New Zealand and the EU 
include: terrorism; China-Taiwan rivalry; transnational crime; fundamentalism; nuclear 
proliferation; illegal arms trade; and environmental security.423 The three primary 
security concerns that both the EU and New Zealand prioritise are state fragility, 
terrorism and transnational crime. While attention to particular security concerns will 
differ between EU and New Zealand interests – such as the current EU preoccupation 
with securing the movement of energy supplies – the three primary strategic challenges 
remain a stable platform from which the EU-NZ security dialogue can develop. These 
common perceptions on security provide possibilities of working together on a wide 
range of strategic issues. This increases the likelihood of developing social and political 
links, which enhance a common knowledge of diplomatic and cultural procedures, 
resulting in a more efficient and deeper dialogue process. Although focusing on the 
similarities is essential for effective security discourse, the differences must also be 
examined and acknowledged for a more balanced view of the relationship.  
 
Although there is a marked harmonisation of EU and New Zealand definitions of 
security, the motivations behind these security concepts tend to differ. The EU promotes 
security in the Asia Pacific region in order to maintain economic stability and safeguard 
its values of liberal democracy, human rights, effective multilateralism and the rule of 
law. However, New Zealand’s conceptualisation of security is bound in more pragmatic 
motives. For example, economic, political or environmental destabilisation in the South 
                                                 
423 European Parliament, Delegation for relations with Australia and New Zealand 12th EP/New Zealand 
Interparliamentary Meeting.  
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Pacific could encourage immigration, generate displaced people and foster terrorism, 
which would directly affect New Zealand and only implicitly disturb the EU. The Union 
remains far more limited with regard to the direct effects of security degradation due to 
its geographical placement. Although the security priorities are similar, when the 
underlying motivations are compared, the results become nuanced. Consequently, it can 
be envisaged that when the EU and New Zealand security-identities interact with one 
another, within the confines of regionalism, the volume will reach a point where subtle 
differences appear, limiting the effectiveness of the dialogue. While disparities are 
apparent between the EU and New Zealand, divergent views on security also exist 
between a common EU-NZ outlook on the one side and a dissimilar Asia Pacific 
perspective on the other.   
 
Another limiting factor for the EU-NZ security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region is the 
South East Asian and Pacific security culture. The EU and New Zealand share a similar 
security culture in promoting effective multilateralism as the best method to minimize 
transnational security threats. However, many countries in South East Asia and the South 
Pacific do not share this view, preferring to deal with security challenges on a national 
basis. The EU and New Zealand must be sensitive in their multilateral approaches to 
specific security concerns in the region, such as terrorism, in order to minimize the risk of 
interfering in the sovereignty of another country. This does not reject regional approaches 
to security, but encourages the need to maintain sensitivity and a close relationship with 
Asia Pacific countries to avoid cultural or diplomatic confusion. The best methods to 
overcome this hurdle are through continual dialogue, cultural exchanges and information 
sharing; enhancing inter-subjectivity, cultural links and political dialogue will increase 
trust and reduce the scope for misunderstandings.    
 
7.2 Geographic Perceptions  
 
The EU and New Zealand share similar geographical perceptions of the Asia Pacific 
region. Both see South East Asia and the South Pacific as two separate entities and, 
consequently, have generated specific policy frameworks for the two areas. The apparent 
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harmonisation in how New Zealand and the EU see the region undoubtedly contributes to 
a greater volume of security dialogue. However, the EU has a tendency to treat the 
Pacific as a single region and, at times, view the South Pacific as part of Asia.424 This 
perspective could create inefficiencies in development aid distribution if, for example, 
Timorese culture is treated the same as Fijian culture. Despite possible confusion, 
continual fellowship with New Zealand will provide the EU with an increasing 
knowledge of the region and the most suitable diplomatic approach to take.  
 
Due to the expanding economy in South East Asia, and China’s immense economic and 
political growth over the last decade, the EU tends to prioritise the APT region over the 
South Pacific from a security point of view.425 New Zealand, on the other hand, 
prioritises the South Pacific as their main security concern due to their constitutional, 
historical and geographical connections. Thus, while the geographical perceptions match, 
the importance given to each region can vary. The difference in priorities may limit the 
depth of the EU-NZ security dialogue as the inherent interests are differentiated. 
However, the disparities in interest are not excessive: both New Zealand and the EU have 
a significant interest in both regions. Indeed, the disparities that do exist can positively 
reinforce the relationship by providing alternative perceptions of the regions; through 
sharing information the EU and New Zealand can develop an enhanced awareness of 
each other, which may reduce any possible confusion in the future.   
 
There will always be a disparity of interest due to the difference in size of the economies 
in the EU and New Zealand. Resources are more limited in New Zealand, which may 
affect the dialogue process. Indeed New Zealand’s MFAT notes: “we do not have the 
resources to bolster significantly the breadth and depth of our engagement…so we often 
remain of marginal or occasional interest.”426 Even if human or financial resources do not 
play a significant role, the image of the EU as a dominant economic superpower and New 
Zealand’s economic dependence upon it can affect EU and New Zealand actors, from a 
                                                 
424 A number of interviews with New Zealand officials, 19 April 2007 and 8 November 2006. 
425 NB: This statement is based on a more traditional understanding of security and does not fully take into 
account development aid as a security concern. 
426 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Relations; Europe, European Union Enlargement.” 
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psychological point of view. While this may not explicitly affect the depth of the EU-NZ 
security dialogue, it can implicitly determine the approach both actors assume and, to a 
certain extent, dictate the topics of discussion in sub-regional consultations.       
 
Due to the lack of geographical proximity of the EU and New Zealand, it has been argued 
that perceptions, actions and interests will always be separate. A New Zealand politician 
connected to security issues believes that even with the speed of communication, it is 
distance that will always differentiate EU and New Zealand perceptions. While 
acknowledging the importance of the EU-NZ dialogue, the parliamentarian noted: “You 
can never get a New Zealander to… [achieve] a sufficiently clear and subtle 
understanding of the EU worldview because we are not Europeans and the same applies 
in reverse….We are never going to be perfect because we have just got different interests 
and outlooks.”427 While this is true, focusing on the remarkable number of similarities 
that exist, New Zealand, if situated in Europe, would undoubtedly be an EU Member 
State.428 
 
7.3 Normative Values and Images 
 
As good global citizens the EU and New Zealand share and foster similar values. 
Expounding democratic values, promoting human rights and adhering to the international 
rule of law have created similar policy reflexes within both governing institutions. 
Indeed, the current New Zealand Defence Minister noted that the normative features of 
the EU as a global actor are seen to be positive in the eyes of New Zealand.429 Providing 
a substantial foundation to develop EU-NZ security relations, these common values 
solidify the relationship. Other normative features of the dialogue, such as the promotion 
of regionalism in the Asia Pacific region, also cultivate a strong relationship. However, 
subtle differences in how values are promoted can limit the volume of dialogue. The 
depth of the future EU-NZ security dialogue will be determined by the amount of 
                                                 
427 Interview with New Zealand politician, 16 April 2007. 
428 Interview with European Parliament official, 8 December 2006. 
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interaction with Asia Pacific countries: understanding the specific cultural and political 
customs in South East Asia and the Pacific will undoubtedly provide for a more secure 
and safer region. 
 
Promoting regionalism as an effective security mechanism to ensure stability in the Asia 
Pacific region is firmly supported by the EU and New Zealand. This is done through 
supporting and encouraging South East Asian and Pacific security institutions in the 
region such as the PIF or the ARF. Promoting regionalism through cooperative methods, 
such as Europe-New Zealand aid harmonisation, is clearly in EU and New Zealand’s best 
interests. While this clear overlap in interest encourages a greater volume of dialogue, the 
way in which the Union and New Zealand wish to promote regionalism contain subtle 
differences. For example, the EU “tend to trumpet themselves as a model for the ARF”430 
which, from a New Zealand perspective, is seen as unconstructive. Commenting on the 
EU and regionalism, a New Zealand official stated that the EU needs to be aware of the 
different animosities that have been long held in South East Asia: “I don’t think the EU is 
a model necessarily at all for the ARF. I think each region has to find its own model 
based on the culture…I don’t think we should try and mirror or replicate the EU’s model 
for the ASEAN Regional Forum or the Pacific Islands Forum.”431 While economic 
integration has been the key for European political stability, it may not be an appropriate 
model for the Asia Pacific region. This does not mean regionalism should be rejected, 
rather, specific regional approaches based on distinct Asia Pacific cultural and political 
protocols must be built up from an internal impetus. Although the means may be 
divergent, the primary goal remains the same: promoting peace through regionalism. As 
the EU-NZ dialogue continues to develop, common approaches will emerge, limiting the 
disparities and encouraging a further deepening of a security-focused dialogue for the 
Asia Pacific region.      
 
The unique diplomatic and cultural traditions of the Asia Pacific region will determine 
the representatives’ actions in the international environment. Continual interaction with 
                                                 
430 Interview with New Zealand official, 19 April 2007. 
431 Ibid. 
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Asia Pacific countries will provide valuable insight into the apparent diversity between 
the countries, build trust and reduce misunderstandings. This will enable New Zealand 
and the EU to acknowledge and accommodate the respective cultural settings. If aspects 
of the political culture are not understood – the Asian Way being a relevant example – the 
possibility of an effective and significant dialogue will be limited. One reason for 
problems emerging in regional dialogues has been credited to the European Union’s 
misunderstandings of Asian culture.432 Furthermore, the number of officials from the 
Union who have a specific knowledge of Asia Pacific culture is substantially limited. 
From a New Zealand perspective it is only “foreign ministry officials [who] have wider 
international experience and little of that in the Asia/Pacific region.”433 Despite this, there 
is a growing understanding amongst EU officials that culture matters. Indeed, the 
importance of understanding cultural differences in other nations and regions is 
mentioned by a European Commission official, who states that understanding culture is 
fundamentally important and finds that the largest mistakes at the international level are 
made by a lack of appreciation for cultural differences.434 This example reflects a 
developing understanding of how cultural differences can affect consultation procedures. 
The EU must be willing to listen and acquire a succinct view of cultural practices in the 
Asia Pacific region. Dialogue with New Zealand offers an efficient means for achieving 
this goal.     
 
The unique multicultural makeup of New Zealand, as a country expounding European 
values with strong Pacific and increasing Asian connections and cultural practices, places 
New Zealand in a positive and advantageous position concerning its security relationship 
with the EU. The Union recognises that New Zealand can offer a unique perspective due 
to its particular location in the Asia Pacific region and its principle associations with 
regional institutions.435 Even if New Zealand is on the periphery of Asia, it is still firmly 
                                                 
432 The official mentioned that a problem with ASEM was that the EU is not good at understanding Asian 
culture: Interview with New Zealand Official, 8 November 2006. 
433 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Foreign Relations; Europe, European Union Enlargement.”    
434 Interview with EU Commission official and New Zealand official, 20 November 2006 and 8 December 
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435 Helen Clark, “PM addresses European Policy Centre,” address to the European Policy Centre (Brussels, 
29 November 2005), http://www.beehive.govt.nz. Also see Bruno Julien, “Address to the New Zealand-
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connected to the region. Common economic, social and political linkages have been 
formed throughout an extensive historical record of New Zealand in the South Pacific 
and South East Asia. These historical ties have provided New Zealand with specific area-
knowledge, such as diplomatic and cultural customs, that shape a unique and effective 
approach to the region. These culturally influenced diplomatic methods are related to the 
EU through the various consultation mechanisms. Commenting on the culture and the 
EU-NZ security relationship, a New Zealand official stated: “we certainly talk to them 
about our approach and why we think the way we do”436 in an effort to aid EU officials’ 
approach in the Asia Pacific region. Although New Zealand’s interests, diplomatic 
expertise and military experience in the South Pacific do not match its relationship with 
South East Asia, New Zealand’s experience in the Asia Pacific region holds a significant 
advantage that the EU must realise and make use of during EU-NZ security consultations.   
 
The normative interests of the EU and New Zealand are entirely compatible and create a 
stable platform for the developing EU-NZ security relationship. While there remain some 
inconsistencies, such as varying methods in the promotion of regionalism, the goal in 
promoting common values remains the same. Through continual interaction with New 
Zealand officials, EU representatives will acquire a greater culture-based knowledge vis-
à-vis diplomatic approaches in the Asia Pacific region. As the EU and New Zealand 
adhere to similar values, it is natural that cooperation should emerge in an effort to 
promote these values: thus, capabilities must also be analysed.  
 
7.4 Capabilities  
 
The security capabilities of the EU and New Zealand in the Asia Pacific region provide a 
substantial area where cooperation can reap considerable benefits. By focusing on 
complementarity and coordination in development assistance, diplomatic programmes, or 
military initiatives, various sectors of EU-NZ security collaboration are revealed, that can 
be maintained and developed. The images and perceptions each agency has will also 
                                                                                                                                                 
Europe Business Council,” the European Commission's Delegation to Australia (13 February 2006), 
http://www.delaus.cec.eu.int/pressandinformation/speeches/ Julien_Feb2006_NZ.htm. 
436 Interview New Zealand official, 19 April 2007. 
 138 
contribute to the potential depth of interaction, which is inextricably linked to EU and 
New Zealand diplomatic endeavours.  
 
Diplomatic initiatives that promote stability in the Asia Pacific region offer a specific 
area of EU-NZ security cooperation that can strengthen and provide possibilities for 
future development. The Union and New Zealand are currently involved in a myriad of 
projects that attempt to provide a safer environment in the region. For example, 
encouraging Asia Pacific states to adopt the UN 12 Conventions on Terrorism, or 
supporting regional military missions, are security concerns that both actors have a strong 
interest in developing. Further encouragement of cultivating cultural awareness is an area 
that deserves attention on the EU-NZ agenda. A European diplomat interviewed 
mentioned that one “must take into account the culture of countries in bilateral or 
multilateral [settings]…when I act in Asia Pacific meetings…you clearly see that not 
only do they have different expectations and different problems but also different ways of 
talking and negotiating and working.”437 This certainly highlights the importance of 
cultural awareness and the need to develop cultural learning amongst decision makers 
and officials. 
  
Development assistance is an area of cooperation where the EU and New Zealand can 
effectively work together in promoting security and a stable environment in the Asia 
Pacific region. Working together on development projects, such as education in the 
Solomon Islands, will foster a greater amount of cultural and political understanding 
amongst officials. Joint initiatives will also encourage future development projects, help 
to solidify the EU-NZ relationship and reduce the possibility of aid duplication through 
specific cooperation. Despite the strong connection formed through development 
assistance, – the EU being one of the largest suppliers of aid to the Pacific – Europe has 
voiced concerns that their humanitarian efforts in the Pacific are not being fully realised. 
As the EU’s aid priority – reflected in its aid distribution – is firmly planted in the 
African continent, the EU has faced some doubt from New Zealand officials concerning 
the Unions development efforts in the Asia Pacific region. A European Parliament report 
                                                 
437 Interview with European Official, 17 April 2007.  
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noted that: “New Zealanders do not always appreciate how much development aid is 
currently provided by the EU to the South Pacific, and there are unfounded fears that the 
EU is turning its attention away from the region. The EU is, in fact, the second largest 
donor to the South Pacific”438 Whether this will directly or implicitly affect the depth of 
EU-NZ security dialogue remains difficult to determine. If EU development aid to the 
Pacific is not appreciated by New Zealand, the level of dialogue and trust may decrease. 
As images can define perceptions, it is important that New Zealand and the EU remain 
sensitive to how they are perceived. 
 
The links between perceptions, values and diplomacy are well illustrated through New 
Zealand’s and the EU’s diplomatic approaches in the Asia Pacific region. Australia and 
New Zealand are seen by the EU as reliable security partners in the Asia Pacific region. 
The unique cultural makeup and geographical position of Australia and New Zealand 
generates a favourable stance for consultations with the European Union. However, 
Australian relations with the Asia Pacific have created an image that could increase the 
EU-NZ security dialogue. While not alluding to a strained EU-Australian security 
relationship, the perception of Australian diplomacy as forceful and, at times, 
condescending – in the eyes of PICs, New Zealand and the EU – could affect EU 
officials’ relationship with Australia. From a socio-political perspective, the EU may 
prefer to interact with more likeminded actors such as New Zealand. Commenting on his 
observations on a tour of Australia and New Zealand in 2004, the Union’s Development 
Commissioner “was critical of Australia’s ‘muscular’ and ‘too American’ approach in the 
Pacific. Recent Australian actions in Papua New Guinea following on from the RAMSI 
mission looked to Nielson like neo-colonialism in the absence of a multilateral 
framework.”439 Many European and New Zealand officials who were interviewed 
expressed dissatisfaction with the diplomatic style of Australia in the Asia Pacific region. 
The Commission’s Desk Officer for Australia and New Zealand stated that the EU and 
New Zealand share the same values and see “eye-to-eye on more international issues than 
                                                 
438 European Parliament, “Delegation for relations with Australia and New Zealand 12th EP/New Zealand 
Interparliamentary Meeting 26 February – 5 March 2006.”  
439 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archival material: Pacific Donor Consultations, File No: AID/PAC/9, Vol. 
3. 
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Australia.”440 As New Zealand shares values more inline with EU norms, and is a firm 
supporter of soft-power, cooperating with a more likeminded partner on security issues in 
the Pacific would seem logical. If Australia’s diplomacy continues to be seen 
unfavourably in the eyes of EU officials, New Zealand will most likely be favoured as a 
closer partner, from a normative perspective. 
 
While military endeavours are non existent between the EU and New Zealand, 
cooperation with EU Member States through bilateral initiatives – such as joint French-
NZ military exercises – or multilateral exercises played out through the PSI, implicitly 
connect the EU with New Zealand. Continual military operations will also help maintain 
an effective amount of interoperability and will avoid the risk of duplication. If EU Battle 
Groups are deployed in the Asia Pacific and cooperate with New Zealand forces in the 
future, similar capabilities will be essential for effective operations. This is the added 
advantage of cooperation with ESDP and NATO in areas outside of the Asia Pacific 
region such as Afghanistan: an ability to keep up to date with European military 
‘thinking’ will be highly beneficial for any future activities. Besides long-term planning, 
the EU is able to assist in current military initiatives in the Asia Pacific region through 
financial flanking measures or direct input. An example of such efforts can be seen in the 
EU financial backing of the RAMSI mission. In this way, the EU can remain relevant as a 
direct security partner in the region.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Identities can be forged by a process of continual inter-subjective exchange, creating an 
environment of solidarity and reducing mistrust amongst cooperative agencies. Seen as 
the cornerstone of regular consultation, common interests are aligned and differences 
acknowledged as the volume of dialogue matures. The limits of the dialogue are arguably 
set by the differences that exist within the individual socio-cultural milieux that represent 
the actors’ individual identity. However, differences can at times enhance understanding 
between actors; through information sharing and social learning, alternative perceptions 
                                                 
440 Interview with EU Commission official, 20 November 2006. 
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can be understood and, periodically taken on. Continual cooperation will reduce the 
possibilities of not realising differences, culminating in a deeper dialogue. 
 
Exploring the overlap between EU and New Zealand security identities in the Asia 
Pacific region has helped to elucidate the level of the EU-NZ security dialogue. Similar 
perceptions are encountered in how the European Union and New Zealand 
geographically perceive the Asia Pacific region, understand the concept of security, think 
and operate from a military point of view, and adhere to international law and liberal 
democratic values. These areas solidify the relationship and generate a general impetus to 
increase the security dialogue. However, there are nuanced views in how to achieve their 
joint goal of promoting stability in the Asia Pacific region. Different motivations behind 
common goals, such as how to extend the value of regionalism in the Asia Pacific region, 
limit the depth of dialogue. There will always be different and subtle diplomatic or 
cultural practices that disunite actors. However, through a process of continual inter-
subjective exchange, differences can be acknowledged and accepted as the EU-NZ 
security dialogue evolves. Furthermore, if the apparent advantage of New Zealand’s 
culture-based knowledge of the Asia Pacific is utilized by the EU, the possibility for a 
stronger dialogue would be enhanced.  
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8 Conclusion  
 
A multitude of security related forums, security exercises and initiatives can be found in 
the Asia Pacific region. Amongst this myriad of security mechanisms, EU and New 
Zealand security dialogues exist. The primary aim of this thesis was to explore the 
volume of security dialogue between the EU and New Zealand in the Asia Pacific region. 
A number of informal and formal diplomatic channels, development cooperation, military 
exercises, cultural ties and educational links have been uncovered. This reflects a 
multidimensional dialogue that encompasses a wide range of competencies, personnel 
and practices. While this thesis started with one question, it ends with many more. This is 
not seen as a limitation, but rather recognises that the EU-NZ security dialogue is an area 
that deserves considerably more attention, particularly within the context of a 
constructivist agenda. The following section sketches out possible initiatives for 
government officials, future research proposals and a commentary on the vices and 
virtues of constructivism, in relation to this research. The second section deals with some 
final conclusions that this thesis has formulated. 
 
8.1 Future Initiatives  
 
If the European Union and New Zealand choose to be proactive and recognise the 
importance of the EU-NZ security dialogue, a number of possibilities await the 
consultation processes. In connection with the results of this thesis, a number of 
initiatives are recommended that are envisaged to deepen the security relationship. These 
include: increasing the awareness of the dialogue; enhancing security information 
sharing; encouraging the EU’s security role in the Pacific; promoting informal political 
and cultural links; and applying appropriate action to knowledge, vis à vis images and 
perceptions of the self and other. From an academic perspective, a number of possible 
long-term research areas are also recommended.     
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Policy Proposals and Initiatives  
To ensure a deeper consultative process in the future, a greater effort must be made to 
increase the internal awareness of the EU-NZ security dialogue. A number of EU and 
New Zealand officials, both in Brussels and Wellington, possess a limited knowledge of 
the security dialogue processes. While this indicates the perceived level of importance of 
the dialogue, it may also point towards a lack of information sharing between governing 
institutions. Indeed, a European official from the Commission mentioned that “EU 
Member States do not realise or understand how good a relationship the EU has with 
New Zealand.”441 Developing the internal profile of the dialogue may increase the total 
amount of input and ideas produced by a number of actors, such as diplomats, NGOs, 
interested EU Member States, EU institutions or New Zealand politicians. This would 
culminate in a deeper and more proficient dialogue process. Increasing the importance 
and available knowledge of the dialogue can be achieved by: encouraging continual 
interaction between New Zealand and EU officials, promoting the cultural and diplomatic 
advantage of New Zealand’s relationship in the Pacific; focusing on similar concepts of 
security; and forging new initiatives for future cooperation. With a proactive spirit, the 
EU and New Zealand can reap the benefits of a deeper dialogue.  
 
An increase in security information sharing is one particular area that would benefit the 
EU-NZ security dialogue. If New Zealand and the EU instigate a contract similar to the 
official agreement on information trading between the European Law Enforcement 
Cooperation (EUROPOL) and Australia, stronger EU-NZ security links could develop 
and cooperation increase. The agreement stipulates that both parties will “exchange 
strategic and operational information to combat serious international crime and 
terrorism.”442 While the EU and New Zealand do exchange strategic information through 
various mediums such as the ARF or ministerial consultations, an official agreement 
would obligate both parties to continually exchange information as opposed to the current 
ad hoc process. In connection to EUROPOL, enhancing information sharing on the ESDP 
Police missions – such as the Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) or Palestinian territory 
                                                 
441 Interview with EU Commission official, 20 November 2006. 
442 European Law Enforcement Cooperation (EUROPOL), “Australia and Europe join forces to combat 
international crime,” http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=home&language=en.  
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(EUPOL COPPS) operations – and New Zealand Police missions in the Pacific, would 
undoubtedly contribute to forming better operational practices and encourage any 
collaborative future ESDP missions in the Asia Pacific region.  
 
EU security involvement in the Pacific will be a noteworthy determinant in how the EU-
NZ security relationship will develop. The current New Zealand Defence Minister noted 
that the EU-NZ security dialogue is currently at a ‘good level’ and will be expected to 
grow as the “EU continues to increase its ‘out of area’ peace support and disaster relief 
activities, establishes itself as a truly global actor,”443 and participates on security 
challenges that matter to New Zealand. Consequently, New Zealand officials seem to be 
interested in strengthening the security relationship only when the EU enhances its 
security profile in the Asia Pacific region. This does not necessarily reflect a disinterested 
New Zealand position, but rather a pragmatic approach in which the value of the security 
dialogue for the region will remain limited until the EU increases its security role. Thus, 
the future dialogue will be highly dependent upon the EU’s evolutionary role in the Asia 
Pacific region in general, and the South Pacific in particular.    
 
A noteworthy New Zealand parliamentarian stated that “informalism is immeasurable in 
terms of value…[it is] very very powerful.”444 Although informal dialogue is difficult to 
measure, recognition of the importance of unofficial consultation continues to grow. 
Informalism generates important links that can help future policy implementation and 
augment the knowledge of other diplomatic practices. It will also provide an environment 
where officials are able to consult more freely; not being bound by a restrictive agenda 
will undoubtedly encourage greater cooperation. This is an important area that must be 
further exploited to promote and support the EU-NZ security dialogue in the Asia Pacific 
region. In addition, the inflexible nature of EU decision-making reinforces the argument 
that New Zealand must influence the right people at the right time. Phil Goff reiterates 
this idea by stating that to influence the EU foreign policy one would have to establish 
dialogue with all Member States, the High Representative and a number of 
                                                 
443 Phill Goff, Letter from the Minister of Defence to the Author, 13 March 2007. 
444 Interview with New Zealand politician, 16 April 2007. Also see Goff, “New Zealand and the European 
Union a year after enlargement,” 71. 
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Commissioners, which is beyond any reasonable limit.445 If informal structures are set in 
place, it will be easier to promote New Zealand’s interests in the EU. Although gauging 
and encouraging informal links can be highly problematic, there are a number of 
initiatives that will enhance greater EU-NZ informal dialogue. Promoting greater 
military, sport, academic, or bureaucratic exchanges; adding to the working-holiday 
agreements between New Zealand and a number of European countries; and promoting 
the value of informal networks to practitioners and participants in the field, are three 
areas that, if properly developed, could produce valuable people-to-people links and 
encourage unofficial dialogue in the future. Furthermore, instigating a formal security 
institution or research centre with a specific focus on threats in the Pacific would 
encourage greater links and promote long-term stability in the region.  
 
Image and perception determines a significant amount of action and decisions made in 
the international environment. Not generally perceived as a priority in security orientated 
dialogue, how countries or regions are perceived is an area where the EU and New 
Zealand can work together. There appears to be a nuanced understanding of Asia Pacific 
self-perception and how the EU and New Zealand perceive the region. The EU and New 
Zealand, to a greater or lesser extent, face an unfortunate neo-colonial image in the 
region. Whether this is at all substantive is secondary to the perceptions Asia Pacific 
countries have of the EU and New Zealand. Perhaps due to the EU’s large development 
aid or its geographical position, the Union tends to portray an image of an external actor 
that will, at times, obstinately apply conditionality through its provision of aid. 
Furthermore, the attitude of some EU officials in the Pacific, which is often reinforced by 
its own administrational structure, also produces an image that hints of neo-colonialism. 
Although subtle, the attitudes of officials do not always reflect EU policy; this directly 
contributes to forming perceptions and images that could be detrimental to the EU’s 
objectives in the Asia Pacific region. While both the EU and New Zealand often see neo-
colonial branding as a vent of frustration rather than the actual reality, it has raised a level 
of sensitivity in New Zealand in its diplomatic approach to the Pacific.446 It is 
                                                 
445 Goff, “New Zealand and the European Union a year after enlargement,” 71. 
446 Interview with EU Commission official, 20 November 2006.  
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recommended that the EU adopt a similar position. Not only must the Union become 
more sensitive to how it is perceived in the Asia Pacific region, but it must also alter its 
diplomatic methods to accommodate the level of tensions that can accumulate vis à vis 
perceptions in the region. For example, the Union should nurture and support regionalism 
in the Pacific and must be careful not to directly control its evolution.447 Both the EU and 
New Zealand must also be aware of the negative images that can be created when 
capability-expectation gaps develop vis à vis policy implementation in the region. While 
the European Commission does finance research initiatives to learn how they are 
perceived – such as the commendable perception studies research at the National Centre 
for Research on Europe448– concrete actions and results must come from the EU, and be 
encouraged by New Zealand, if greater cooperation and more effective security-related 
initiatives are to eventuate in the future.       
 
Future Research Areas and Theoretical Reflections 
A number of specific areas of future research have surfaced while analysing security-
focused dialogue in the Asia Pacific region. A continual exploration of areas related to 
the dialogue processes and political philosophy will undoubtedly provide greater insight 
into the EU-NZ security dialogue, constructivist theory and the complexities of 
regionalism.  
 
As outlined in chapter 2, two primary tenants of constructivism were adopted as the main 
theoretical focus of this study, namely socialisation and identity formation. Through this, 
a constructivist model was created in order to explain the reflectivist tendencies of EU-
NZ security dialogue in the Asia Pacific region (see Figure 2.2). The following (Figure 
8.1) is a reconstruction of Figure 2.2: the alterations are principally based on the text, 
which has been replaced with specific information and ideas developed throughout the 
thesis that supported the original model. This study firmly demonstrates the connection 
between inter-subjective exchange and deeper dialogue, which Figure 8.1 attempts to 
                                                 
447 An interesting parallel can be observed in regard to US diplomatic and financial support of European 
integration in the 1950’s. 
448 See Martin Holland and Natalia Chaban, “The EU through the Eyes of the Asia-Pacific, Public 
perceptions and media representations,” NCRE Research Series No. 4, (2005). 
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demonstrate. It has been argued that, upon the foundation of common images and values, 
cooperation can be advanced and solidified (see Figure 8.1, section i.). Within this 
cooperation, the separate security-identities of each agency – as analysed in chapters 5, 6 
and 7 – was analysed in order to determine the overlap of specific socio-political interests 
(see Figure 8.1, section ii.). These factors not only determine the possible depth of 
dialogue, but also create a specific sub-regional security culture (see Figure 8.1, section 
iii). However, this thesis has not sufficiently demonstrated that self-interest can become 
secondary to collective-interest in a decision-making capacity; rather, it is assumed (see 
Figure 8.1, section iv). Exploring the link between collective-interests and decision 
making within a regional setting is certainly an area of research that would advance the 
theory of constructivism.  
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Figure 8.1: Constructivist model of the European Union and New Zealand 
sub-regional security consultation process 
 
In connection to the above argument, a focus on what particular information and 
knowledge political actors have access to and decide to use, would be a worthy tangent to 
explore. The source of specific data that state actors use is a determining factor in how 
decisions are influenced. Analysing this specific area would illuminate yet another 
research avenue of how decision makers act and what motivates them within a sub-
regional locality. 
 
Particularly within the field of international relations, constructivist theory remains 
situated on the periphery of political philosophy. Indeed, if this study were analysed 
through the lens of a neorealist or a liberal theorist, the results would be notably different. 
For example, it could be supposed that a realist would see little value in the EU-NZ 
security relationship, as only a few, diminutive material results have emerged from the 
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security consultation. Realism places little value on the effects of socialisation and the 
formation of informal people-to-people links. Indeed, the notion and importance of 
values, images and norms are often sidelined by mainstream theorists, who prefer to 
analyse a variant set of traditional indicators. Constructivism does not directly adhere to 
realist notions such as anarchy, self-help, or power balancing, but chooses to analyse how 
state actors perceive these ideas: effectively taking a theoretical step back. In contrast to 
the theoretical approach of this study assuming reflectivist tendencies, a focus on material 
forces and nature would yield an alternative analysis vis à vis how ideas and interests can 
be defined. Therefore, a realist examination of the EU-NZ security relationship would be 
encouraged to gain an alternative perspective on the relationship.               
 
While this thesis set out the basic tenants of constructivism and its possible uses in its 
analysis of sub-regional dialogue, it does not look at the specific nature and consequences 
of the individuals who participate in the security-related Asia Pacific dialogue 
mechanisms. Analysing the correlation between those who directly interact with Asia 
Pacific nations and those who attend regional security meetings, would help in 
understanding the effectiveness of the dialogue process; continual interaction with the 
same people will enhance the relationship. However, if officials based in Europe attend 
high level security fora, and embassy staff located in the vicinity of the Asia Pacific 
region to not attend, the possibility of a deeper dialogue will remain limited. 
Additionally, the turn-over of diplomatic posts and other vocational positions will have 
an affect on the volume of dialogue. Common ideas and values, including the formation 
of social and political links, create an enhanced sub-regional setting that is highly 
determined by whether the same participants attend the same consultative process over a 
certain period of time. Who attends, the level of representation that exists, and the 
designated time of a particular posting will affect the volume of dialogue. Tracking the 
long-term associations of political actors involved with the EU-NZ security dialogue 
would provide an appropriate avenue for future research.  
 
In connection to who attends, the values that participants hold are directly relevant to the 
theoretical approach of this study. As discussed in the thesis, the regional security 
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outlook of New Zealand is determined by the leading political party: a change in power 
may mean an alteration in its values and approach to foreign affairs. For example, if the 
National party wins the next election, greater attention may be focussed on more 
traditional security elements, such as homeland security. Furthermore, as the values and 
norms that New Zealand officials adhere to are not set in any binding constitution, their 
values and norms could change over time, reducing or enhancing future security-related 
dialogue. EU values are less dynamic, as they are bound to official treaties that 
specifically reflect European values and norms. This being said, Member States’ 
influence over EU foreign affairs – particularly the larger states such as France, Germany 
or Britain – can have a significant affect on EU’s role in the Asia Pacific region. For 
example, bilateral negotiations with a particular South East Asian country may produce 
results that are estranged from an EU foreign policy objective. Increased transparency 
between Member States and EU institutions must continue for an effective CFSP in the 
Asia Pacific region for the future.  
 
8.2 Final Conclusions 
 
As transnational security challenges continue to infiltrate the Asia Pacific region and its 
actors’ consciousness, the need for regional solutions continues to be stressed by its 
allies. As noted in Chapter 3, over 300 security mechanisms exist within the Asia Pacific 
region which has generated a vast network of social and political links. The values 
inherent in many South East Asian and Pacific countries has, to a certain extent, 
prohibited effective regional responses to threats prioritised by the EU and New Zealand, 
such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, fundamentalism or corruption. Largely from a 
Western perspective, the slow evolution and pace of some of these mechanisms, for 
instance the ARF, has lead to a sense of frustration. However, it must be emphasised – 
particularly due to the colonial history of the region, enhancing the risk of a neo-colonial 
image – that the evolution of regional security institutions within the Asia Pacific region, 
must come from an internal impetus with merely external diplomatic support. The 
intricate network of political links generated through inter-subjective exchange will 
certainly encourage a greater cultural understanding and limit these nuanced frustrations.  
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Within this context, the EU and New Zealand have forged an array of dialogue 
mechanisms, forming a matrix that defines the EU-NZ security dialogue in the Asia 
Pacific region. This dialogue has contributed to a more stable, prosperous and safer 
environment in the region, achieved through: the promotion of values and norms, 
including liberal democracy, good governance, the rule of law and the positive effects of 
regionalism; the provision of substantial development aid to underdeveloped countries; 
supporting educational infrastructure and exchanges; and the financial and logistical 
support of regional security missions and EOMs. The effectiveness of regional security 
mechanisms such as the ARF – perceived as one of the most effective forms of security 
dialogue for New Zealand – and other more direct consultation methods, is limited or 
enhanced by perceptions. The value the EU and New Zealand place on dialogue 
mechanisms will determine the possible volume of interaction. With an understanding of 
the various facets of the EU-NZ security consultation, this research has explored the 
separate security-identity formulations of each actor in order to fully appreciate and 
uncover the realities of the dialogue processes. 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the volume of dialogue is determined by how closely 
aligned security cultures are when they interact with each other in a regional setting. A 
number of factors including historic dynamics, definitions of security, conceptualisations 
of the Asia Pacific region, normative values, and capabilities, make up a unique socio-
cultural milieu. This collection of factors forms a specific security-identity for both the 
EU and New Zealand. Analysing the EU-NZ security relationship through this particular 
lens has revealed a considerable number of similarities and subtle differences. A strong 
bond has been built through a collective understanding of common norms and values, 
which has been manifested in a myriad of joint activities. Other areas of cooperation such 
as the promotion of regionalism can distort the effectiveness of the security consultations. 
While these differences limit the volume of dialogue, it can also provide the context for 
discussion and social-learning, whereby a greater volume of dialogue can be formed. 
However, this is determined by the willingness of each actor to listen and acknowledge 
the importance of cultural values. For example, if the EU can take advantage of New 
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Zealand’s culture-based knowledge of the Asia Pacific region, the possibility for greater 
cooperation can be enhanced. 
 
The volume of dialogue will continue to be affected by a number of variables including 
capabilities, domestic politics or the amount of financial and logistical resources 
accredited towards the consultative process. However, through a continual process of 
regular dialogue, ranging from high level ministerial visits to informal dialogue between 
military personnel within the PSI, a greater appreciation for the other’s culture can be 
achieved and a more stable sub-regional identity can emerge. A constellation of factors 
will continue to alter perceptions, resulting in ever-changing and evolving security 
identities. This unavoidable dynamism stresses the importance of continual inter-
subjectivity within sub-regional dialogue mechanisms. Through the various consultative 
measures, the evolving identities can be understood and complement the EU-NZ security 
dialogue in the Asia Pacific region. The intricate and complex regional security 
architecture with in South East Asia and the Pacific continues to promote peace and 
stability in the region. With this system, the bourgeoning security consultation of the 
European Union and New Zealand – forged out of common perceptions and similar 
interests – continues to abridge the tyranny of distance.   
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